Learning from Iraq PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Learning from Iraq PDF full book. Access full book title Learning from Iraq by Steven Metz. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Steven Metz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Counterinsurgency
Languages : en
Pages : 140
Get Book Here
Book Description
While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?
Author: Steven Metz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Counterinsurgency
Languages : en
Pages : 140
Get Book Here
Book Description
While the involvement of the United States in counterinsurgency has a long history, it had faded in importance in the years following the end of the Cold War. When American forces first confronted it in Iraq, they were not fully prepared. Since then, the U.S. military and other government agencies have expended much effort to refine their counterinsurgency capabilities. But have they done enough?
Author: Daniel P. Bolger
Publisher: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt
ISBN: 0544370481
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 565
Get Book Here
Book Description
A high-ranking general's gripping insider account of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how it all went wrong. Over a thirty-five-year career, Daniel Bolger rose through the army infantry to become a three-star general, commanding in both theaters of the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. He participated in meetings with top-level military and civilian players, where strategy was made and managed. At the same time, he regularly carried a rifle alongside rank-and-file soldiers in combat actions, unusual for a general. Now, as a witness to all levels of military command, Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars, from 9/11 to the final withdrawal from the region. Writing with hard-won experience and unflinching honesty, Bolger makes the firm case that in Iraq and in Afghanistan, we lost -- but we didn't have to. Intelligence was garbled. Key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories. And, at the root of our failure, we never really understood our enemy. Why We Lost is a timely, forceful, and compulsively readable account of these wars from a fresh and authoritative perspective.
Author: Conrad C. Crane
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Democratization
Languages : en
Pages : 88
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Jan Hallenberg
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 113422964X
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 240
Get Book Here
Book Description
We are living amidst the fallout of the most controversial conflict of our times. This book is a tough examination of how and why it was fought and of its continuing effects. This major new work contains analysis of the Iraq War from several different academic, as well as military perspectives. Its emphasis is on the links between US foreign policy, US strategy and the US conduct of war and it also covers Iraqi grand strategies, the consequences of the War for transatlantic relations, and includes a chapter on the International Law dimension. In scrutinzing the war and the behaviour of its main parties, the editors draw upon international relations, political science, strategic thought and military theory, plus international law and media studies. For those wishing to understand the Iraq war from a very wide range of rigorous perspectives, this is a must-read.
Author: James H. Lebovic
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190935332
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 257
Get Book Here
Book Description
The United States national-security establishment is vast, yet the United States has failed to meet its initial objectives in almost every one of its major, post-World War II conflicts. Of these troubled efforts, the US wars in Vietnam (1965-73), Iraq (2003-11), and Afghanistan (2001-present) stand out for their endurance, resource investment, human cost, and miscalculated decisions. Because overarching policy goals are distant and open to interpretation, policymakers ground their decisions in the immediate world of short-term objectives, salient tasks, policy constraints, and fixed time schedules. As a consequence, they exaggerate the benefits of their preferred policies, ignore the accompanying costs and requirements, and underappreciate the benefits of alternatives. In Planning to Fail, James H. Lebovic argues that a profound myopia helps explain US decision-making failures. In each of the wars explored in this book, he identifies four stages of intervention. First and foremost, policymakers chose unwisely to go to war. After the fighting began, they inadvisably sought to extend or expand the mission. Next, they pursued the mission, in abbreviated form, to suboptimal effect. Finally, they adapted the mission to exit from the conflict. Lebovic argues that US leaders were effectively planning to fail whatever their hopes and thoughts were at the time the intervention began. Decision-makers struggled less than they should have, even when conditions allowed for good choices. Then, when conditions on the ground left them with only bad choices, they struggled furiously and more than could ever matter. Policymakers allowed these wars to sap available capabilities, push US forces to the breaking point, and exhaust public support. They finally settled for terms of departure that they (or their predecessors) would have rejected at the start of these conflicts. Offering a far-ranging and detailed analysis, this book identifies an unmistakable pattern of failure and highlights lessons we can learn from it.
Author: W. Andrew Terrill
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Max G. Manwaring
Publisher: Strategic Studies Institute
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 28
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Anthony L. Smith
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 30
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Anthony H. Cordesman
Publisher: CSIS
ISBN: 9780892064328
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 596
Get Book Here
Book Description
"In April of 2003, a stunned world looked on as the armed forces of the United States and Britain conducted a lightning-fast military campaign against Iraq. Confounding predictions of failure, the Anglo-American victory brought down not just the Iraqi regime, but also much of the conventional wisdom about modern war. But even as U.S. and British forces occupied Basra, Tikrit, and Mosul, the Iraqi nation slipped into anarchy - and new military and security challenges emerged." "In this book, respected military analyst Anthony Cordesman provides the first in-depth examination of the key issues swirling around the most significant U.S. war since Vietnam. Finding answers is essential if we are to understand the United States' awesome power and its place in a new age of international terror and regional conflict. Finding answers is also essential if we are to draw the proper lessons and understand the new challenges of conflict termination, peacemaking, and nation building."--BOOK JACKET.
Author: Spencer D. Bakich
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 022610785X
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 344
Get Book Here
Book Description
Common and destructive, limited wars are significant international events that pose a number of challenges to the states involved beyond simple victory or defeat. Chief among these challenges is the risk of escalation—be it in the scale, scope, cost, or duration of the conflict. In this book, Spencer D. Bakich investigates a crucial and heretofore ignored factor in determining the nature and direction of limited war: information institutions. Traditional assessments of wartime strategy focus on the relationship between the military and civilians, but Bakich argues that we must take into account the information flow patterns among top policy makers and all national security organizations. By examining the fate of American military and diplomatic strategy in four limited wars, Bakich demonstrates how not only the availability and quality of information, but also the ways in which information is gathered, managed, analyzed, and used, shape a state’s ability to wield power effectively in dynamic and complex international systems. Utilizing a range of primary and secondary source materials, Success and Failure in Limited War makes a timely case for the power of information in war, with crucial implications for international relations theory and statecraft.
