Author: Shigeo Muto
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 306
Get Book Here
Book Description
Stable sets and subsolutions are studied mainly for symmetric, n-person, characteristic-function form games (n;k) in which k-person coalitions are strongly vital, i.e., v(s)
Author: Kai Michaelis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 126
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Zhi Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 218
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Shigeo Muto
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 136
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Tatsuro Ichiishi
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 1483295052
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 449
Get Book Here
Book Description
Game Theory and Applications outlines game theory and proves its validity by examining it alongside the neoclassical paradigm. This book contends that the neoclassical theory is the exceptional case, and that game theory may indeed be the rule. The papers and abstracts collected here explore its recent development and suggest new research directions. Explains many of the recent central developments in game theory Highlights new research directions in economic theory which surpass the neoclassical paradigm Includes game-theoretical analyses in economics, political science, and biology Written by leading game theorists, economists, political scientists, and biologists
Author: Robert James Weber
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 196
Get Book Here
Book Description
The formal proceedings of an n-person cooperative game can be modelled as a multi-stage negotiation process. At each stage, coalitions may object to the proposal at hand. If a particular objection is given recognition, then the non-objecting players respond to that objection in such a manner that a new proposal results from the objection and response. An equilibrium collection of strategies in this negotiation game may be viewed as a 'standard of behavior' to which no nonconformist pressures exist. This paper explores the relationship between the set of proposals to which no objections are made in such an equilibrium collection, and the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets of the original game. (Modified author abstract).
Author: Mohamed Rabie
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 170
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Operations research
Languages : en
Pages : 78
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Shigeo Muto
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 16
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Imma Curiel
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 147574871X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 198
Get Book Here
Book Description
In this book applications of cooperative game theory that arise from combinatorial optimization problems are described. It is well known that the mathematical modeling of various real-world decision-making situations gives rise to combinatorial optimization problems. For situations where more than one decision-maker is involved classical combinatorial optimization theory does not suffice and it is here that cooperative game theory can make an important contribution. If a group of decision-makers decide to undertake a project together in order to increase the total revenue or decrease the total costs, they face two problems. The first one is how to execute the project in an optimal way so as to increase revenue. The second one is how to divide the revenue attained among the participants. It is with this second problem that cooperative game theory can help. The solution concepts from cooperative game theory can be applied to arrive at revenue allocation schemes. In this book the type of problems described above are examined. Although the choice of topics is application-driven, it also discusses theoretical questions that arise from the situations that are studied. For all the games described attention will be paid to the appropriateness of several game-theoretic solution concepts in the particular contexts that are considered. The computation complexity of the game-theoretic solution concepts in the situation at hand will also be considered.
