Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report. The EC-47 in Southeast Asia PDF Download
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 75
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Air Force doctrine emphasizes that the most important aspect of tactical air reconnaissance is tactical responsiveness. To achieve this responsiveness, "the time goal of tactical reconnaissance" ideally must be "near instantaneous data sensing, processing, and dissemination to permit rapid command actions whenever necessary." This report explores the potential of a prototype tactical air reconnaissance effort which, since its inception in May 1966, has repeatedly attained the real-time goal of Air Force doctrine. Three EC-47 Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons (TEWS) are conducting a project now called COMBAT COUGAR whose objective is " ... day/night, all weather ARDF (Airborne Radio Direction Finding) operations against low-powered enemy operated transmitters in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), and other permissive areas of Southeast Asia in support of requirements established by COMUSMACV and the Commander, 7AF." The TEWS collection, both of fixes locating enemy transmitters and related intelligence information, is the core of the real-time intelligence available to COMUSMACV and his subordinate commanders. Their prompt reactions to this information by ground maneuver, artillery fire, tactical air, and ARC LIGHT (B-52) strikes, frequently have foiled the enemy's plans and severely hurt his forces. In this account, ARDF has the preponderant role in the sphere of intelligence available to the ground commander in Southeast Asia. Within the limitations required to protect highly sensitive information, this CHECO report surveys the background, operations, and achievements of the TEWS from the arrival of the first RC-47 (now EC-47) at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Saigon, in May 1966, until 30 April 1968. Along with the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army aviation has the same share of ARDF mission time in support of COMUSMACV. Army aviation conducted ARDF test in RVN in 1961, a year before the first Air Force test. By 1965, 15 Army aircraft exclusively conducted the ARDF operation.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 75
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Book Description
Air Force doctrine emphasizes that the most important aspect of tactical air reconnaissance is tactical responsiveness. To achieve this responsiveness, "the time goal of tactical reconnaissance" ideally must be "near instantaneous data sensing, processing, and dissemination to permit rapid command actions whenever necessary." This report explores the potential of a prototype tactical air reconnaissance effort which, since its inception in May 1966, has repeatedly attained the real-time goal of Air Force doctrine. Three EC-47 Tactical Electronic Warfare Squadrons (TEWS) are conducting a project now called COMBAT COUGAR whose objective is " ... day/night, all weather ARDF (Airborne Radio Direction Finding) operations against low-powered enemy operated transmitters in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), and other permissive areas of Southeast Asia in support of requirements established by COMUSMACV and the Commander, 7AF." The TEWS collection, both of fixes locating enemy transmitters and related intelligence information, is the core of the real-time intelligence available to COMUSMACV and his subordinate commanders. Their prompt reactions to this information by ground maneuver, artillery fire, tactical air, and ARC LIGHT (B-52) strikes, frequently have foiled the enemy's plans and severely hurt his forces. In this account, ARDF has the preponderant role in the sphere of intelligence available to the ground commander in Southeast Asia. Within the limitations required to protect highly sensitive information, this CHECO report surveys the background, operations, and achievements of the TEWS from the arrival of the first RC-47 (now EC-47) at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Saigon, in May 1966, until 30 April 1968. Along with the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Army aviation has the same share of ARDF mission time in support of COMUSMACV. Army aviation conducted ARDF test in RVN in 1961, a year before the first Air Force test. By 1965, 15 Army aircraft exclusively conducted the ARDF operation.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 85
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Book Description
"The EC-47 in Southeast Asia," a Project CHECO Report published 20 September 1968, examined the USAF effort in ARDF (Airborne Radio Direction Finding) from its SEA inception in 1962 through April 1968. Since that time, several changes in equipment, relocation of tactical electronic warfare squadrons (TEWS), and concomitant moves of the detachments of the 6994th Security Squadron have necessitated this updating of the original report. The function of the program--that of locating and fixing the positions of low-powered enemy transmitters, and of gathering intelligence from these emissions, in a near-real-time sense--remains the same as of this writing. The operation, with the exception of the activities of an EC-47 detachment at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, had previously been called "Combat Cougar". Because of a suspected compromise of the nickname, the project was renamed "Combat Cross" by CSAF message 251548Z June 1970, and all references to the program in this report will reflect the change. The Thai-based detachment, operating exclusively over Laos, was designated "Commando Forge." The sensitive nature of some aspects of the Combat Cross/Commando Forge mission has acted as a restraint on any acknowledgment of the degree of success achieved by the ARDF function, but unofficial comment by ground commanders benefiting from its real-time electronic reconnaissance has invariably been highly favorable. Within the limitations imposed by the need to protect sensitive information, this CHECO report documents the operations, functions, organizational changes, and achievements of the USAF/ARDF function in SEA from April 1968 through July 1970.
