Stable Sets for Symmetric, N-person, Cooperative Games PDF Download
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Author: Shigeo Muto
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 306
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Book Description
Stable sets and subsolutions are studied mainly for symmetric, n-person, characteristic-function form games (n;k) in which k-person coalitions are strongly vital, i.e., v(s)
Author: Shigeo Muto
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 306
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Book Description
Stable sets and subsolutions are studied mainly for symmetric, n-person, characteristic-function form games (n;k) in which k-person coalitions are strongly vital, i.e., v(s)
Author: Zhi Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 218
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Book Description
Author: Kai Michaelis
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Game theory
Languages : en
Pages : 126
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Book Description
Author: Tatsuro Ichiishi
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 1483295052
Category : Language Arts & Disciplines
Languages : en
Pages : 449
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Book Description
Game Theory and Applications outlines game theory and proves its validity by examining it alongside the neoclassical paradigm. This book contends that the neoclassical theory is the exceptional case, and that game theory may indeed be the rule. The papers and abstracts collected here explore its recent development and suggest new research directions. - Explains many of the recent central developments in game theory - Highlights new research directions in economic theory which surpass the neoclassical paradigm - Includes game-theoretical analyses in economics, political science, and biology - Written by leading game theorists, economists, political scientists, and biologists
Author: Imma Curiel
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 147574871X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 198
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Book Description
In this book applications of cooperative game theory that arise from combinatorial optimization problems are described. It is well known that the mathematical modeling of various real-world decision-making situations gives rise to combinatorial optimization problems. For situations where more than one decision-maker is involved classical combinatorial optimization theory does not suffice and it is here that cooperative game theory can make an important contribution. If a group of decision-makers decide to undertake a project together in order to increase the total revenue or decrease the total costs, they face two problems. The first one is how to execute the project in an optimal way so as to increase revenue. The second one is how to divide the revenue attained among the participants. It is with this second problem that cooperative game theory can help. The solution concepts from cooperative game theory can be applied to arrive at revenue allocation schemes. In this book the type of problems described above are examined. Although the choice of topics is application-driven, it also discusses theoretical questions that arise from the situations that are studied. For all the games described attention will be paid to the appropriateness of several game-theoretic solution concepts in the particular contexts that are considered. The computation complexity of the game-theoretic solution concepts in the situation at hand will also be considered.
Author: A. J. Jones
Publisher: Horwood Publishing
ISBN: 9781898563143
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 304
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Book Description
This modern, still relevant text is suitable for senior undergraduate and graduate students, teachers and professionals in mathematics, operational research, economics, sociology; and psychology, defence and strategic studies, and war games. Engagingly written with agreeable humor, the book can also be understood by non-mathematicians. It shows basic ideas of extensive form, pure and mixed strategies, the minimax theorem, non-cooperative and co-operative games, and a ''first class'' account of linear programming, theory and practice. The text is self-contained with comprehensive source references. Based on a series of lectures given by the author in the theory of games at Royal Holloway College, it gives unusually comprehensive but concise treatment of co-operative games, an original account of bargaining models, with a skilfully guided tour through the Shapely and Nash solutions for bimatrix games and a carefully illustrated account of finding the best threat strategies.
Author: Leonid Kitainik
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401119600
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 272
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Book Description
In decision theory there are basically two appr~hes to the modeling of individual choice: one is based on an absolute representation of preferences leading to a ntDnerical expression of preference intensity. This is utility theory. Another approach is based on binary relations that encode pairwise preference. While the former has mainly blossomed in the Anglo-Saxon academic world, the latter is mostly advocated in continental Europe, including Russia. The advantage of the utility theory approach is that it integrates uncertainty about the state of nature, that may affect the consequences of decision. Then, the problems of choice and ranking from the knowledge of preferences become trivial once the utility function is known. In the case of the relational approach, the model does not explicitly accounts for uncertainty, hence it looks less sophisticated. On the other hand it is more descriptive than normative in the first stand because it takes the pairwise preference pattern expressed by the decision-maker as it is and tries to make the best out of it. Especially the preference relation is not supposed to have any property. The main problem with the utility theory approach is the gap between what decision-makers are and can express, and what the theory would like them to be and to be capable of expressing. With the relational approach this gap does not exist, but the main difficulty is now to build up convincing choice rules and ranking rules that may help the decision process.
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Economics, Mathematical
Languages : en
Pages : 768
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Book Description
Author: Anatol Rapoport
Publisher: Courier Corporation
ISBN: 0486143678
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 337
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Book Description
DIVSequel to Two-Person Game Theory introduces necessary mathematical notation (mainly set theory), presents basic concepts and models, and provides applications to social situations. /div
Author: Theo S. H. Driessen
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401577870
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 235
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Book Description
The study of the theory of games was started in Von Neumann (1928), but the development of the theory of games was accelerated after the publication of the classical book "Theory of games and economic behavior" by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). As an initial step, the theory of games aims to put situations of conflict and cooperation into mathematical models. In the second and final step, the resulting models are analysed on the basis of equitable and mathematical reasonings. The conflict and/or cooperative situation in question is generally due to the interaction between two or more individuals (players). Their interaction may lead up to several potential payoffs over which each player has his own preferences. Any player attempts to achieve his largest possible payoff, but the other players may also exert their influence on the realization of some potential payoff. As already mentioned, the theory of games consists of two parts, a modelling part and a solution part. Concerning the modelling part, the mathematical models of conflict and cooperative situations are described. The description of the models includes the rules, the strategy space of any player, potential payoffs to the players, the preferences of each player over the set of all potential payoffs, etc. According to the rules, it is either permitted or forbidden that the players communicate with one another in order to make binding agreements regarding their mutual actions.
