Author: Torsten Persson
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262661928
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 324
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Book Description
The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.
Author: Daron Acemoglu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Constitutions
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
In this essay I review the new book by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions, which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules. I also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of popular empirical strategies in the newly emerging field of comparative political economy.
Author: Lorenz Blume
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
Author: Martin Ardanaz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Book Description
According to an influential theoretical argument, presidential systems tend to present smaller governments because the separation between those who decide the size of the fiscal purse and those who allocate it creates incentives for lower public expenditures. In practice, forms of government vary greatly, and budget institutions -the rules according to which budgets are drafted, approved, and implemented- are one (of many) drivers of such variation. This paper argues that under more hierarchical budget rules, presidential and parliamentary systems generate a similar incentive structure for the executive branch in shaping the size of government. This hypothesis is tested on a broad cross-section of countries, presidentialism is found to have a negative impact on government size only when executive discretion in the budget process is low (that is, in a context of separation of powers). However, the negative effect of presidentialism on expenditures vanishes or is even reversed when the executive`s discretion over the budget process is higher. Hence, budget institutions that impose restrictions on the legislature`s ability to amend budget proposals can make political regimes look more alike in terms of fiscal outcomes.
Author: Germán Caruso
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 37
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Book Description
The understanding of the economic effect of formal institutional rules has progressed substantially in recent decades. These formal analyses have tended to take for granted that institutional arenas such as Congress are the places where decision-making takes place. That is a good approximation in some cases (such as many developed countries today) but not in others. If countries differ in how institutionalized their policymaking is, it is possible that the impact of formal political rules on policy outcomes might depend on that. This paper explores that hypothesis and finds that some important claims regarding the impact of constitutions on policy outcomes do not hold for countries in which institutionalization is low. The findings suggest the need to develop a broader class of policymaking models in which the degree to which decision-making follows “the rules” is also endogenized.
Author: Katarzyna Metelska-Szaniawska
Publisher: Polish Studies in Economics
ISBN: 9783631669532
Category : Constitutional law
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Constitutions and economic policy - the theoretical nexus -- Post-socialist constitutions in a nutshell -- Regression analyses of economic effects of post-socialist constitutions -- The synthetic control approach to estimating economic effects of post-socialist constitutions -- An evolutionary perspective on the role of post-socialist constitutions
Author: Philippe De Donder
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Hajo Christian Schmitt
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This Master's Thesis analyses the process of property rights definition and enforcement at democratization and its consequences for economic growth in the short and medium term. Property rights are defined as de-jure property rights and enforced according to the level of rule of law. Definition and enforcement of property rights constitute the de-facto property rights. The level of de-facto property rights influences significantly the economic performance of countries after democratization. A theoretical model for the determination of the constitu- tional and institutional parameters associated with the definition of de-facto property rights is developed in this thesis. A close relation to the prevailing level of social inequality in the coun- try and the development of redistributive institutions after democratization is predicted. These propositions are tested against a dataset of countries at democratization and their economic effects are evaluated.
Author: Tom Ginsburg
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9781108729208
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 342
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Book Description
Many constitutions include provisions intended to limit the discretion of governments in economic policy. In times of financial crises, such provisions often come under pressure as a result of calls for exceptional responses to crisis situations. This volume assesses the ability of constitutional orders all over the world to cope with financial crises, and the demands for emergency powers that typically accompany them. Bringing together a variety of perspectives from legal scholars, economists, and political scientists, this volume traces the long-run implications of financial crises for constitutional order. In exploring the theoretical and practical problems raised by the constitutionalization of economic policy during times of severe crisis, this volume showcases an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency.
Author: Anna Chadwick
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1000653617
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 197
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Book Description
This interdisciplinary collection examines the significance of constitutions in setting the terms and conditions upon which market economies operate. With some important exceptions, most notably from the tradition of Latin American constitutionalism, scholarship on constitutional law has paid negligible attention to questions of how constitutions relate to economic phenomena. A considerable body of literature has debated the due limits of the exercise of executive and legislative power, and discussions about legitimacy, democracy, and the adjudication of rights (civil and political, and socioeconomic) abound, yet scant attention has been paid by constitutional lawyers to the ways in which constitutions may protect and empower economic actors, and to how constitutions might influence the regulation and governance of specific markets. The contributors to this collection mobilize insights from other disciplines – including economic theory, history, and sociology – and consider the relationship between constitutional frameworks and bodies of law – including property law, criminal law, tax law, financial regulation, and human rights law – to advance understanding of how constitutions relate to markets and to the political economy. This book’s analysis of the role constitutions play in shaping markets will appeal to scholars and students in law, economics, history, politics, and sociology.
