Author: Clarence B. Allen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Public schools
Languages : en
Pages : 188
Book Description
Report on the Norton High School Evaluation, April 28-20, 1941
Author: Clarence B. Allen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Public schools
Languages : en
Pages : 188
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Public schools
Languages : en
Pages : 188
Book Description
Congressional Record
Author: United States. Congress
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 1324
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 1324
Book Description
Air Force Combat Units of World War II
Author: Maurer Maurer
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428915850
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 520
Book Description
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428915850
Category : United States
Languages : en
Pages : 520
Book Description
The National Union Catalog, Pre-1956 Imprints
Author: Library of Congress
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Catalogs, Union
Languages : en
Pages : 762
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Catalogs, Union
Languages : en
Pages : 762
Book Description
Japan’s Decision For War In 1941: Some Enduring Lessons
Author: Dr. Jeffrey Record
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252961
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 105
Book Description
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
Publisher: Pickle Partners Publishing
ISBN: 1786252961
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 105
Book Description
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
Public Documents of the State of Maine; Being the Reports of the Various Public Officers and Departments
Author: Maine
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 1956
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 1956
Book Description
Anxious Decades
Author: Michael E. Parrish
Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company
ISBN: 9780393311341
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 548
Book Description
"Impressively detailed. . . . An authoritative and epic overview."--Publishers Weekly
Publisher: W. W. Norton & Company
ISBN: 9780393311341
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 548
Book Description
"Impressively detailed. . . . An authoritative and epic overview."--Publishers Weekly
A Historical Review and Analysis of Army Physical Readiness Training and Assessment
Author: Whitfield East
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781494444969
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 290
Book Description
"The Drillmaster of Valley Forge-Baron Von Steuben-correctly noted in his "Blue Book" how physical conditioning and health (which he found woefully missing when he joined Washington's camp) would always be directly linked to individual and unit discipline, courage in the fight, and victory on the battlefield. That remains true today. Even an amateur historian, choosing any study on the performance of units in combat, quickly discovers how the levels of conditioning and physical performance of Soldiers is directly proportional to success or failure in the field. In this monograph, Dr. Whitfield "Chip" East provides a pragmatic history of physical readiness training in our Army. He tells us we initially mirrored the professional Armies of Europe as they prepared their forces for war on the continent. Then he introduces us to some master trainers, and shows us how they initiated an American brand of physical conditioning when our forces were found lacking in the early wars of the last century. Finally, he shows us how we have and must incorporate science (even when there exists considerable debate!) to contribute to what we do-and how we do it-in shaping today's Army. Dr. East provides the history, the analysis, and the pragmatism, and all of it is geared to understanding how our Army has and must train Soldiers for the physical demands of combat. Our culture is becoming increasingly ''unfit," due to poor nutrition, a lack of adequate and formal exercise, and too much technology. Still, the Soldiers who come to our Army from our society will be asked to fight in increasingly complex and demanding conflicts, and they must be prepared through new, unique, and scientifically based techniques. So while Dr. East's monograph is a fascinating history, it is also a required call for all leaders to better understand the science and the art of physical preparation for the battlefield. It was and is important for us to get this area of training right, because getting it right means a better chance for success in combat.
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781494444969
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 290
Book Description
"The Drillmaster of Valley Forge-Baron Von Steuben-correctly noted in his "Blue Book" how physical conditioning and health (which he found woefully missing when he joined Washington's camp) would always be directly linked to individual and unit discipline, courage in the fight, and victory on the battlefield. That remains true today. Even an amateur historian, choosing any study on the performance of units in combat, quickly discovers how the levels of conditioning and physical performance of Soldiers is directly proportional to success or failure in the field. In this monograph, Dr. Whitfield "Chip" East provides a pragmatic history of physical readiness training in our Army. He tells us we initially mirrored the professional Armies of Europe as they prepared their forces for war on the continent. Then he introduces us to some master trainers, and shows us how they initiated an American brand of physical conditioning when our forces were found lacking in the early wars of the last century. Finally, he shows us how we have and must incorporate science (even when there exists considerable debate!) to contribute to what we do-and how we do it-in shaping today's Army. Dr. East provides the history, the analysis, and the pragmatism, and all of it is geared to understanding how our Army has and must train Soldiers for the physical demands of combat. Our culture is becoming increasingly ''unfit," due to poor nutrition, a lack of adequate and formal exercise, and too much technology. Still, the Soldiers who come to our Army from our society will be asked to fight in increasingly complex and demanding conflicts, and they must be prepared through new, unique, and scientifically based techniques. So while Dr. East's monograph is a fascinating history, it is also a required call for all leaders to better understand the science and the art of physical preparation for the battlefield. It was and is important for us to get this area of training right, because getting it right means a better chance for success in combat.
