Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report. Air Response to the Tet Offensive, 30 January - 29 February 1968 PDF Download
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Languages : en
Pages : 110
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This report traces the 1968 Communist Tet Offensive in Vietnam. Significant events which had an impact on airpower, and the application and responsiveness of air, are examined during this period of extremely heightened military activity. Air response ranged across the entire spectrum of air capability, from tactical airstrikes to the ground defense of air installations. Close support of ground troops in cities, air base defense, VNAF performance, emergency airlift, and civic responsiveness are all examined in this report.
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Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 110
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Book Description
This report traces the 1968 Communist Tet Offensive in Vietnam. Significant events which had an impact on airpower, and the application and responsiveness of air, are examined during this period of extremely heightened military activity. Air response ranged across the entire spectrum of air capability, from tactical airstrikes to the ground defense of air installations. Close support of ground troops in cities, air base defense, VNAF performance, emergency airlift, and civic responsiveness are all examined in this report.
Author: A. W. Thompson (Major.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Tet Offensive, 1968
Languages : en
Pages : 93
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 124
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On the night of 22-23 February 1969, the Communist forces in South Vietnam launched a major offensive. The ensuing action was variously called "The Post-Tet Offensive of 1969" and "The Winter-Spring Offensive of 1969". Since the enemy initiative was the fourth in a series of offensives beginning with the infamous Tet Campaign of 1968, this report is titled: "The Fourth Offensive Concerned with air response to the Fourth Offensive, the opening chapter establishes the enemy in South Vietnam, explains his goals, and describes his weaknesses and strengths. The second chapter provides an overview of the Fourth Offensive and the continuing Allied operations to deny the enemy the benefits of the initiative. It also compares the Fourth Offensive to its three predecessors, and then briefly analyzes the broad employment of airpower during the period of enemy attacks. The third, fourth, and fifth chapters describe the air and ground activity that occurred in the various geographical areas known as Corps Tactical Zones (CTZs). The concluding chapter reflects on the military lessons to be learned by a study of the Fourth Offensive. During the period of this report, the Allied forces in Vietnam were forbidden to take offensive action on a strategic scale. Offensive air operations were prohibited over Cambodia and North Vietnam and Allied ground forces were restricted to within the borders of South Vietnam. Although air interdiction continued in Laos, most of the air activity in South Vietnam was directly related to the fire and maneuver of the forces on the ground. Therefore, for the most part, the air response to the enemy offensive must be explained in concert with the scheme of ground operations. Clearly, the concept of the Allies was one of vigorous tactical offense within the imposed bounds of a strategic defense. The enemy did not assault a static systems of defense; the Allies moved out to meet the enemy in an effort to spoil his attack and preempt the initiative.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 62
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"Air-to-Air Encounters over North Vietnam, 1 July 1967-31 December 1968," describes and analyzes four periods of air-to-air activity before the bombing halt on 1 November 1968. It also depicts the relative strengths of United States air power and North Vietnamese air defenses in the months which followed their struggle for air supremacy. This publication reviews briefly events before 1 July 1967, as it is a continuation of CHECO report, "Air-to-Air Encounters over North Vietnam, 1 January-30 June 1967."
Author: Warren A. Trest
Publisher: Military Bookshop
ISBN: 9781780398075
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 166
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Book Description
High quality reprint of this recently declassified 1968 study.Operation NIAGARA was a concentrated air effort executed by the 7th Air Force Commander in early 1968 to disrupt a potential major offensive in northwestern I Corps and the contiguous area of Laos An extensive enemy build-up in the western DMZ area in late 1967 and early 1968 indicated that a major offensive was developing, with the estimated objective of overrunning Khe Sanh and other friendly positions located astride Route 9--the most readily accessible infiltration route for North Vietnamese forces bypassing the DMZ into South Vietnam It was further estimated that the enemy would launch his offensive on or about 30 January-when the South Vietnamese would be observing the Lunar New Year Thus, at the direction of COMUSMACV, the 7th Air Force Commander and his operations and intelligence staff planned and directed SLAM-type operations in the NIAGARA area several days prior to the Tet Holidays. These operations were accorded the highest priority, and were applied on a sustained basis SLAM-type operations began in the NIAGARA area on 22 January, with 595 tactical strike sorties (including 7AF, USMC, and USN) and 49 B-52 sorties flown against enemy targets When Operation NIAGARA officially terminated on 31 March 1968, over 24,400 tactical strike sorties and 2,500 B-52 sorties had been flown This was the greatest sustained concentration of airpower in the Vietnam conflict to date The purpose of this report is to bring the statistical weight of effort into proper perspective through the narrative study and documentation of significant developments It addresses in particular those operational areas of 7th Air Force evaluative concern-i.e. operational problems and lessons learned, coordination and control, the development of targets and tactics, and the responsiveness of airpower to the tactical situation.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 82
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Book Description
