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Author:
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ISBN:
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Languages : en
Pages : 678
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 678
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Author: Mara Oliva
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319761951
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 230
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Book Description
In the 1950s, most of the American public opposed diplomatic and trade relations with Communist China; traditional historiography blames this widespread hostility for the tensions between China and the United States during Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency. In this book, Mara Oliva reconsiders the influence of U.S. public opinion on Sino-American relations, arguing that it is understudied and often misinterpreted. She shows how the Eisenhower administration’s hard line policy towards Beijing had been formulated in line with U.S. national security interests, not as a result of public pressure. However, the public did play a significant role in shaping the implementation, timing and political communication of Washington’s strategy, ultimately hampering relations with the Communist giant and seriously heightening the risk of nuclear conflict. Drawing together an extensive array of published and unpublished sources, this book offers a new prism for understanding one of the most difficult decades in the history of both countries.
Author: Nancy Bernkopf Tucker
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231159250
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 314
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Book Description
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker confronts the coldest period of the cold warÑthe moment in which personality, American political culture, public opinion, and high politics came together to define the Eisenhower AdministrationÕs policy toward China. A sophisticated, multidimensional account based on prodigious, cutting edge research, this volume convincingly portrays EisenhowerÕs private belief that close relations between the United States and the PeopleÕs Republic of China were inevitable and that careful consideration of the PRC should constitute a critical part of American diplomacy. Tucker provocatively argues that the Eisenhower AdministrationÕs hostile rhetoric and tough actions toward China obscure the presidentÕs actual views. Behind the scenes, Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, pursued a more nuanced approach, one better suited to ChinaÕs specific challenges and the stabilization of the global community. Tucker deftly explores the contradictions between Eisenhower and his advisorsÕ public and private positions. Her most powerful chapter centers on EisenhowerÕs recognition that rigid trade prohibitions would undermine the global postwar economic recovery and push China into a closer relationship with the Soviet Union. Ultimately, Tucker finds EisenhowerÕs strategic thinking on Europe and his fear of toxic, anticommunist domestic politics constrained his leadership, making a fundamental shift in U.S. policy toward China difficult if not impossible. Consequently, the president was unable to engage congress and the public effectively on China, ultimately failing to realize his own high standards as a leader.
Author: Justin E. Burch
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : China
Languages : en
Pages : 282
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Book Description
"This study examines the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55 and how the Eisenhower administration handled the imbroglio and attempts to explain why the crisis lasted for such a long period of time. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles believed that in international relations between adversaries, the number one reason for the start of wars was miscalculation by one side or the other. Yet throughout the fall of 1954 and into the summer of 1955, the presidential administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower made America's position with regards to the Republic of China (ROC) controlled offshore islands anything but clear to Mao, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), or the international community. Eisenhower and the National Security Council (NSC) were consistently caught between two opposing philosophies and political realities in its dealing with the crisis. International pressure from the British and a hostile domestic and global public opinion, kept America from publicly declaring that it would defend the offshore islands. The administrations fear of handing communism what was viewed as another victory in the Cold War and irrevocably damaging Nationalist troop morale on Taiwan kept Dulles and Eisenhower from formulating a publicly clear and unequivocal policy for Formosa, the Pescadores and the nationalist-held islands. This failure extended a confrontation for nearly a year that should have ended in a matter of days or weeks. There has, to this point, never been a monograph written specifically about the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55. However, the event is well covered by journal articles and chapters in books discussing US foreign Policy, US diplomacy, the Cold War, the Eisenhower administration, US-China relations, Military history, and a variety of other topics. While the Taiwan Straits Crisis is