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Author: James R. Barth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 55
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Book Description
Financial system policymakers around the world continue to respond vigorously to the problems in financial markets, financial institutions, and financial system regulation and supervision brought into high relief by the global financial crisis. However, the overall understanding of what those responses are remains rather vague and limited. Our study contributes to improving the state of knowledge by focusing on one particularly relevant issue, the regulation and supervision of systemically important banks (SIBs). The heart of our contribution is the presentation of information heretofore obscure, or new, or both. Our approach is to develop two complementary perspectives. The first perspective is what we have characterized as "the global view." That discussion begins by noting that the G20 and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) are the architects of the most significant agenda in the world to reform the global financial system, including in particular as that system operates through systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). We explain what the G20 and the FSB are, how they came to occupy the driver's seat so to speak, and the evolution of their major financial system reform initiatives since the darkest days of the global financial crisis. Our discussion highlights SIFIs initiatives, emphasizing in particular those pertaining to global systemically important financial institutions/banks (G-SIFIs and G-SIBs). Our second perspective is a country-specific one. It starts by making the important observation that while most of the largest banks around the world have not been designated as "globally" systemically important, they are nevertheless systemically important when considered in a national or "domestic" context. Under those circumstances it is therefore fortunate that, due to recent World Bank efforts, a large set of information exists about the regulation and supervision of SIBs. Our study summarizes and highlights the new data collected by the World Bank on the post-crisis regulation and supervision of SIBs by 135 countries around the world. Broadly, that analysis shows that countries are more similar than different in the measures they have adopted for regulating and supervising SIBs. We conclude our study by suggesting that, although that fact should aid countries in coordinating policies internationally, there is a very long way to go in that respect.
Author: James R. Barth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 55
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Book Description
Financial system policymakers around the world continue to respond vigorously to the problems in financial markets, financial institutions, and financial system regulation and supervision brought into high relief by the global financial crisis. However, the overall understanding of what those responses are remains rather vague and limited. Our study contributes to improving the state of knowledge by focusing on one particularly relevant issue, the regulation and supervision of systemically important banks (SIBs). The heart of our contribution is the presentation of information heretofore obscure, or new, or both. Our approach is to develop two complementary perspectives. The first perspective is what we have characterized as "the global view." That discussion begins by noting that the G20 and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) are the architects of the most significant agenda in the world to reform the global financial system, including in particular as that system operates through systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). We explain what the G20 and the FSB are, how they came to occupy the driver's seat so to speak, and the evolution of their major financial system reform initiatives since the darkest days of the global financial crisis. Our discussion highlights SIFIs initiatives, emphasizing in particular those pertaining to global systemically important financial institutions/banks (G-SIFIs and G-SIBs). Our second perspective is a country-specific one. It starts by making the important observation that while most of the largest banks around the world have not been designated as "globally" systemically important, they are nevertheless systemically important when considered in a national or "domestic" context. Under those circumstances it is therefore fortunate that, due to recent World Bank efforts, a large set of information exists about the regulation and supervision of SIBs. Our study summarizes and highlights the new data collected by the World Bank on the post-crisis regulation and supervision of SIBs by 135 countries around the world. Broadly, that analysis shows that countries are more similar than different in the measures they have adopted for regulating and supervising SIBs. We conclude our study by suggesting that, although that fact should aid countries in coordinating policies internationally, there is a very long way to go in that respect.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic books
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Mr.John C Caparusso
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1513525255
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 34
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Book Description
The Global Financial Crisis unleashed changes in the operating and regulatory environments for large international banks. This paper proposes a novel taxonomy to identify and track business model evolution for the 30 Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). Drawing from banks’ reporting, it identifies strategies along four dimensions –consolidated lines of business and geographic orientation, and the funding models and legal entity structures of international operations. G-SIBs have adjusted their business models, especially by reducing market intensity. While G-SIBs have maintained international orientation, pressures on funding models and entity structures could affect the efficiency of capital flows through the bank channel.
Author: Tryggvi Gudmundsson
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1475554702
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
The post-crisis financial sector framework reform remains incomplete. While capital and liquidity requirements have been strengthened, doubts remain over other aspects, including the fact that expectations of government support for systemically-important banks (SIBs) remain intact. In this paper, we use a jump diffusion option-pricing approach to provide estimates of implicit subsidies gained by these banks due to the expectation of protection to creditors provided by governments. While these subsidies have declined in the post-crisis era as volatility has declined and capital levels have increased, they remain non-trivial. Even conservative parameterizations of default and loss probabilities lead to macroeconomically significant figures.
