Author: Robert Sonné Cohen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 489
Book Description
Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science
Author: Robert Sonné Cohen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 489
Book Description
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 489
Book Description
Proceedings of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science 1964/1966
Author: Robert S. Cohen
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401035083
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 539
Book Description
This third volume of Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science contains papers which are based upon Colloquia from 1964 to 1966. In most cases, they have been substantially modified subsequent to presentation and discussion. Once again we publish work which goes beyond technical analysis of scientific theories and explanations in order to include philo sophical reflections upon the history of science and also upon the still problematic interactions between metaphysics and science. The philo sophical history of scientific ideas has increasingly been recognized as part of the philosophy of science, and likewise the cultural context of the genesis of such ideas. There is no school or attitude to be taken as de fining the scope or criteria of our Colloquium, and so we seek to under stand both analytic and historical aspects of science. This volume, as the previous two, constitutes a substantial part of our final report to the U. S. National Science Foundation, which has continued its support of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science by a grant to Boston University. That report will be concluded by a subse quent volume of these Studies. It is a pleasure to record our thanks to the Foundation for its confidence and funds. We dedicate this book to the memory of Norwood Russell Hanson. During this academic year of 1966-67, this beloved and distinguished American philosopher participated in our Colloquium, and he did so before.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401035083
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 539
Book Description
This third volume of Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science contains papers which are based upon Colloquia from 1964 to 1966. In most cases, they have been substantially modified subsequent to presentation and discussion. Once again we publish work which goes beyond technical analysis of scientific theories and explanations in order to include philo sophical reflections upon the history of science and also upon the still problematic interactions between metaphysics and science. The philo sophical history of scientific ideas has increasingly been recognized as part of the philosophy of science, and likewise the cultural context of the genesis of such ideas. There is no school or attitude to be taken as de fining the scope or criteria of our Colloquium, and so we seek to under stand both analytic and historical aspects of science. This volume, as the previous two, constitutes a substantial part of our final report to the U. S. National Science Foundation, which has continued its support of the Boston Colloquium for the Philosophy of Science by a grant to Boston University. That report will be concluded by a subse quent volume of these Studies. It is a pleasure to record our thanks to the Foundation for its confidence and funds. We dedicate this book to the memory of Norwood Russell Hanson. During this academic year of 1966-67, this beloved and distinguished American philosopher participated in our Colloquium, and he did so before.
The Limits of Logical Empiricism
Author: Alfons Keupink
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 140204299X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 405
Book Description
This volume collects some of the most significant papers of Arthur Pap. Pap’s work played an important role in the development of the analytic tradition. This goes beyond the merely historical fact of Pap’s influential views of dispositional and modal concepts. Pap's writings in philosophy of science, modality, and philosophy of mathematics provide insightful alternative perspectives on philosophical problems of current interest.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 140204299X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 405
Book Description
This volume collects some of the most significant papers of Arthur Pap. Pap’s work played an important role in the development of the analytic tradition. This goes beyond the merely historical fact of Pap’s influential views of dispositional and modal concepts. Pap's writings in philosophy of science, modality, and philosophy of mathematics provide insightful alternative perspectives on philosophical problems of current interest.
Philosophical Lectures on Probability
Author: Bruno de Finetti
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1402082029
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 239
Book Description
Bruno de Finetti (1906–1985) is the founder of the subjective interpretation of probability, together with the British philosopher Frank Plumpton Ramsey. His related notion of “exchangeability” revolutionized the statistical methodology. This book (based on a course held in 1979) explains in a language accessible also to non-mathematicians the fundamental tenets and implications of subjectivism, according to which the probability of any well specified fact F refers to the degree of belief actually held by someone, on the ground of her whole knowledge, on the truth of the assertion that F obtains.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1402082029
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 239
Book Description
Bruno de Finetti (1906–1985) is the founder of the subjective interpretation of probability, together with the British philosopher Frank Plumpton Ramsey. His related notion of “exchangeability” revolutionized the statistical methodology. This book (based on a course held in 1979) explains in a language accessible also to non-mathematicians the fundamental tenets and implications of subjectivism, according to which the probability of any well specified fact F refers to the degree of belief actually held by someone, on the ground of her whole knowledge, on the truth of the assertion that F obtains.
