Author: John Earman
Publisher: U of Minnesota Press
ISBN: 0816611599
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 494
Book Description
Testing Scientific Theories was first published in 1984. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. Since much of a scientist's work consists of constructing arguments to show how experiments and observation bear on a particular theory, the methodologies of theory testing and their philosophical underpinnings are of vital concern to philosophers of science. Confirmation of scientific theories is the topic of Clark Glymour's important book Theory and Evidence,published in 1980. His negative thesis is that the two most widely discussed accounts of the methodology of theory testing - hypothetico-deductivism and Bayesianism - are flawed. The issues Glymour raises and his alternative "bootstrapping" method provided the focus for a conference sponsored by the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science and for this book. As editor John Earman says in his preface, the papers presented in Testing Scientific Theories germinate so many new ideas that philosophers of science will reap the harvest for years to come. Topics covered include a discussion of Glymour's bootstrapping theory of confirmation, the Bayesian perspective and the problems of old evidence, evidence and explanation, historical case studies, alternative views on testing theories, and testing particular theories, including psychoanalytic hypotheses and hypotheses about the completeness of the fossil record.
Testing Scientific Theories
Author: John Earman
Publisher: U of Minnesota Press
ISBN: 0816611599
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 494
Book Description
Testing Scientific Theories was first published in 1984. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. Since much of a scientist's work consists of constructing arguments to show how experiments and observation bear on a particular theory, the methodologies of theory testing and their philosophical underpinnings are of vital concern to philosophers of science. Confirmation of scientific theories is the topic of Clark Glymour's important book Theory and Evidence,published in 1980. His negative thesis is that the two most widely discussed accounts of the methodology of theory testing - hypothetico-deductivism and Bayesianism - are flawed. The issues Glymour raises and his alternative "bootstrapping" method provided the focus for a conference sponsored by the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science and for this book. As editor John Earman says in his preface, the papers presented in Testing Scientific Theories germinate so many new ideas that philosophers of science will reap the harvest for years to come. Topics covered include a discussion of Glymour's bootstrapping theory of confirmation, the Bayesian perspective and the problems of old evidence, evidence and explanation, historical case studies, alternative views on testing theories, and testing particular theories, including psychoanalytic hypotheses and hypotheses about the completeness of the fossil record.
Publisher: U of Minnesota Press
ISBN: 0816611599
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 494
Book Description
Testing Scientific Theories was first published in 1984. Minnesota Archive Editions uses digital technology to make long-unavailable books once again accessible, and are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions. Since much of a scientist's work consists of constructing arguments to show how experiments and observation bear on a particular theory, the methodologies of theory testing and their philosophical underpinnings are of vital concern to philosophers of science. Confirmation of scientific theories is the topic of Clark Glymour's important book Theory and Evidence,published in 1980. His negative thesis is that the two most widely discussed accounts of the methodology of theory testing - hypothetico-deductivism and Bayesianism - are flawed. The issues Glymour raises and his alternative "bootstrapping" method provided the focus for a conference sponsored by the Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science and for this book. As editor John Earman says in his preface, the papers presented in Testing Scientific Theories germinate so many new ideas that philosophers of science will reap the harvest for years to come. Topics covered include a discussion of Glymour's bootstrapping theory of confirmation, the Bayesian perspective and the problems of old evidence, evidence and explanation, historical case studies, alternative views on testing theories, and testing particular theories, including psychoanalytic hypotheses and hypotheses about the completeness of the fossil record.
Understanding, Explanation, and Scientific Knowledge
Author: Kareem Khalifa
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107195632
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 265
Book Description
The first comprehensive exploration of the nature and value of understanding, addressing burgeoning debates in epistemology and philosophy of science.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107195632
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 265
Book Description
The first comprehensive exploration of the nature and value of understanding, addressing burgeoning debates in epistemology and philosophy of science.