Author: Mustafa Akcay
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 223
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Book Description
My dissertation topic is on the impact of changes in the monetary policy interest rate target on bank distress and systemic risk in the U.S. banking system. The financial crisis of 2007-2009 had devastating effects on the banking system worldwide. The feeble performance of financial institutions during the crisis heightened the necessity of understanding systemic risk exhibited the critical role of monitoring the banking system, and strongly necessitated quantification of the risks to which banks are exposed, for incorporation in policy formulation. In the aftermath of the crisis, US bank regulators focused on overhauling the then existing regulatory framework in order to provide comprehensive capital buffers against bank losses. In this context, the Basel Committee proposed in 2011, the Basel III framework in order to strengthen the regulatory capital structure as a buffer against bank losses. The reform under Basel III framework aimed at raising the quality and the quantity of regulatory capital base and enhancing the risk coverage of the capital structure. Separately, US bank regulators adopted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) to implement stress tests on systemically important bank holding companies (SIBs). Concerns about system-wide distress have broadened the debate on banking regulation towards a macro prudential approach. In this context, limiting bank risk and systemic risk has become a prolific research field at the crossroads of banking, macroeconomics, econometrics, and network theory over the last decade (Kuritzkes et al., 2005; Goodhart and Sergoviano, 2008; Geluk et al., 2009; Acharya et al., 2010, 2017; Tarashev et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2012; Browless and Engle, 2012, 2017 and Cummins, 2014). The European Central Bank (ECB) (2010) defines systemic risk as a risk of financial instability "so widespread that it impairs the functioning of a financial system to the point where economic growth and welfare suffer materially." While US bank regulators and policy-makers have moved to strengthen the regulatory framework in the post-crisis period in order to prevent another financial crisis, a growing recent line of research has suggested that there is a significant link between monetary policy and bank distress (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999; Borio and Zhu, 2008; Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010; Delis and Kouretas, 2010; Gertler and Karadi, 2011; Delis et al., 2017). In my research, I examine the link between the monetary policy and bank distress. In the first chapter, I investigate the impact of the federal funds rate (FFR) changes on the banking system distress between 2001 and 2013 within an unrestricted vector auto-regression model. The Fed used FFR as a primary policy tool before the financial crisis of 2007-2009, but focused on quantitative easing (QE) during the crisis and post-crisis periods when the FFR hit the zero bound. I use the Taylor rule rate (TRR, 1993) as an "implied policy rate", instead of the FFR, to account for the impact of QE on the economy. The base model of distress includes three macroeconomic indicators-real GDP growth, inflation, and TRR-and a systemic risk indicator (Expected capital shortfall (ES)). I consider two model extensions; (i) I include a measure of bank lending standards to account for the changes in the systemic risk due to credit tightening, (ii) I replace inflation with house price growth rate to see if the results remain robust. Three main results can be drawn. First, the impulse response functions (IRFs) show that raising the monetary policy rate contributed to insolvency problems for the U.S. banks, with a one percentage point increase in the rate raising the banking systemic stress by 1.6 and 0.8 percentage points, respectively, in the base and extend models. Second, variance decomposition (VDs) analysis shows that up to ten percent of error variation in systemic risk indicator can be attributed to innovations in the policy rate in the extended model. Third, my results supplement the view that policy rate hikes led to housing bubble burst and contributed to the financial crisis of 2007-2009. This is an example for how monetary policy-making gets more complex and must be conducted with utmost caution if there is a bubble in the economy. In the second chapter, I examine the prevalence and asymmetry of the effects on bank distress from positive and negative shocks to the target fed fund rate (FFR) in the period leading to the financial crisis (2001-2008). A panel model with three blocks of control variables is used. The blocks include: positive/negative FFR shocks, macroeconomic drivers, and bank balance sheet indicators. A distress indicator similar to Texas Ratio is used to proxy distress. Shocks to FFR are defined along the lines suggested by Morgan (1993). Three main results are obtained. First, FFR shocks, either positive or negative, raise bank distress over the following year. Second, the magnitudes of the effects from positive and negative shocks are unequal (asymmetric); a 100 bps positive (negative) shock raises the bank distress indicator (scaled from 0 to 1) by 9 bps (3 bps) over the next year. Put differently, after a 100 bps positive (negative) shock, the probability of bankruptcy rises from 10% to 19% (13%). Third, expanding operations into non-banking activities by FHCs does not benefit them in terms of distress due to unanticipated changes in the FFR as FFR shocks (positive or negative) create similar levels of distress for BHCs and FHCs. In the third chapter, I explore the systemic risk