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Author: Guido Vogt
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642201326
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 208
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Book Description
Information sharing is frequently promoted as a mean to improve the supply chain performance. This work shows the results of behavioral experiments, in which the participants share private information in order to influence the contract terms in a Just-in-Time environment. It is shown that the impact of information sharing is ambiguous, and dependent on several factors, such as contract flexibility and complexity or the interacting behavioral types. The experimental results form the basis for a behavioral principal-agent model that gives valuable insights on how the interaction of trust, trustworthiness and the information sharing strategy impacts the supply chain performance.
Author: Guido Vogt
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642201326
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 208
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Book Description
Information sharing is frequently promoted as a mean to improve the supply chain performance. This work shows the results of behavioral experiments, in which the participants share private information in order to influence the contract terms in a Just-in-Time environment. It is shown that the impact of information sharing is ambiguous, and dependent on several factors, such as contract flexibility and complexity or the interacting behavioral types. The experimental results form the basis for a behavioral principal-agent model that gives valuable insights on how the interaction of trust, trustworthiness and the information sharing strategy impacts the supply chain performance.
Author: Guido Vogt
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 9783642201318
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 181
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Book Description
Information sharing is frequently promoted as a mean to improve the supply chain performance. This work shows the results of behavioral experiments, in which the participants share private information in order to influence the contract terms in a Just-in-Time environment. It is shown that the impact of information sharing is ambiguous, and dependent on several factors, such as contract flexibility and complexity or the interacting behavioral types. The experimental results form the basis for a behavioral principal-agent model that gives valuable insights on how the interaction of trust, trustworthiness and the information sharing strategy impacts the supply chain performance.
Author: Guido Voigt
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 216
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Book Description
Author: Sridhar Tayur
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461549493
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 851
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Book Description
Quantitative models and computer-based tools are essential for making decisions in today's business environment. These tools are of particular importance in the rapidly growing area of supply chain management. This volume is a unified effort to provide a systematic summary of the large variety of new issues being considered, the new set of models being developed, the new techniques for analysis, and the computational methods that have become available recently. The volume's objective is to provide a self-contained, sophisticated research summary - a snapshot at this point of time - in the area of Quantitative Models for Supply Chain Management. While there are some multi-disciplinary aspects of supply chain management not covered here, the Editors and their contributors have captured many important developments in this rapidly expanding field. The 26 chapters can be divided into six categories. Basic Concepts and Technical Material (Chapters 1-6). The chapters in this category focus on introducing basic concepts, providing mathematical background and validating algorithmic tools to solve operational problems in supply chains. Supply Contracts (Chapters 7-10). In this category, the primary focus is on design and evaluation of supply contracts between independent agents in the supply chain. Value of Information (Chapters 11-13). The chapters in this category explicitly model the effect of information on decision-making and on supply chain performance. Managing Product Variety (Chapters 16-19). The chapters in this category analyze the effects of product variety and the different strategies to manage it. International Operations (Chapters 20-22). The three chapters in this category provide an overview of research in the emerging area of International Operations. Conceptual Issues and New Challenges (Chapters 23-27). These chapters outline a variety of frameworks that can be explored and used in future research efforts. This volume can serve as a graduate text, as a reference for researchers and as a guide for further development of this field.
Author: M. Çakanyıldırım
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
We analyze a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a retailer. The supplier's unit production cost, which characterizes his type, is only privately known to him. When trading with the retailer, the supplier demands a reservation profit that depends on his unit production cost. We model this problem as a game of adverse selection. In this model, the retailer offers a menu of contracts, each of which consists of two parameters: the ordering quantity and the supplier's share of the channel profit. We show that the optimal contract depends critically on a surrogate measure. This measure represents the size of the outside market that the supplier may serve if not trading with the retailer. An important implication from our analysis is that information asymmetry alone does not necessarily induce loss in channel efficiency. The optimal contract can coordinate the supply chain as long as the size of the outside market is comparable to the quantities required by the retailer. We further discuss the retailer's preference of the supplier's type under different market conditions, as well as evaluate the effects of the supplier's reservation profit, the retail price, and the demand uncertainty on the optimal contract.