Theories of Scientific Method
Author: Robert Nola
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317493486
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 343
Book Description
What is it to be scientific? Is there such a thing as scientific method? And if so, how might such methods be justified? Robert Nola and Howard Sankey seek to provide answers to these fundamental questions in their exploration of the major recent theories of scientific method. Although for many scientists their understanding of method is something they just pick up in the course of being trained, Nola and Sankey argue that it is possible to be explicit about what this tacit understanding of method is, rather than leave it as some unfathomable mystery. They robustly defend the idea that there is such a thing as scientific method and show how this might be legitimated. This book begins with the question of what methodology might mean and explores the notions of values, rules and principles, before investigating how methodologists have sought to show that our scientific methods are rational. Part 2 of this book sets out some principles of inductive method and examines its alternatives including abduction, IBE, and hypothetico-deductivism. Part 3 introduces probabilistic modes of reasoning, particularly Bayesianism in its various guises, and shows how it is able to give an account of many of the values and rules of method. Part 4 considers the ideas of philosophers who have proposed distinctive theories of method such as Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend and Part 5 continues this theme by considering philosophers who have proposed naturalised theories of method such as Quine, Laudan and Rescher. This book offers readers a comprehensive introduction to the idea of scientific method and a wide-ranging discussion of how historians of science, philosophers of science and scientists have grappled with the question over the last fifty years.
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317493486
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 343
Book Description
What is it to be scientific? Is there such a thing as scientific method? And if so, how might such methods be justified? Robert Nola and Howard Sankey seek to provide answers to these fundamental questions in their exploration of the major recent theories of scientific method. Although for many scientists their understanding of method is something they just pick up in the course of being trained, Nola and Sankey argue that it is possible to be explicit about what this tacit understanding of method is, rather than leave it as some unfathomable mystery. They robustly defend the idea that there is such a thing as scientific method and show how this might be legitimated. This book begins with the question of what methodology might mean and explores the notions of values, rules and principles, before investigating how methodologists have sought to show that our scientific methods are rational. Part 2 of this book sets out some principles of inductive method and examines its alternatives including abduction, IBE, and hypothetico-deductivism. Part 3 introduces probabilistic modes of reasoning, particularly Bayesianism in its various guises, and shows how it is able to give an account of many of the values and rules of method. Part 4 considers the ideas of philosophers who have proposed distinctive theories of method such as Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend and Part 5 continues this theme by considering philosophers who have proposed naturalised theories of method such as Quine, Laudan and Rescher. This book offers readers a comprehensive introduction to the idea of scientific method and a wide-ranging discussion of how historians of science, philosophers of science and scientists have grappled with the question over the last fifty years.
Quantum Measure Theory
Author: J. Hamhalter
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401701199
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 412
Book Description
This book is the first systematic treatment of measures on projection lattices of von Neumann algebras. It presents significant recent results in this field. One part is inspired by the Generalized Gleason Theorem on extending measures on the projection lattices of von Neumann algebras to linear functionals. Applications of this principle to various problems in quantum physics are considered (hidden variable problem, Wigner type theorems, decoherence functional, etc.). Another part of the monograph deals with a fascinating interplay of algebraic properties of the projection lattice with the continuity of measures (the analysis of Jauch-Piron states, independence conditions in quantum field theory, etc.). These results have no direct analogy in the standard measure and probability theory. On the theoretical physics side, they are instrumental in recovering technical assumptions of the axiomatics of quantum theories only by considering algebraic properties of finitely additive measures (states) on quantum propositions.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401701199
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 412
Book Description
This book is the first systematic treatment of measures on projection lattices of von Neumann algebras. It presents significant recent results in this field. One part is inspired by the Generalized Gleason Theorem on extending measures on the projection lattices of von Neumann algebras to linear functionals. Applications of this principle to various problems in quantum physics are considered (hidden variable problem, Wigner type theorems, decoherence functional, etc.). Another part of the monograph deals with a fascinating interplay of algebraic properties of the projection lattice with the continuity of measures (the analysis of Jauch-Piron states, independence conditions in quantum field theory, etc.). These results have no direct analogy in the standard measure and probability theory. On the theoretical physics side, they are instrumental in recovering technical assumptions of the axiomatics of quantum theories only by considering algebraic properties of finitely additive measures (states) on quantum propositions.
The Logic in Philosophy of Science
Author: Hans Halvorson
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107110998
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 305
Book Description
Reconsiders the role of formal logic in the analytic approach to philosophy, using cutting-edge mathematical techniques to elucidate twentieth-century debates.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107110998
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 305
Book Description
Reconsiders the role of formal logic in the analytic approach to philosophy, using cutting-edge mathematical techniques to elucidate twentieth-century debates.