not now a major incident engrained in the American public's conscience, like World War II or the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is a standard case study that is nearly always mentioned in major academic reference works. The first historical accounts of the crisis focused on the belief that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles singlehandedly ran American foreign policy during his tenure. The historiographical interpretation settled on a perception that Dulles and the military pulled Eisenhower to an unnecessary ideological confrontation with Mao Zedong's Peoples Republic of China (PRC). This interpretation was largely dismissed during the 1960s and 1970s as research began to confirm that, although Dulles had a great deal of influence, it was in the end Eisenhower who made the final decisions. As Eisenhower era documents slowly became available to the public, the next generation of historians began to grapple with how the crisis unfolded and in what respect Cold War ideology governed how the White House made decisions. With the publication, in the 1980s, of the Foreign Relations of the United States, covering this period, historians like H.W. Brands interpreted the crisis through the prism of the Dulles and Eisenhower policy of Massive Retaliation and saw the crisis as a test of that policy. The next era of investigation into this Cold War case study came from historians, both from the east and west, who used Chinese documents to tell, for the first time, the PRC side of the crisis, adding to our overall knowledge of the event. This thesis is an attempt to merge all of these schools, along with new original research, to come up with a more complete understanding of why Eisenhower and Dulles made the decisions they did in the 1950s with regards to Taiwan and the Offshore islands. This project concludes that Dulles came into the Eisenhower administration with a clear idea of how to conduct foreign policy. The new secretary of state believed in clarity of design and purpose. If America was straight forward in what it wanted and what it would and would not do, then miscalculation by the enemy, in this case worldwide Communism, would be negated. The best way to avoid a big war in the calculation of Dulles was to avoid misunderstandings between nations. Unfortunately, the dynamics of the Cold War and the realities of the offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits kept Dulles from implementing what should have been a rational, even successful policy. Because the KMT government on Taiwan was wrapping up so much of its prestige into holding all of the territory it still controlled, The US believed it could not allow the offshore islands to fall and result in catastrophic consequences for the morale of the nationalist military and destabilize Jiang's government. If Taiwan fell to the Communists as a result, then it would serve as the first domino of western leaning democracies to crumble. Southeast Asia, Japan, the Philippines could be next and America would be endanger of losing the Cold War altogether. However, American allies like Great Britain would not support a war over the offshore islands and American public opinion was decidedly against another conflict in Asia so soon after the conclusion of the deeply unpopular Korean War. The Eisenhower administration had painted itself into an ideological corner that created longstanding tensions and crisis after crisis all because it could not make a clear decision on the status of Quemoy, Matsu, and the other ROC holdings along the mainland Chinese coast. As a result of these findings, this study focuses on the offshore islands and why the Eisenhower administration was unable to make a final decision on their status and thereby giving the world a clear understanding of where the United States stood. In addition this project also investigates the US-Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1954 and how it impacted this event more clearly than in previous works. For the first time, this endeavor takes the word of Eisenhower, Dulles, and the National Security Council when they stated that they could not allow the offshore islands to fall to the communists because it would damage the morale of ROC troops and the government of Jiang Jieshi. Furthermore, this thesis puts a new focus on the impact of British and international opposition to the United States position with regards to Quemoy and Matsu and explains how this opposition along with a lack of American domestic support, moderated the Eisenhower administration's actions and kept the US from going to war with the PRC. There are many opportunities for further research on this topic. One avenue would be to delve more thoroughly than this study does into the relationship between the White House and Congress and how House and Senate members affected the decision making process. The one major set of documents that remains classified, are National Security Administration documents that could have a wealth of information on what the intelligence was telling the administration with regards to the PRC. Also, along those lines an investigation into American support for raiding operations conducted by the ROC on the PRC could be of great value. Finally a project describing primarily the Joint Chiefs internal discussions and ultimate recommendations to the president would be a fascinating expose. Army Joint Chief General Mathew Ridgway was often at odds with the other chiefs on a variety of issues, the Taiwan Straits Crisis only being one of them."--Abstract.