Author: Harish Krishnan
Publisher: Now Pub
ISBN: 9781601985781
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 176
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Book Description
The Economic Foundations of Supply Chains Contracts is premised on the theme that as supply chain management moves from a focus on optimization problems to issues of coordination, a closer link to the underlying economic foundations is essential. This monograph offers a synthesis of the economic foundations of supply chain contracts. Accordingly, the coverage is selective and incorporates elements of economic theory that we believe will be of most value to our intended readers, the students and scholars of management science and operations management. After and introduction, Section 2 provides an overview of evidence on the nature and frequency of specific supply chain contracts. Section 3 offers some brief remarks on methodology concerning the application of economic theory to supply chain contracting. Section 4 reviews the basic setting: perfect markets. The simplest departure from perfect markets is the introduction of market power. This is examined in Section 5 via the assumption of a single monopolist upstream, facing a competitive downstream market. Section 6 considers contracts in a standard framework: one firm operates at each of two levels of a supply chain. Section 7 adds imperfect competition downstream. Section 8 considers contracts in a setting with a single downstream firm and multiple upstream firms, including the case of a single incumbent firm facing potential entry. Section 9 reviews the role of contracts in competing supply chains. Sections 10 and 11 review the dynamics of supply chain contracting and an explicit asymmetric information approach to contracting. Section 12 reviews the key contributions to the fundamental issues of vertical integration, investment in specific assets, and long run or relational contracting. Section 13 concludes the monograph with an overview of additional issues in the economics of supply chain contracting
Author: Karl Inderfurth
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 41
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Book Description
Author: Panos Kouvelis
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118115791
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 497
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Book Description
A comprehensive, one-stop reference for cutting-edge research in integrated risk management, modern applications, and best practices In the field of business, the ever-growing dependency on global supply chains has created new challenges that traditional risk management must be equipped to handle. Handbook of Integrated Risk Management in Global Supply Chains uses a multi-disciplinary approach to present an effective way to manage complex, diverse, and interconnected global supply chain risks. Contributions from leading academics and researchers provide an action-based framework that captures real issues, implementation challenges, and concepts emerging from industry studies.The handbook is divided into five parts: Foundations and Overview introduces risk management and discusses the impact of supply chain disruptions on corporate performance Integrated Risk Management: Operations and Finance Interface explores the joint use of operational and financial hedging of commodity price uncertainties Supply Chain Finance discusses financing alternatives and the role of financial services in procurement contracts; inventory management and capital structure; and bank financing of inventories Operational Risk Management Strategies outlines supply risks and challenges in decentralized supply chains, such as competition and misalignment of incentives between buyers and suppliers Industrial Applications presents examples and case studies that showcase the discussed methodologies Each topic's presentation includes an introduction, key theories, formulas, and applications. Discussions conclude with a summary of the main concepts, a real-world example, and professional insights into common challenges and best practices. Handbook of Integrated Risk Management in Global Supply Chains is an essential reference for academics and practitioners in the areas of supply chain management, global logistics, management science, and industrial engineering who gather, analyze, and draw results from data. The handbook is also a suitable supplement for operations research, risk management, and financial engineering courses at the upper-undergraduate and graduate levels.