Completeness and Reduction in Algebraic Complexity Theory
Author: Peter Bürgisser
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3662041790
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 174
Book Description
This is a thorough and comprehensive treatment of the theory of NP-completeness in the framework of algebraic complexity theory. Coverage includes Valiant's algebraic theory of NP-completeness; interrelations with the classical theory as well as the Blum-Shub-Smale model of computation, questions of structural complexity; fast evaluation of representations of general linear groups; and complexity of immanants.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3662041790
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 174
Book Description
This is a thorough and comprehensive treatment of the theory of NP-completeness in the framework of algebraic complexity theory. Coverage includes Valiant's algebraic theory of NP-completeness; interrelations with the classical theory as well as the Blum-Shub-Smale model of computation, questions of structural complexity; fast evaluation of representations of general linear groups; and complexity of immanants.
Models and Methods in the Philosophy of Science: Selected Essays
Author: Patrick Suppes
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401723001
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 506
Book Description
The thirty-one papers collected in this volume represent most of the arti cles that I have published in the philosophy of science and related founda tional areas of science since 1970. The present volume is a natural succes sor to Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science, a collection of my articles published in 1969 by Reidel (now a part of Kluwer). The articles are arranged under five main headings. Part I contains six articles on general methodology. The topics range from formal methods to the plurality of science. Part II contains six articles on causality and explanation. The emphasis is almost entirely on probabilistic approaches. Part III contains six articles on probability and measurement. The impor tance of representation theorems for both probability and measurement is stressed. Part IV contains five articles on the foundations of physics. The first three articles are concerned with action at a distance and space and time, the last two with quantum mechanics. Part V contains eight articles on the foundations of psychology. This is the longest part and the articles reflect my continuing strong interest in the nature of learning and perception. Within each part the articles are arranged chronologically. I turn now to a more detailed overview of the content. The first article of Part I concerns the role of formal methods in the philosophy of science. Here I discuss what is the new role for formal methods now that the imperialism of logical positivism has disappeared.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401723001
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 506
Book Description
The thirty-one papers collected in this volume represent most of the arti cles that I have published in the philosophy of science and related founda tional areas of science since 1970. The present volume is a natural succes sor to Studies in the Methodology and Foundations of Science, a collection of my articles published in 1969 by Reidel (now a part of Kluwer). The articles are arranged under five main headings. Part I contains six articles on general methodology. The topics range from formal methods to the plurality of science. Part II contains six articles on causality and explanation. The emphasis is almost entirely on probabilistic approaches. Part III contains six articles on probability and measurement. The impor tance of representation theorems for both probability and measurement is stressed. Part IV contains five articles on the foundations of physics. The first three articles are concerned with action at a distance and space and time, the last two with quantum mechanics. Part V contains eight articles on the foundations of psychology. This is the longest part and the articles reflect my continuing strong interest in the nature of learning and perception. Within each part the articles are arranged chronologically. I turn now to a more detailed overview of the content. The first article of Part I concerns the role of formal methods in the philosophy of science. Here I discuss what is the new role for formal methods now that the imperialism of logical positivism has disappeared.
Models and Idealizations in Science
Author: Alejandro Cassini
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030658023
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 270
Book Description
This book provides both an introduction to the philosophy of scientific modeling and a contribution to the discussion and clarification of two recent philosophical conceptions of models: artifactualism and fictionalism. These can be viewed as different stances concerning the standard representationalist account of scientific models. By better understanding these two alternative views, readers will gain a deeper insight into what a model is as well as how models function in different sciences. Fictionalism has been a traditional epistemological stance related to antirealist construals of laws and theories, such as instrumentalism and inferentialism. By contrast, the more recent fictional view of models holds that scientific models must be conceived of as the same kind of entities as literary characters and places. This approach is essentially an answer to the ontological question concerning the nature of models, which in principle is not incompatible with a representationalist account of the function of models. The artifactual view of models is an approach according to which scientific models are epistemic artifacts, whose main function is not to represent the phenomena but rather to provide epistemic access to them. It can be conceived of as a non-representationalist and pragmatic account of modeling, which does not intend to focus on the ontology of models but rather on the ways they are built and used for different purposes. The different essays address questions such as the artifactual view of idealization, the use of information theory to elucidate the concepts of abstraction and idealization, the deidealization of models, the nature of scientific fictions, the structural account of representation and the ontological status of structures, the role of surrogative reasoning with models, and the use of models for explaining and predicting physical phenomena.