Review of Educational Research
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 622
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 622
Book Description
Breaking Point
Author: Rebecca Schwartz Greene
Publisher: Fordham University Press
ISBN: 1531500137
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 256
Book Description
This book informs the public for the first time about the impact of American psychiatry on soldiers during World War II. Breaking Point is the first in-depth history of American psychiatry in World War II. Drawn from unpublished primary documents, oral histories, and the author’s personal interviews and correspondence over years with key psychiatric and military policymakers, it begins with Franklin Roosevelt’s endorsement of a universal Selective Service psychiatric examination followed by Army and Navy pre- and post-induction examinations. Ultimately, 2.5 million men and women were rejected or discharged from military service on neuropsychiatric grounds. Never before or since has the United States engaged in such a program. In designing Selective Service Medical Circular No. 1, psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan assumed psychiatrists could predict who might break down or falter in military service or even in civilian life thereafter. While many American and European psychiatrists questioned this belief, and huge numbers of American psychiatric casualties soon raised questions about screening’s validity, psychiatric and military leaders persisted in 1942 and 1943 in endorsing ever tougher screening and little else. Soon, families complained of fathers and teens being drafted instead of being identified as psychiatric 4Fs, and Blacks and Native Americans, among others, complained of bias. A frustrated General George S. Patton famously slapped two “malingering” neuropsychiatric patients in Sicily (a sentiment shared by Marshall and Eisenhower, though they favored a tamer style). Yet psychiatric rejections, evacuations, and discharges mounted. While psychiatrist Roy Grinker and a few others treated soldiers close to the front in Tunisia in early 1943, this was the exception. But as demand for manpower soared and psychiatrists finally went to the field and saw that combat itself, not “predisposition,” precipitated breakdown, leading military psychiatrists switched their emphasis from screening to prevention and treatment. But this switch was too little too late and slowed by a year-long series of Inspector General investigations even while numbers of psychiatric casualties soared. Ironically, despite and even partly because of psychiatrists’ wartime performance, plus the emotional toll of war, postwar America soon witnessed a dramatic growth in numbers, popularity, and influence of the profession, culminating in the National Mental Health Act (1946). But veterans with “PTSD,” not recognized until 1980, were largely neglected.
Publisher: Fordham University Press
ISBN: 1531500137
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 256
Book Description
This book informs the public for the first time about the impact of American psychiatry on soldiers during World War II. Breaking Point is the first in-depth history of American psychiatry in World War II. Drawn from unpublished primary documents, oral histories, and the author’s personal interviews and correspondence over years with key psychiatric and military policymakers, it begins with Franklin Roosevelt’s endorsement of a universal Selective Service psychiatric examination followed by Army and Navy pre- and post-induction examinations. Ultimately, 2.5 million men and women were rejected or discharged from military service on neuropsychiatric grounds. Never before or since has the United States engaged in such a program. In designing Selective Service Medical Circular No. 1, psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan assumed psychiatrists could predict who might break down or falter in military service or even in civilian life thereafter. While many American and European psychiatrists questioned this belief, and huge numbers of American psychiatric casualties soon raised questions about screening’s validity, psychiatric and military leaders persisted in 1942 and 1943 in endorsing ever tougher screening and little else. Soon, families complained of fathers and teens being drafted instead of being identified as psychiatric 4Fs, and Blacks and Native Americans, among others, complained of bias. A frustrated General George S. Patton famously slapped two “malingering” neuropsychiatric patients in Sicily (a sentiment shared by Marshall and Eisenhower, though they favored a tamer style). Yet psychiatric rejections, evacuations, and discharges mounted. While psychiatrist Roy Grinker and a few others treated soldiers close to the front in Tunisia in early 1943, this was the exception. But as demand for manpower soared and psychiatrists finally went to the field and saw that combat itself, not “predisposition,” precipitated breakdown, leading military psychiatrists switched their emphasis from screening to prevention and treatment. But this switch was too little too late and slowed by a year-long series of Inspector General investigations even while numbers of psychiatric casualties soared. Ironically, despite and even partly because of psychiatrists’ wartime performance, plus the emotional toll of war, postwar America soon witnessed a dramatic growth in numbers, popularity, and influence of the profession, culminating in the National Mental Health Act (1946). But veterans with “PTSD,” not recognized until 1980, were largely neglected.