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Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674020634
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308
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Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Author: Lucian A. Bebchuk
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 9780674020634
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 308
Get Book Here
Book Description
The company is under-performing, its share price is trailing, and the CEO gets...a multi-million-dollar raise. This story is familiar, for good reason: as this book clearly demonstrates, structural flaws in corporate governance have produced widespread distortions in executive pay. Pay without Performance presents a disconcerting portrait of managers' influence over their own pay--and of a governance system that must fundamentally change if firms are to be managed in the interest of shareholders. Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried demonstrate that corporate boards have persistently failed to negotiate at arm's length with the executives they are meant to oversee. They give a richly detailed account of how pay practices--from option plans to retirement benefits--have decoupled compensation from performance and have camouflaged both the amount and performance-insensitivity of pay. Executives' unwonted influence over their compensation has hurt shareholders by increasing pay levels and, even more importantly, by leading to practices that dilute and distort managers' incentives. This book identifies basic problems with our current reliance on boards as guardians of shareholder interests. And the solution, the authors argue, is not merely to make these boards more independent of executives as recent reforms attempt to do. Rather, boards should also be made more dependent on shareholders by eliminating the arrangements that entrench directors and insulate them from their shareholders. A powerful critique of executive compensation and corporate governance, Pay without Performance points the way to restoring corporate integrity and improving corporate performance.
Author: Benjamin Hermalin
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0444635408
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 762
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Book Description
The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance, Volume One, covers all issues important to economists. It is organized around fundamental principles, whereas multidisciplinary books on corporate governance often concentrate on specific topics. Specific topics include Relevant Theory and Methods, Organizational Economic Models as They Pertain to Governance, Managerial Career Concerns, Assessment & Monitoring, and Signal Jamming, The Institutions and Practice of Governance, The Law and Economics of Governance, Takeovers, Buyouts, and the Market for Control, Executive Compensation, Dominant Shareholders, and more. Providing excellent overviews and summaries of extant research, this book presents advanced students in graduate programs with details and perspectives that other books overlook. - Concentrates on underlying principles that change little, even as the empirical literature moves on - Helps readers see corporate governance systems as interrelated or even intertwined external (country-level) and internal (firm-level) forces - Reviews the methodological tools of the field (theory and empirical), the most relevant models, and the field's substantive findings, all of which help point the way forward
Author: John S. Beasley
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1781005109
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 553
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Book Description
Research on executive compensation has exploded in recent years, and this volume of specially commissioned essays brings the reader up-to-date on all of the latest developments in the field. Leading corporate governance scholars from a range of countries set out their views on four main areas of executive compensation: the history and theory of executive compensation, the structure of executive pay, corporate governance and executive compensation, and international perspectives on executive pay. The authors analyze the two dominant theoretical approaches – managerial power theory and optimal contracting theory – and examine their impact on executive pay levels and the practices of concentrated and dispersed share ownership in corporations. The effectiveness of government regulation of executive pay and international executive pay practices in Australia, the US, Europe, China, India and Japan are also discussed. A timely study of a controversial topic, the Handbook will be an essential resource for students, scholars and practitioners of law, finance, business and accounting.
Author: Steven Clifford
Publisher: Penguin
ISBN: 0735212392
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 289
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Book Description
"The pay gap between chief executive officers of major U.S. firms and their workers is higher than ever before--depending on the method of calculation, CEOs get paid between 300 and 700 times more than the average worker. Such outsized pay is a relatively recent phenomenon, but ... few detractors truly understand the numerous factors that have contributed to the dizzying upward spiral in CEO compensation. Steven Clifford, a former CEO who has also served on many corporate boards, has a name for these procedures and practices: 'The CEO Pay Machine.' [This book] is Clifford's ... explanation of the 'machine'--how it works, how its parts interact, and how every step pushes CEO pay to higher levels"--
Author: Martin Neil Baily
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 9780815719366
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 420
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Book Description
For almost thirty years, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA) has provided academic and business economists, government officials, and members of the financial and business communities with timely research of current economic issues.Contents include:ArticlesProduct and Stock Market Responses to Automotive Product Liability Verdicts by Steven Garber and John AdamsThe Distribution of the Insurance Market Effects of Tort Liability by Patricia H. Born and W. Kip ViscusiThe Link between Liability Reforms and Productivity: Some Empirical Evidence by Thomas J. Campbell, Daniel P. Kessler, and George B. ShepherdWhat Drives Venture Capital Fundraising by Paul A. Gompers and Josh LernerCapital's Contribution to Productivity and the Nature of Competition by Axel Börsch-SupanExtending the East Asian Miracle: Microeconomic Evidence from Korea by Martin Neil Baily and Eric ZitzewitzThe Tobacco Deal by Jeremy Bulow and Paul Klemperer
Author: Steven Balsam
Publisher: Academic Press
ISBN: 9780120771264
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 410
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Book Description
General readers have no idea why people should care about what executives are paid and why they are paid the way they are. That's the reason that The Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Forbes, and other popular and practitioner publications have regular coverage on them. This book not only proposes a reason - executives need incentives in order to maximize firm value (economists call this agency theory) - it also describes the nature and design of executive compensation practices. Those incentives can take the form of benefits (salary, stock options), or prerquisites (reflecting the status of the executive within the organizational culture.