Publisher: Springer Nature
ISBN: 3030658023
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 270
Book Description
This book provides both an introduction to the philosophy of scientific modeling and a contribution to the discussion and clarification of two recent philosophical conceptions of models: artifactualism and fictionalism. These can be viewed as different stances concerning the standard representationalist account of scientific models. By better understanding these two alternative views, readers will gain a deeper insight into what a model is as well as how models function in different sciences. Fictionalism has been a traditional epistemological stance related to antirealist construals of laws and theories, such as instrumentalism and inferentialism. By contrast, the more recent fictional view of models holds that scientific models must be conceived of as the same kind of entities as literary characters and places. This approach is essentially an answer to the ontological question concerning the nature of models, which in principle is not incompatible with a representationalist account of the function of models. The artifactual view of models is an approach according to which scientific models are epistemic artifacts, whose main function is not to represent the phenomena but rather to provide epistemic access to them. It can be conceived of as a non-representationalist and pragmatic account of modeling, which does not intend to focus on the ontology of models but rather on the ways they are built and used for different purposes. The different essays address questions such as the artifactual view of idealization, the use of information theory to elucidate the concepts of abstraction and idealization, the deidealization of models, the nature of scientific fictions, the structural account of representation and the ontological status of structures, the role of surrogative reasoning with models, and the use of models for explaining and predicting physical phenomena.
Philosophy of Science: The Key Thinkers
Author: James Robert Brown
Publisher: A&C Black
ISBN: 1441142002
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 290
Book Description
A guide to the key figures in the Philosophy of Science from Plato and Aristotle through to Popper, Puttnam and Cartwright.
Publisher: A&C Black
ISBN: 1441142002
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 290
Book Description
A guide to the key figures in the Philosophy of Science from Plato and Aristotle through to Popper, Puttnam and Cartwright.
The Completeness of Scientific Theories
Author: Martin Carrier
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401109109
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 296
Book Description
Earlier in this century, many philosophers of science (for example, Rudolf Carnap) drew a fairly sharp distinction between theory and observation, between theoretical terms like 'mass' and 'electron', and observation terms like 'measures three meters in length' and 'is _2° Celsius'. By simply looking at our instruments we can ascertain what numbers our measurements yield. Creatures like mass are different: we determine mass by calculation; we never directly observe a mass. Nor an electron: this term is introduced in order to explain what we observe. This (once standard) distinction between theory and observation was eventually found to be wanting. First, if the distinction holds, it is difficult to see what can characterize the relationship between theory :md observation. How can theoretical terms explain that which is itself in no way theorized? The second point leads out of the first: are not the instruments that provide us with observational material themselves creatures of theory? Is it really possible to have an observation language that is entirely barren of theory? The theory-Iadenness of observation languages is now an accept ed feature of the logic of science. Many regard such dependence of observation on theory as a virtue. If our instruments of observation do not derive their meaning from theories, whence comes that meaning? Surely - in science - we have nothing else but theories to tell us what to try to observe.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401109109
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 296
Book Description
Earlier in this century, many philosophers of science (for example, Rudolf Carnap) drew a fairly sharp distinction between theory and observation, between theoretical terms like 'mass' and 'electron', and observation terms like 'measures three meters in length' and 'is _2° Celsius'. By simply looking at our instruments we can ascertain what numbers our measurements yield. Creatures like mass are different: we determine mass by calculation; we never directly observe a mass. Nor an electron: this term is introduced in order to explain what we observe. This (once standard) distinction between theory and observation was eventually found to be wanting. First, if the distinction holds, it is difficult to see what can characterize the relationship between theory :md observation. How can theoretical terms explain that which is itself in no way theorized? The second point leads out of the first: are not the instruments that provide us with observational material themselves creatures of theory? Is it really possible to have an observation language that is entirely barren of theory? The theory-Iadenness of observation languages is now an accept ed feature of the logic of science. Many regard such dependence of observation on theory as a virtue. If our instruments of observation do not derive their meaning from theories, whence comes that meaning? Surely - in science - we have nothing else but theories to tell us what to try to observe.