contributions of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) from 2001 to 2015 by using the expected shortfall approach. Developed by analogy with the component expected shortfall concept, I decompose the aggregate systemic risk, as measured by expected shortfall, into several subgroups of banks by using publicly available balance sheet data to define the probability of bank default. The risk measure, thus, encompasses the entire universe of banks. I find that concentration of assets in a smaller number of larger banks raises systemic risk. The systemic risk contribution of banks designated as SIFIs increased sharply during the financial crisis and reached 74% at the end of 2015. Two-thirds of this risk contribution is attributed to the four largest banks in the U.S.: Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup and Wells Fargo. I also find that diversifying business operations by expanding into nontraditional operations does not reduce the systemic risk contribution of financial holding companies (FHCs). In general, FHCs are individually riskier than BHCs despite their more diversified basket of products; FHCs contribute a disproportionate amount to systemic risk given their size, all else being equal. I believe monetary policy-making in the last decade carries many lessons for policy makers. Particularly, the link between the monetary policy target rate and bank distress and systemic risk is an interesting topic by all accounts due to its implications and challenges (explained in more detail in first and second chapters). The literature studying the relation between bank distress and monetary policy is fairly small but developing fast. The models I investigate in my work are simple in many ways but they may serve as a basis for more sophisticated models.
Author: Marc Dobler
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1513567780
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 63
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Book Description
The global financial crisis (GFC) has renewed interest in emergency liquidity support (sometimes referred to as “Lender of Last Resort”) provided by central banks to financial institutions and challenged the traditional way of conducting these operations. Despite a vast literature on the topic, central bank approaches and practices vary considerably. In this paper we focus on, for the most part, the provision of idiosyncratic support, approaching it from an operational perspective; highlighting different approaches adopted by central banks; and also identifying some of the issues that arose during the GFC.
Author: José Vinãls
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484340949
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 27
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Book Description
The U.S., the U.K., and more recently, the E.U., have proposed policy measures directly targeting complexity and business structures of banks. Unlike other, price-based reforms (e.g., Basel 3 and G-SIFI surcharges), these proposals have been developed unilaterally with material differences in scope, design and implementation schedules. This may exacerbate cross-border regulatory arbitrage and put a further burden on consolidated supervision and cross-border resolution. This paper provides an analysis of the potential implications of implementing different structural policy measures. It proposes a pragmatic and coordinated approach to development of these policies to reduce risk of regulatory arbitrage and minimize unintended consequences. In doing so, it also aims to identify a set of common policy measures that countries could adopt to re-scope bank business models and corporate structures.
Author: Ms.Marina Moretti
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1513512277
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 88
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Book Description
This paper updates the IMF’s work on general principles, strategies, and techniques from an operational perspective in preparing for and managing systemic banking crises in light of the experiences and challenges faced during and since the global financial crisis. It summarizes IMF advice concerning these areas from staff of the IMF Monetary and Capital Markets Department (MCM), drawing on Executive Board Papers, IMF staff publications, and country documents (including program documents and technical assistance reports). Unless stated otherwise, the guidance is generally applicable across the IMF membership.
Author: Belinda Tracey
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking
Languages : en
Pages : 330
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Author: Mr.Stijn Claessens
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1484336658
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 39
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Book Description
We identify current challenges for creating stable, yet efficient financial systems using lessons from recent and past crises. Reforms need to start from three tenets: adopting a system-wide perspective explicitly aimed at addressing market failures; understanding and incorporating into regulations agents’ incentives so as to align them better with societies’ goals; and acknowledging that risks of crises will always remain, in part due to (unknown) unknowns – be they tipping points, fault lines, or spillovers. Corresponding to these three tenets, specific areas for further reforms are identified. Policy makers need to resist, however, fine-tuning regulations: a “do not harm” approach is often preferable. And as risks will remain, crisis management needs to be made an integral part of system design, not relegated to improvisation after the fact.