Author: David Weil
Publisher: Harvard University Press
ISBN: 067472612X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 421
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Book Description
In the twentieth century, large companies employing many workers formed the bedrock of the U.S. economy. Today, on the list of big business's priorities, sustaining the employer-worker relationship ranks far below building a devoted customer base and delivering value to investors. As David Weil's groundbreaking analysis shows, large corporations have shed their role as direct employers of the people responsible for their products, in favor of outsourcing work to small companies that compete fiercely with one another. The result has been declining wages, eroding benefits, inadequate health and safety protections, and ever-widening income inequality. From the perspectives of CEOs and investors, fissuring--splitting off functions that were once managed internally--has been phenomenally successful. Despite giving up direct control to subcontractors and franchises, these large companies have figured out how to maintain the quality of brand-name products and services, without the cost of maintaining an expensive workforce. But from the perspective of workers, this strategy has meant stagnation in wages and benefits and a lower standard of living. Weil proposes ways to modernize regulatory policies so that employers can meet their obligations to workers while allowing companies to keep the beneficial aspects of this business strategy.
Author: Martin N. Baily
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 9780815705901
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 438
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Book Description
For almost thirty years, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (BPEA) has provided academic and business economists, government officials, and members of the financial and business communities with timely research of current economic issues. Contents Include: Articles PAUL JOSKOW, NANCY ROSE, and ANDREA SHEPARD Regulatory Constraints on CEO Compensation HENRY S. FARBER The Incidence and Costs of Job Loss: 1982-91 JOHN E. CALFEE and CLIFFORD WINSTON The Consumer Welfare Effects of Liability for Pain and Suffering: An Exploratory Analysis BOYAN JOVANOVIC The Diversification of Production KENNETH FLAMM Semiconductory Dependency and Strategic Trade Policy JOHN BISHOP Improving Job Matches in the U.S. Labor Market
Author: Kym Maree Sheehan
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 0857938339
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 255
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Book Description
ïBased on extensive interviews with those directly involved in the executive pay setting process _ executives themselves, remuneration committee members, remuneration consultants, and institutional investors _ this excellent study finally explains how, despite repeated regulation over the past twenty years in both the UK and Australia, limits on the amount executives get paid, and a clear relationship between pay and performance remain as elusive as ever. Dr. SheehanÍs study suggests that by targeting the pay setting process rather than pay itself, regulation may have contributed, albeit unintentionally, to the endless upward ratcheting of absolute levels of executive pay.Í _ John Roberts, University of Sydney, Australia ïFor those that believe executive remuneration in the UK and Australia is too high and poorly aligned with company performance, this book provides an excellent analytical framework and strong arguments in favor of greater shareholder oversight of remuneration practices and pay levels. It is well-written, carefully argued and persuasive in its treatment of the subject. I wholeheartedly recommend it.Í _ Randall S. Thomas, Vanderbilt University Law School, US In this timely book, Kym Sheehan examines the regulatory technique known as ïsay on payÍ _ where shareholders vote on executive compensation in an annual, advisory vote on the remuneration report. Using the model of the regulated remuneration cycle, and drawing upon evidence of its operation from interviews, voting data and remuneration reports from UK and Australian companies, the book demonstrates whether say on pay can operate successfully to both constrain executive greed and ensure accountability exists for company performance and decision-making. The Regulation of Executive Compensation is essential reading for corporate governance academics, remuneration consultants, company directors, regulators, pension and superannuation fund trustees and unions. Politicians and their policy advisers, lawyers, accountants and anyone concerned about the corporate governance of listed companies will find much to interest them in this detailed study.
Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic government information
Languages : en
Pages : 312
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Book Description