Author: Alfred F. Hurley
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Vietnam War, 1961-1975
Languages : en
Pages : 61
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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The term "short round," of artillery inception, described a shell which fell short of its target. In Air Force employment, this term is somewhat altered: "A short round incident is defined as the air delivery of ordnance which results in injury or death to friendly military forces or noncombatants." This CHECO report depicts those short rounds delivered by fixed-wing aircraft, specifically those under the operational control of the Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Control Center (TACC). This report encompasses "short round" incidents reported from January through December 1971. It emphasizes a narrative of each incident with the factors leading up to the incident, the investigating officer's conclusions and recommendations, and the efforts made by commanders to minimize the recurrence of the accidental release of air-delivered ordnance on friendly military forces or noncombatants. A review of the authenticated "short rounds" in CHECO reports of previous years revealed that these incidents basically followed a general pattern of primary and contributing causes: pilot error, poor weather conditions, troop location unknown, weapon system malfunction, wrong target hit due to ground personnel error, poor communications, change in the ground situation, and inaccurate target marking. However, it was also noted that in a troops-in-contact situation the chance of a short round must be weighed against the possibility of heavy losses if close air support is not provided.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 104
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More than a decade of direct American military action in Indochina without a significant pause. for an exchange of prisoners or search for those missing in action ended in January 1973 with the repatriation of American prisoners of war held by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government (PRG) of South Vietnam (Viet Cong). In the wake of Operation Homecoming, however, 2,409 Americans, including 21 civilians remained unaccounted for. The total was divided almost equally between those listed as missing in action (MIA) and those labeled presumed dead but body not recovered (BNR). The number included 977 Air Force (MIA = 690, BNR = 287), 706 Army (MIA = 347, BNR = 359), 409 Navy (MIA = 132, BNR = 277), and 296 Marine (MIA = 105, BNR = 191) personnel, and 21 US civilians (MIA = 13, BNR = 8). Seventy-eight percent of all MIA/BNR incidents were connected with crash sites. The large Air Force total suggested a major difficulty in any proposed casualty resolution (CR) operations: the need to locate and examine crash sites scattered over remote sections of Indochina. Most BNR status Army, Navy, and Marine personnel were also connected with aircraft crashes.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 72
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Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U.S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 78
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In late 1961, when the United States accelerated aid to South Vietnam and Thailand, communications and control facilities were primitive and limited. A rudimentary Air Traffic Control System existed, using high frequency (HF) radio for communications and low frequency beacons for navigational aids. This was sufficient to handle the commercial traffic and existing military traffic. Increased U.S. air involvement, made necessary by the rapidly growing Communist guerrilla activities in South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand soon created a need for a comprehensive air request net and Tactical Air Control system (TACS) to control efficiently this increase in military traffic. On 1 October 1961, the 5th Communications and Control Group and the 1st Mobile Communications Squadron were reorganized. The two 5th Communications and Control Squadrons were deactivated and their personnel and equipment became absorbed in the 1st Mobile Communications Squadron, which was then redesignated the 1st Mobile Communications Group under the Air Force Communications Service. The 605th Tactical Control Squadron was deactivated, and the 5th Communications and Control Group became the 5th Tactical Control Group under the Thirteenth Air Force at Clark Air Base, Philippines. The USAF initially inserted TDY units into South Vietnam and Thailand in November 1961, with elements of the 5th and 507th (Shaw AFB, South Carolina) Tactical Control Groups and the 1st Mobile Communications Group (MCG), which had already acquired the sobriquet of "1st Mob." These mobile units consisted basically of navigational aids (navaids) and single channel high frequency radio systems to link the widely spread activities. As the tempo of operations increased and the extent of USAF participation grew to match the increase insurgency activity, these communications systems proved barely adequate for several reasons. The nucleus for a TACS in Southeast Asia had, however, been formed.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 167
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Author:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 117
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When hostilities began in Southeast Asia, the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service was not fully prepared to enter into armed conflict. The assumption that wartime Search and Rescue (SAR) was an extension of peacetime SAR was in error. This was quickly recognized during the early days of the conflict. In 1964, the only rotary wing aircraft available to be deployed to SEA was the HH-43B assigned to the Local Base Rescue (LBR) units. The amphibious HU-16 and the HC-54 were the only fixed-wing aircraft available. Both these aircraft had a limited rescue and recovery capability. HC-54s, made available as command and control aircraft, were also limited in mission capability. The Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service was forced to take helicopter aircraft from other Air Force missions to provide a partially adequate SAR capability in SEA. Even then it took three years to fully develop and position the required forces. In October 1965, six CH-3C helicopters, modified for combat rescue service, were deployed to SEA. After deployment and additional modifications, they were redesignated the HH-3E (Jolly Green Giant), and became increasingly responsible for the out-country Aircrew Recovery (ACR) mission in Laos, North Vietnam, and the Gulf of Tonkin. Twelve HH-43F (Pedros) were also configured for combat recoveries to augment the HH-43B which had been performing the out-country ACR mission since deployment in October 1964. By January 1967, HH-43 out-country missions had ended. The HC-54s were replaced by the HC-130H/P, a far more suitable aircraft for command and control. Quick access to a downed aircrew member was a crucial element in a successful recovery, but significantly faster helicopters were years away in development. Therefore, longer endurance was vitally necessary to enable the rescue craft to loiter on orbit nearer the areas in which aircraft were likely to be lost.
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 74
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Book Description
The traditional interpretation of the tactical reconnaissance mission as a highly mobile, self-sufficient operation prepared to "know continuously the enemy's capabilities and location" has been reemphasized by the recent military experience in Southeast Asia. A premium has been placed by several factors on the element of surprise, on detection of an enemy able to conceal himself more effectively than ever before, and on the most rapid possible response to requirements established by ground and air forces. Many axioms guiding reconnaissance organization and operations in the past have been reexamined and questioned in the light of conditions encountered in Southeast Asia. The task of providing "needed intelligence information during all phases and for the full spectrum of conflict" has created special problems yet to be fully resolved. This report reviews the expansion and growth in sophistication of the tactical reconnaissance mission in Southeast Asia (SEA) conducted by the United States Air Force from June 1966 to June 1969, noting at the same time the salient problems involved. Tactical reconnaissance emphasizes flexibility in its organization and operation; it can be deployed in package units or through various combinations of reconnaissance aircraft, sensors, and other detection devices as required by the joint force. The Wing, therefore, constitutes the basic tactical unit, small enough to fulfill mobility requirements and still provide from its own resources all the services of a tactical reconnaissance system. The broad scope of the Wing's mission can be seen in a summary of the work of the 432d Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TRW) at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB).