Author: Valery Pavlov
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
A supply chain, which typically employs decentralized decision-making, is coordinated if in the equilibrium firms make decisions that are system-wide optimal. Such decisions, called the first-best, would be made if the supply chain were centralized so that a single decision-maker could force all firms to take recommended actions. Under decentralized decision-making, in order to implement first-best one needs to impose a proper structure of incentives. Supply chain literature, building upon developments in mechanism design, proposes various coordination schemes in the applied business contexts. However, the empirical evidence, coming both from the real world and laboratory experiments, confronts many theoretical predictions. In particular, theoretically optimal contracts are notably more complex than those used in the real world. More importantly, in laboratory experiments the theoretically optimal contracts not just fail to coordinate but, ironically, perform very close to the Double Marginalization benchmark. Thus, legitimate concerns regarding ability of the proposed schemes to coordinate in applied contexts arise. This dissertation focuses on some of the factors leading to coordination failures and investigates their impact on the performance of a supply chain. Chapter "Contingent contract" analyzes a scenario when externalities, created by the third parties, force supply chain partners to use contracts contingent on revealed information. Most of the supply chain literature on coordination deals with perfect information models. The assumption of perfect information is usually justified by instances of information sharing, observed in practice. Researchers conjecture that information sharing ensures perfect information. However, there exists empirical evidence that even under the ultimate form of information sharing, when parties implement "open book accounting", revealed information may not be true. Unfortunately, there is always a possibility to misrepresent information. Notably, under perfect information sharing supply chain partners are likely to find themselves in a situation when they essentially have no choice other than to use a contract that delivers first-best provided that "open books" contain truth. The model of this chapter analyzes performance of a supplier-buyer supply chain under the assumption that questioning each other's reports is prohibitively costly, while parties are aware of possible misrepresentation. Therefore, no matter who offers a contract, it cannot be a screening contract or anything else except a contingent contract that delivers "first-best", given revealed information. The outcome of the arising Bayesian game is distribution-specific, and can be very different from the conjectured performance of a "coordinating" contract. Chapter "Fairness and coordination failures in supply chain contracts" addresses a gap between performance of the contracts suggested by the standard theory, which assumes fully rational profit-maximizing players, and existing data, obtained in the experimental tests of coordinating contracts. Numerous experimental studies find that human decision-makers are neither perfectly rational nor profit-maximizers. While various behavioral factors, such as risk- and loss-aversion, counter-factual payoffs and more general social preferences can greatly affect contracting outcomes, they cannot fully explain the existing data. In the controlled laboratory environment, it is possible to either completely eliminate some of these factors, or, at least, to significantly mitigate and control for them. What is not possible to eliminate, is the players' attitude to contracting outcomes, most commonly called "fairness concerns". The existing models, incorporating fairness concerns into models, assume fairness concerns of players is common knowledge. Realistically, how much a particular person cares about fairness cannot be easily observed or measured and, in fact, is not known to anybody else except that person. In other words, fairness concerns are private information. Therefore, the model presented here takes the next step and treats fairness concerns as private information of players. Given the resulting information asymmetry, it is not surprising that coordination of a dyadic channel with a contract is, in general, no longer possible. At the same time, is possible to coordinate a channel with just a wholesale price contract in case the retailer is sufficiently averse to making higher profit than the supplier. However, we show that when the contract choice is endogenous, the supplier will not choose a wholesale price contract but, instead, a profit-maximizing contract that does not coordinate. The results of the experiment that tests the model's predictions, as well as some underlying assumptions and competing theories, provide strong support for the theory and show that fairness organizes the data very well. Chapter "Competition and contracting in supply chains" presents a simple and, in many respects, robust coordination mechanism. Its performance approaches first-best asymptotically in a setting with one supplier and multiple retailers. By introducing horizontal (Bertrand) competition among the retailers the supplier not only induces retailers to make first-best decisions, but also does it by means of the simplest possible linear pricing scheme. Competition does the entire coordinating job, whereas a wholesale price contract suffices to extract all profit of the competing retailers. Although Bertrand competition is not a new concept, little has been known about its actual performance in the contacting context. It turns out that a competition-based mechanism is not only extremely simple, but it is also robust to several relaxations of the standard assumptions, any of which is enough destroy a coordinating contract. First, it survives certain types of information asymmetry. In the extreme example of private information used in this chapter, the mechanism coordinates the channel even if the supplier is not aware of the very fact of private information. Second, Chapter "Fairness and coordination failures in supply chain contracts" shows how fairness concerns generally make coordination of a dyadic channel impossible. However, for the competition-based mechanism fairness concerns is not an obstacle. Turning to the methodological aspects, we would like to note that the mainstream literature suggests coordinating contracts resulting from models that assume the supplier's ability to make a "take-it-or-leave-it" offer. Credibility of such models has been long debated in the literature. Critics insist that the "take-it-or-leave-it" offer is either not a credible threat in the bilateral monopoly or it is a shortcut, implicitly implying perfect competition on the retailers' side. Allowing for competition explicitly not only avoids this criticism but also brings fuller insights, non-available otherwise.
Author: Lennart Christian Johnsen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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