Revenue Non-equivalence of Auctions with Budget-constrained Buyers PDF Download
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Author: Yeon Koo Che
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 15
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Book Description
Author: Yeon Koo Che
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 15
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Book Description
Author: Yeon-Koo Che
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Book Description
Author: Yeon-Koo Che
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Book Description
Author: Soo Hong Chew
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Book Description
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author: Yanwu Yang
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0124115047
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 213
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Book Description
The Intelligent Systems Series publishes reference works and handbooks in three core sub-topic areas: Intelligent Automation, Intelligent Transportation Systems, and Intelligent Computing. They include theoretical studies, design methods, and real-world implementations and applications. The series' readership is broad, but focuses on engineering, electronics, and computer science. Budget constraints and optimization in sponsored search auctions takes into account consideration of the entire life cycle of campaigns for researchers and developers working on search systems and ROI maximization. The highly experienced authors compiled their knowledge and experience to provide insight, algorithms and development techniques for successful optimized/constrained systems. The book presents a cutting-edge budget optimization approach that embraces three-level budget decisions in the life cycle of search auctions: allocation across markets at the system level, distribution over temporal slots at the campaign level, and real-time adjustment at the keyword level. Delivers a systematic overview and technique for understanding budget constraints and ROI optimization in sponsored search auction systems, including algorithms and developer guides for a range of scenarios Explores effects of constraints on mechanisms, bidding and keyword strategies, and the strategies for budget optimization that developers can employ An informative reference source for both software and systems developers working in the search auctions, marketing and sales strategy optimization, services development for online marketing and advertisement, e-commerce, social and economic networking
Author: Brent Glover
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Many online bidders place bids seconds before the auction's close, a practice known as "sniping." Most theoretical explanations argue that sniping lowers the expected selling price. We examine the revenue effect of sniping by analyzing the revenue differences between auctions with a hard-close ending rule versus those with a soft-close ending rule. Since in a soft-close ending rule there is no rational motivation for sniping, the difference in revenues can be attributed to the effect of sniping. We found selling items using the soft-close mechanism increases the selling price by almost $40 (or 19%) over the hard-close format. We claim that lack of experience could help explain why not all sellers use the soft-close ending rule. However, we cannot explain why auction sites such as eBay only allow sellers to employ a hard-close format.
Author: Srobonti Chattopadhyay
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351271075
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 94
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Book Description
The book elaborates the basic principles of Auction Theory in a non-technical language so as to make them easily accessible to even those not trained in the discipline. Auctions as allocation mechanisms have been in use across the world since antiquity and are still employed in different countries for purchase and sales of a wide range of objects, both by governments and by private agents. Auction has gained popularity over other allocation mechanisms since the rules of auctions are very precise, involve much less subjective judgements compared to other alternative allocation mechanisms and lead to a more efficient process of discovering the true willingness of the buyers to pay. Moreover, the principles of Auction Theory are used in other contexts, for example in designing contests, or in controlling emission levels through allocation of permits and licenses.
Author: Paul Klemperer
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691186294
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 263
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Book Description
Governments use them to sell everything from oilfields to pollution permits, and to privatize companies; consumers rely on them to buy baseball tickets and hotel rooms, and economic theorists employ them to explain booms and busts. Auctions make up many of the world's most important markets; and this book describes how auction theory has also become an invaluable tool for understanding economics. Auctions: Theory and Practice provides a non-technical introduction to auction theory, and emphasises its practical application. Although there are many extremely successful auction markets, there have also been some notable fiascos, and Klemperer provides many examples. He discusses the successes and failures of the one-hundred-billion dollar "third-generation" mobile-phone license auctions; he, jointly with Ken Binmore, designed the first of these. Klemperer also demonstrates the surprising power of auction theory to explain seemingly unconnected issues such as the intensity of different forms of industrial competition, the costs of litigation, and even stock trading 'frenzies' and financial crashes. Engagingly written, the book makes the subject exciting not only to economics students but to anyone interested in auctions and their role in economics.
Author: Maciej H. Kotowski
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 58
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Book Description
We consider all-pay auctions in the presence of interdependent, affiliated valuations and private budget constraints. For the sealed-bid, all-pay auction we characterize a symmetric equilibrium in continuous strategies for the case of N bidders. Budget constraints encourage more aggressive bidding among participants with large endowments and intermediate valuations. We extend our results to the war of attrition where we show that budget constraints lead to a uniform amplification of equilibrium bids among bidders with sufficient endowments. An example shows that with both interdependent valuations and private budget constraints, a revenue ranking between the two auction formats is generally not possible. Equilibria with discontinuous bidding strategies are discussed.