Method, Model and Matter
Author: M. Bunge
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401025193
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 202
Book Description
This collection of essays deals with three clusters of problems in the philo sophy of science: scientific method, conceptual models, and ontological underpinnings. The disjointedness of topics is more apparent than real, since the whole book is concerned with the scientific knowledge of fact. Now, the aim of factual knowledge is the conceptual grasping of being, and this understanding is provided by theories of whatever there may be. If the theories are testable and specific, such as a theory of a particular chemical reaction, then they are often called 'theoretical models' and clas sed as scientific. If the theories are extremely general, like a theory of syn thesis and dissociation without any reference to a particular kind of stuff, then they may be called 'metaphysical' - as well as 'scientific' if they are consonant with science. Between these two extremes there is a whole gamut of kinds of factual theories. Thus the entire spectrum should be dominated by the scientific method, quite irrespective of the subject matter. This is the leitmotiv of the present book. The introductory chapter, on method in the philosophy of science, tackles the question 'Why don't scientists listen to their philosophers?'.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401025193
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 202
Book Description
This collection of essays deals with three clusters of problems in the philo sophy of science: scientific method, conceptual models, and ontological underpinnings. The disjointedness of topics is more apparent than real, since the whole book is concerned with the scientific knowledge of fact. Now, the aim of factual knowledge is the conceptual grasping of being, and this understanding is provided by theories of whatever there may be. If the theories are testable and specific, such as a theory of a particular chemical reaction, then they are often called 'theoretical models' and clas sed as scientific. If the theories are extremely general, like a theory of syn thesis and dissociation without any reference to a particular kind of stuff, then they may be called 'metaphysical' - as well as 'scientific' if they are consonant with science. Between these two extremes there is a whole gamut of kinds of factual theories. Thus the entire spectrum should be dominated by the scientific method, quite irrespective of the subject matter. This is the leitmotiv of the present book. The introductory chapter, on method in the philosophy of science, tackles the question 'Why don't scientists listen to their philosophers?'.
The Justification of Scientific Change
Author: C.R. Kordig
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401017344
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 146
Book Description
In this book I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I con sider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. My position is in opposition to some widely influential and current views. Revolutionary new ideas concerning the philosophy of science have recently been advanced by Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. There are differences among their views and each in some respect differs from the others. It is, however, not the differences, but rather the similarities that are of primary concern to me here. The claim that there are pervasive presuppositions fundamental to scientific in vestigations seems to be essential to the views of these men. Each would further hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that total replace ment, not reduction, is what does, and should, occur during scientific revolutions. I argue that the proposed arguments for radical observational variance, for radical meaning variance, and for radical variance of regulative standards with respect to scientific transitions all fail. I further argue that these positions are in themselves implausible and methodologically undesirable. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of radical meaning variance theorists.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9401017344
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 146
Book Description
In this book I discuss the justification of scientific change and argue that it rests on different sorts of invariance. Against this background I con sider notions of observation, meaning, and regulative standards. My position is in opposition to some widely influential and current views. Revolutionary new ideas concerning the philosophy of science have recently been advanced by Feyerabend, Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and others. There are differences among their views and each in some respect differs from the others. It is, however, not the differences, but rather the similarities that are of primary concern to me here. The claim that there are pervasive presuppositions fundamental to scientific in vestigations seems to be essential to the views of these men. Each would further hold that transitions from one scientific tradition to another force radical changes in what is observed, in the meanings of the terms employed, and in the metastandards involved. They would claim that total replace ment, not reduction, is what does, and should, occur during scientific revolutions. I argue that the proposed arguments for radical observational variance, for radical meaning variance, and for radical variance of regulative standards with respect to scientific transitions all fail. I further argue that these positions are in themselves implausible and methodologically undesirable. I sketch an account of the rationale of scientific change which preserves the merits and avoids the shortcomings of the approach of radical meaning variance theorists.
