The Coordinated Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Product Markets PDF Download
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Author: Kai-Uwe Kühn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
Author: Kai-Uwe Kühn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 48
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Kai-Uwe Kühn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
Author: Gregory Werden
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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Book Description
Author: David T. Levy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 66
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Book Description
Author: Daniel Gore
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107007720
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 559
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Book Description
Provides a clear, concise and practical overview of the key economic techniques and evidence employed in European merger control.
Author: Peter Davis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Mergers can be blocked if they increase the likelihood of coordination. This paper presents the first empirical coordinated effects merger simulation model in a differentiated productmarket. We study the network server market. We find that the incentives to coordinateactually fell as a result of the merger between Hewlett Packard (HP) and Compaq and show,contrary to conventional economic logic, that incentives to coordinate will ceteris paribusoften fall in this way after a merger. We extend the model to empirically examine the impactof multi-market contact, a competitive fringe, and the presence of an antitrust authorityimposing punishments on tacit colluders in the form of fines.
Author: F. William MacElroy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 17
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Book Description
Author: Malcolm B. Coate
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 43
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Book Description
The Merger Guidelines highlight unilateral effects analysis as the most prominent theory of concern in differentiated markets. This study evaluates the Federal Trade Commission's historical record to determine what considerations drive the review process, if these considerations depend on the type of differentiated market under review and if policy has changed much over the 20 years since the 1992 Merger Guidelines were issued. Our results highlight the importance of both direct and indirect proxies for diversion, as well as entry and effects evidence. Moreover, an ability to focus the analysis on price-based competition leads to predictions of significantly higher estimates for the probability of a unilateral effects finding, especially when repositioning is difficult. Little change in policy is identified over the 20-year period of the study, although it is possible that the discussion of effects evidence in the 2010 Merger Guidelines has increased the relevance of this consideration.
Author: Kai-Uwe Kühn
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consolidation and merger of corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Book Description
Author: Tommaso M. Valletti
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 43
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Book Description
On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, this article provides an overview of the state of economic analysis of unilateral effects in mergers with differentiated products. Drawing on our experience with merger enforcement in Europe, we discuss both static and dynamic competition, with a special emphasis on the calibration of competitive effects. We also discuss the role of market shares and structural presumptions in differentiated product markets.
