Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court PDF full book. Access full book title Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court by Thomas H. Hammond. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Thomas H. Hammond
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 9780804751469
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 330
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book presents the first comprehensive model of policymaking by strategically-rational justices who pursue their own policy preferences in the Supreme Court's multi-stage decision-making process.
Author: Thomas H. Hammond
Publisher: Stanford University Press
ISBN: 9780804751469
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 330
Get Book Here
Book Description
This book presents the first comprehensive model of policymaking by strategically-rational justices who pursue their own policy preferences in the Supreme Court's multi-stage decision-making process.
Author: Thomas H. Hammond
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 299
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Scott A. Comparato
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing USA
ISBN: 0313059586
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 191
Get Book Here
Book Description
Applying strategic approaches to both interest groups as amici curiae and state supreme court justices, Comparato investigates the influence of judicial retention methods and the ballot initiative on their behaivor. The results demonstrate that they behave strategically, attempting to achieve their goals within the confines of the institutional setting. What impact do state-level institutions have on the behavior of state supreme court justices and interest groups participating as amici curiae in those courts? Specifically, is the information provided by interest groups conditioned on the judicial retention system, or whether the state uses the ballot initiative, and does that information impact the decision-making process of the justices? Comparato answers these questions by employing strategic theories of judicial and group behavior, with groups motivated by the attainment of policy and group maintenance, and state supreme court justices motivated by policy and the continued maintenance of their position on the court. He argues that the information provided in amicus curiae briefs allows both groups and state supreme court justices to achieve their respective goals. In order to answer these questions, Comparto analyzes litigant and amicus curiae briefs as well as judicial decisions from seven state supreme courts to evaluate the effects of state-level institutions on the types of information provided to state supreme court justices, and how those justices respond to that information. The results suggest that interest groups do behave strategically, providing information to justices that they believe will be useful in helping the justices retain their seats on the court and achieve their desired policy outcomes. There is also support for the expectation that the information provided by litigants and amici, as well as the retention method, have a direct impact on the decision-making of justices.
Author: U. Sommer
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137398647
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 280
Get Book Here
Book Description
Much research is devoted to the decision-making power and precedent set by the Supreme Court. Less attention, however, is given to the strategic behavior during case selection. This book argues that case selection is done strategically, and by means of various criteria - influencing its constitutional position and importance.
Author: Cornell W. Clayton
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226109550
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 359
Get Book Here
Book Description
What influences decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court? For decades social scientists focused on the ideology of individual justices. Supreme Court Decision Making moves beyond this focus by exploring how justices are influenced by the distinctive features of courts as institutions and their place in the political system. Drawing on interpretive-historical institutionalism as well as rational choice theory, a group of leading scholars consider such factors as the influence of jurisprudence, the unique characteristics of supreme courts, the dynamics of coalition building, and the effects of social movements. The volume's distinguished contributors and broad range make it essential reading for those interested either in the Supreme Court or the nature of institutional politics. Original essays contributed by Lawrence Baum, Paul Brace, Elizabeth Bussiere, Cornell Clayton, Sue Davis, Charles Epp, Lee Epstein, Howard Gillman, Melinda Gann Hall, Ronald Kahn, Jack Knight, Forrest Maltzman, David O'Brien, Jeffrey Segal, Charles Sheldon, James Spriggs II, and Paul Wahlbeck.
Author: Lee Epstein
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1009058738
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 101
Get Book Here
Book Description
The past decade has witnessed a worldwide explosion of work aimed at illuminating judicial-behavior: the choices judges make and the consequences of their choices. We focus on strategic accounts of judicial-behavior. As in other approaches to judging, preferences and institutions play a central role but strategic accounts are unique in one important respect: They draw attention to the interdependent - i.e., the strategic - nature of judicial decisions. On strategic accounts, judges do not make decisions in a vacuum, but rather attend to the preferences and likely actions of other actors, including their colleagues, superiors, politicians, and the public. We survey the major methodological approaches for conducting strategic analysis and consider how scholars have used them to provide insight into the effect of internal and external actors on the judges' choices. As far as these studies have traveled in illuminating judicial-behavior, many opportunities for forward movement remain. We flag four in the conclusion.
Author: Lawrence Baum
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
ISBN: 0472022636
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 230
Get Book Here
Book Description
From local trial courts to the United States Supreme Court, judges' decisions affect the fates of individual litigants and the fate of the nation as a whole. Scholars have long discussed and debated explanations of judicial behavior. This book examines the major issues in the debates over how best to understand judicial behavior and assesses what we actually know about how judges decide cases. It concludes that we are far from understanding why judges choose the positions they take in court. Lawrence Baum considers three issues in examining judicial behavior. First, the author considers the balance between the judges' interest in the outcome of particular cases and their interest in other goals such as personal popularity and lighter workloads. Second, Baum considers the relative importance of good law and good policy as bases for judges' choices. Finally Baum looks at the extent to which judges act strategically, choosing their own positions after taking into account the positions that their fellow judges and other policy makers might adopt. Baum argues that the evidence on each of these issues is inconclusive and that there remains considerable room for debate about the sources of judges' decisions. Baum concludes that this lack of resolution is not the result of weaknesses in the scholarship but from the difficulty in explaining human behavior. He makes a plea for diversity in research. This book will be of interest to political scientists and scholars in law and courts as well as attorneys who are interested in understanding judges as decision makers and who want to understand what we can learn from scholarly research about judicial behavior. Lawrence Baum is Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University.
Author: Saul Brenner
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139475681
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 197
Get Book Here
Book Description
To what extent do the justices on the Supreme Court behave strategically? In Strategy on the United States Supreme Court, Saul Brenner and Joseph M. Whitmeyer investigate the answers to this question and reveal that justices are substantially less strategic than many Supreme Court scholars believe. By examining the research to date on each of the justice's important activities, Brenner and Whitmeyer's work shows that the justices often do not cast their certiorari votes in accord with the outcome-prediction strategy, that the other members of the conference coalition bargain successfully with the majority opinion writer in less than 6 percent of the situations, and that most of the fluidity in voting on the Court is nonstrategic. This work is essential to understanding how strategic behavior - or its absence - influences the decisions of the Supreme Court and, as a result, American politics and society.
Author: Timothy R. Johnson
Publisher: SUNY Press
ISBN: 9780791461037
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 200
Get Book Here
Book Description
How oral arguments influence the decisions of Supreme Court justices.
Author: Matthew E. K. Hall
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1108682170
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 229
Get Book Here
Book Description
The most sophisticated theories of judicial behavior depict judges as rational actors who strategically pursue multiple goals when making decisions. However, these accounts tend to disregard the possibility that judges have heterogeneous goal preferences - that is, that different judges want different things. Integrating insights from personality psychology and economics, this book proposes a new theory of judicial behavior in which judges strategically pursue multiple goals, but their personality traits determine the relative importance of those goals. This theory is tested by analyzing the behavior of justices who served on the US Supreme Court between 1946 and 2015. Using recent advances in text-based personality measurement, Hall evaluates the influence of the 'big five' personality traits on the justices' behavior during each stage of the Court's decision-making process. What Justices Want shows that personality traits directly affect the justices' choices and moderate the influence of goal-related situational factors on justices' behavior.