Author: Kerry K. Gershaneck
Publisher: Independently Published
ISBN:
Category : China
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
"Political Warfare provides a well-researched and wide-ranging overview of the nature of the People's Republic of China (PRC) threat and the political warfare strategies, doctrines, and operational practices used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The author offers detailed and illuminating case studies of PRC political warfare operations designed to undermine Thailand, a U.S. treaty ally, and Taiwan, a close friend"--
Author: William I. Hitchcock
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
ISBN: 1451698437
Category : Biography & Autobiography
Languages : en
Pages : 895
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Book Description
The New York Times–bestselling biography: a “complete and powerful assessment” of Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency (Booklist, starred review). Drawing on newly declassified documents and thousands of pages of unpublished material, The Age of Eisenhower tells the story of a masterful president guiding the nation through the great crises of the 1950s, from McCarthyism and the Korean War through civil rights turmoil and Cold War conflicts. This is a portrait of a skilled leader who, despite his conservative inclinations, found a middle path through the bitter partisanship of his era. At home, Eisenhower affirmed the central elements of the New Deal, such as Social Security; fought the demagoguery of Senator Joseph McCarthy; and advanced the agenda of civil rights for African-Americans. Abroad, he ended the Korean War and avoided a new quagmire in Vietnam. Yet he also charted a significant expansion of America’s missile technology and deployed a vast array of covert operations around the world to confront the challenge of communism. As he left office, he cautioned Americans to remain alert to the dangers of a powerful military-industrial complex that could threaten their liberties. Today, presidential historians rank Eisenhower fifth on the list of great presidents, and William Hitchcock’s “rich narrative” shows us why Ike’s stock has risen so high. He was a gifted leader, a decent man of humble origins who used his powers to advance the welfare of all Americans (The Wall Street Journal).
Author: Bill Gertz
Publisher: Simon and Schuster
ISBN: 1621571157
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 337
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Book Description
The devastating terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and America's first domestic bio-terrorism mail attacks have shifted America's attention and resources to the immediate threat of international terrorism. But we shouldn't be fooled. Since the publication of the hardcover edition of The China Threat in November of 2000, one thing remains very much the same: the People's Republic of China is the most serious long-term national security challenge to the United States. In fact, after the events of September 11, the China threat should seem all the more real, for Communist China is one of the most important backers of states that support international terrorism. —From the new introduction by the author
Author: Shirley A. Kan
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1437988083
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 86
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Book Description
Despite apparently consistent statements in 4 decades, the U.S. ¿one China¿ policy concerning Taiwan remains somewhat ambiguous and subject to different interpretations. Apart from questions about what the ¿one China¿ policy entails, issues have arisen about whether U.S. Presidents have stated clear positions and have changed or should change policy, affecting U.S. interests in security and democracy. Contents of this report: (1) U.S. Policy on ¿One China¿: Has U.S. Policy Changed?; Overview of Policy Issues; (2) Highlights of Key Statements by Washington, Beijing, and Taipei: Statements During the Admin. of Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, George W. Bush, Clinton, and Obama. A print on demand report.
Author: Andrew S. Crines
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319685457
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 336
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Book Description
This is the first thorough and systematic interrogation of Republican Party oratory and rhetoric that examines a series of leading figures in American conservative politics. It asks: How do leading Republican Party figures communicate with and influence their audiences?; What makes a successful speech, and why do some speeches fail to resonate? Most importantly, it also investigates why orators use different styles of communication with different audiences, such as the Senate, party conventions, public meetings, and through the media. By doing so it shines important new light into conservative politics from the era of Eisenhower to the more brutal politics of Donald Trump. The book will appeal to students and scholars across the fields of US politics, contemporary US history, and rhetoric and communication studies.
Author: Robert S. Ross
Publisher: BRILL
ISBN: 1684173590
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 532
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Book Description
The twelve essays in this volume underscore the similarities between Chinese and American approaches to bilateral diplomacy and between their perceptions of each other’s policy-making motivations. Much of the literature on U.S.–China relations posits that each side was motivated either by ideologically informed interests or by ideological assumptions about its counterpart. But as these contributors emphasize, newly accessible archives suggest rather that both Beijing and Washington developed a responsive and tactically adaptable foreign policy. Each then adjusted this policy in response to changing international circumstances and changing assessments of its counterpart’s policies. Motivated less by ideology than by pragmatic national security concerns, each assumed that the other faced similar considerations.