Time: A Philosophical Analysis
Author: T. Chapman
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9400979045
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 181
Book Description
This book is intended as an exposition of a particular theory of time in the sense of an interrelated set of attempted solutions to philosophical problems about it. Generally speaking there are two views about time held by philosophers and some scientists interested in philosophical issues. The first called the A-theory (after McTaggart's expression A-determinations for the properties of being past, present or future) is often thought to be closer to our commonsense view of time or to the concept of time presupposed by ordinary language. It includes at least the following theses, (a) Logic ought really to include tensed quantifiers for existence on one of its important usages means, present existence. More generally, we can't reduce all tensed locutions to tenseless ones. (b) The distinction between past, present and future is an objective one. It is not, for example, dependent on our consciousness of change; some A-theorists hold also, that the distinction, in effect, is an absolute one.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9400979045
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 181
Book Description
This book is intended as an exposition of a particular theory of time in the sense of an interrelated set of attempted solutions to philosophical problems about it. Generally speaking there are two views about time held by philosophers and some scientists interested in philosophical issues. The first called the A-theory (after McTaggart's expression A-determinations for the properties of being past, present or future) is often thought to be closer to our commonsense view of time or to the concept of time presupposed by ordinary language. It includes at least the following theses, (a) Logic ought really to include tensed quantifiers for existence on one of its important usages means, present existence. More generally, we can't reduce all tensed locutions to tenseless ones. (b) The distinction between past, present and future is an objective one. It is not, for example, dependent on our consciousness of change; some A-theorists hold also, that the distinction, in effect, is an absolute one.
Combinators, λ-Terms and Proof Theory
Author: S. Stenlund
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 940102913X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 186
Book Description
The aim of this monograph is to present some of the basic ideas and results in pure combinatory logic and their applications to some topics in proof theory, and also to present some work of my own. Some of the material in chapter 1 and 3 has already appeared in my notes Introduction to Combinatory Logic. It appears here in revised form since the presen tation in my notes is inaccurate in several respects. I would like to express my gratitude to Stig Kanger for his invalu able advice and encouragement and also for his assistance in a wide variety of matters concerned with my study in Uppsala. I am also in debted to Per Martin-USf for many valuable and instructive conversa tions. As will be seen in chapter 4 and 5, I also owe much to the work of Dag Prawitz and W. W. Tait. My thanks also to Craig McKay who read the manuscript and made valuable suggestions. I want, however, to emphasize that the shortcomings that no doubt can be found, are my sole responsibility. Uppsala, February 1972.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 940102913X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 186
Book Description
The aim of this monograph is to present some of the basic ideas and results in pure combinatory logic and their applications to some topics in proof theory, and also to present some work of my own. Some of the material in chapter 1 and 3 has already appeared in my notes Introduction to Combinatory Logic. It appears here in revised form since the presen tation in my notes is inaccurate in several respects. I would like to express my gratitude to Stig Kanger for his invalu able advice and encouragement and also for his assistance in a wide variety of matters concerned with my study in Uppsala. I am also in debted to Per Martin-USf for many valuable and instructive conversa tions. As will be seen in chapter 4 and 5, I also owe much to the work of Dag Prawitz and W. W. Tait. My thanks also to Craig McKay who read the manuscript and made valuable suggestions. I want, however, to emphasize that the shortcomings that no doubt can be found, are my sole responsibility. Uppsala, February 1972.