This third "ROLLING THUNDER" CHECO report about air operations against North Vietnam is concerned primarily with the plans, statistics, and eventual results of the program for the years 1967 and 1968. Although the Air Force role is stressed, vital contributions from other services are recorded to achieve proper balance; basic trends and comparisons are valid In January 1967, air operations forced Hanoi to pay heavily for its aggression against the Republic of Vietnam. In addition, airstrikes had generated serious economic upheavals in North Vietnam, and had presented a dramatic picture of U.S. power and determination, culminating in the initiation of negotiations in Paris. Planning for airstrikes against North Vietnam began in June 1964, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) asked CINCPAC to prepare targets in North Vietnam for airstrikes. ROLLING THUNDER (RT) attacks began in March 1965, and are detailed in two earlier CHECO reports. References made to the ROLLING THUNDER Target List (RTTL) refer to JCS' Designated Targets that required JCS' authorization for a strike. The lists, constantly in a state of change, due to additions and deletions, were numbered: RT 1, 2, 3, etc. The Alpha Targets of the RTTL were those considered the most critical in Route Packages V and VIA (ROLLING THUNDER Handbook, July 1968). A more detailed explanation of the ROLLING THUNDER Target List is presented in Section II of this handbook.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 122
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This report traces the 1968 Communist Winter-Spring campaign in the Saigon area. The three distinct phases of enemy attacks -- the Tet Offensive, the rocket assaults beginning on 18 February, and the May Offensive -- are examined in light of air response. Particular emphasis is placed on examining the resultant damage in the urban area plus the requirement for and the effectiveness of fixed wing aircraft in urban guerrilla warfare. During the series of offensives on Saigon, command of U.S., FWMAF, and RVNAF forces was maintained by National Commanders. Combined operations involving the above forces were founded upon the principle of cooperation, coordination, mutual support, and close partnership at all echelons. The defense and security of Saigon were delegated by the Commanding General, III Corps, to the Commanding Officer of the Capital Military District (CMD), the area encompassing Saigon and its environs. To accomplish his assigned missions, the Commanding Officer (CO) of the CMD had operational control of all RVNAF units except designated General Reserve units stationed or deployed into the CMD. At the onset of the enemy Spring Offensive, command relationships in the CMD were not designed to facilitate conducting a major combined defensive campaign in Gia Dinh and Saigon. The subsequent CMD reorganization and birth of the Capital Military Assistance Command (CMAC) will be discussed in a separate report.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 203
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Book Description
This CHECO report on Lam Son 719, the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos in February and March 1971, is an interim narrative of what was one of the most significant military actions in Southeast Asia since the enemy's 1968 Tet Offensive. It also is a report on one of the most fundamental problems faced by Americans in the Vietnam conflict--the proper employment of American technological superiority, mainly air power, against an enemy highly skilled in the elusive art of jungle warfare and equipped with modern sophisticated weaponry with the exception of aircraft. Lam Son 719 was the first major operation of its kind - a cross-border activity in which large South Vietnamese ground forces operated independently without U.S. Army ground advisors but with almost complete dependence upon U.S. air support. Yet in Lam Son 719, some of the problems associated with the U.S. effort since 1962 reappeared and had to be resolved to meet the particular situation. Primary among these was the before-the-fact coordination of air support for ground or airmobile operations to fit the needs of a fluid ground situation. Also of significance was the problem of locating the enemy and bringing the maximum firepower to bear on him. Despite these problems, Lam Son 719 showed that a large Vietnamese ground force, which had remained on the sidelines for years, could move into the enemy stronghold given U.S. air support. This was a critical test of its capability, a test which would have a great impact upon plans for American withdrawal from Vietnam.
Author:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 157
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Book Description
Operation NIAGARA was a concentrated air effort executed by the 7th Air Force Commander in early 1968 to disrupt a potential major offensive in northwestern I Corps and the contiguous area of Laos An extensive enemy build-up in the western DMZ area in late 1967 and early 1968 indicated that a major offensive was developing, with the estimated objective of overrunning Khe Sanh and other friendly positions located astride Route 9--the most readily accessible infiltration route for North Vietnamese forces bypassing the DMZ into South Vietnam It was further estimated that the enemy would launch his offensive on or about 30 January-when the South Vietnamese would be observing the Lunar New Year Thus, at the direction of COMUSMACV, the 7th Air Force Commander and his operations and intelligence staff planned and directed SLAM-type operations in the NIAGARA area several days prior to the Tet Holidays. These operations were accorded the highest priority, and were applied on a sustained basis SLAM-type operations began in the NIAGARA area on 22 January, with 595 tactical strike sorties (including 7AF, USMC, and USN) and 49 B-52 sorties flown against enemy targets When Operation NIAGARA officially terminated on 31 March 1968, over 24,400 tactical strike sorties and 2,500 B-52 sorties had been flown This was the greatest sustained concentration of airpower in the Vietnam conflict to date The purpose of this report is to bring the statistical weight of effort into proper perspective through the narrative study and documentation of significant developments It addresses in particular those operational areas of 7th Air Force evaluative concern-i.e. operational problems and lessons learned, coordination and control, the development of targets and tactics, and the responsiveness of airpower to the tactical situation.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
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