Truthlikeness
Author: I. Niiniluoto
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9400937393
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 542
Book Description
The modern discussion on the concept of truthlikeness was started in 1960. In his influential Word and Object, W. V. O. Quine argued that Charles Peirce's definition of truth as the limit of inquiry is faulty for the reason that the notion 'nearer than' is only "defined for numbers and not for theories". In his contribution to the 1960 International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science at Stan ford, Karl Popper defended the opposite view by defining a compara tive notion of verisimilitude for theories. was originally introduced by the The concept of verisimilitude Ancient sceptics to moderate their radical thesis of the inaccessibility of truth. But soon verisimilitudo, indicating likeness to the truth, was confused with probabilitas, which expresses an opiniotative attitude weaker than full certainty. The idea of truthlikeness fell in disrepute also as a result of the careless, often confused and metaphysically loaded way in which many philosophers used - and still use - such concepts as 'degree of truth', 'approximate truth', 'partial truth', and 'approach to the truth'. Popper's great achievement was his insight that the criticism against truthlikeness - by those who urge that it is meaningless to speak about 'closeness to truth' - is more based on prejudice than argument.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9400937393
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 542
Book Description
The modern discussion on the concept of truthlikeness was started in 1960. In his influential Word and Object, W. V. O. Quine argued that Charles Peirce's definition of truth as the limit of inquiry is faulty for the reason that the notion 'nearer than' is only "defined for numbers and not for theories". In his contribution to the 1960 International Congress for Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science at Stan ford, Karl Popper defended the opposite view by defining a compara tive notion of verisimilitude for theories. was originally introduced by the The concept of verisimilitude Ancient sceptics to moderate their radical thesis of the inaccessibility of truth. But soon verisimilitudo, indicating likeness to the truth, was confused with probabilitas, which expresses an opiniotative attitude weaker than full certainty. The idea of truthlikeness fell in disrepute also as a result of the careless, often confused and metaphysically loaded way in which many philosophers used - and still use - such concepts as 'degree of truth', 'approximate truth', 'partial truth', and 'approach to the truth'. Popper's great achievement was his insight that the criticism against truthlikeness - by those who urge that it is meaningless to speak about 'closeness to truth' - is more based on prejudice than argument.
Rational Changes in Science
Author: Joseph C. Pitt
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9400937792
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 234
Book Description
THE PROBLEMS OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY Fashion is a fickle mistress. Only yesterday scientific rationality enjoyed considerable attention, consideration, and even reverence among phi losophers; "but today's fashion leads us to despise it, and the matron, rejected and abandoned as Hecuba, complains; modo maxima rerum, tot generis natisque potens - nunc trahor exui, inops", to cite Kant for our purpose, who cited Ovid for his. Like every fashion, ours also has its paradoxical aspects, as John Watkins correctly reminds in an essay in this volume. Enthusiasm for science was high among philosophers when significant scientific results were mostly a promise, it declined when that promise became an undeniable reality. Nevertheless, as with the decline of any fashion, even the revolt against scientific rationality has some reasonable grounds. If the taste of the philosophical community has changed so much, it is not due to an incident or a whim. This volume is not about the history of and reasons for this change. Instead, it provides a view of the new emerging image of scientific rationality in both its philosophical and historical aspects. In particular, the aim of the contributions gathered here is to focus on the concept around which the discussions about rationality have mostly taken place: scientific change.
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9400937792
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 234
Book Description
THE PROBLEMS OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY Fashion is a fickle mistress. Only yesterday scientific rationality enjoyed considerable attention, consideration, and even reverence among phi losophers; "but today's fashion leads us to despise it, and the matron, rejected and abandoned as Hecuba, complains; modo maxima rerum, tot generis natisque potens - nunc trahor exui, inops", to cite Kant for our purpose, who cited Ovid for his. Like every fashion, ours also has its paradoxical aspects, as John Watkins correctly reminds in an essay in this volume. Enthusiasm for science was high among philosophers when significant scientific results were mostly a promise, it declined when that promise became an undeniable reality. Nevertheless, as with the decline of any fashion, even the revolt against scientific rationality has some reasonable grounds. If the taste of the philosophical community has changed so much, it is not due to an incident or a whim. This volume is not about the history of and reasons for this change. Instead, it provides a view of the new emerging image of scientific rationality in both its philosophical and historical aspects. In particular, the aim of the contributions gathered here is to focus on the concept around which the discussions about rationality have mostly taken place: scientific change.