Price Experimentation with Strategic Buyers

Price Experimentation with Strategic Buyers PDF Author: Oksana Loginova
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26

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Book Description
A two-period model in which a monopolist endeavors to learn about the permanent demand parameter of a specific repeat buyer is investigated. The buyer may strategically reject the seller's first-period offer for one of two reasons. First, in order to conceal information (i.e., to pool), a high-valuation buyer may reject high prices that would never be accepted by a low-valuation buyer. Second, in order to reveal information (i.e., to signal), a low-valuation buyer may reject low prices that would always be accepted by a high-valuation buyer. Given this, the seller often finds it optimal to post prices that reveal no useful information. Indeed, in the equilibrium where there is no signaling, the seller never charges an informative first-period price. Learning may occur in the equilibrium where there is maximal signaling, but the scope for learning is quite limited even in this case. Indeed, in order to preempt information transmission through signaling, the seller may be induced to set a first-period price strictly below the buyer's lowest possible valuation.

Price Experimentation with Strategic Buyers

Price Experimentation with Strategic Buyers PDF Author: Oksana Loginova
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 26

Get Book Here

Book Description
A two-period model in which a monopolist endeavors to learn about the permanent demand parameter of a specific repeat buyer is investigated. The buyer may strategically reject the seller's first-period offer for one of two reasons. First, in order to conceal information (i.e., to pool), a high-valuation buyer may reject high prices that would never be accepted by a low-valuation buyer. Second, in order to reveal information (i.e., to signal), a low-valuation buyer may reject low prices that would always be accepted by a high-valuation buyer. Given this, the seller often finds it optimal to post prices that reveal no useful information. Indeed, in the equilibrium where there is no signaling, the seller never charges an informative first-period price. Learning may occur in the equilibrium where there is maximal signaling, but the scope for learning is quite limited even in this case. Indeed, in order to preempt information transmission through signaling, the seller may be induced to set a first-period price strictly below the buyer's lowest possible valuation.

The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing

The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing PDF Author: Thomas T. Nagle
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1351733729
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 332

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Book Description
The Strategy and Tactics of Pricing explains how to manage markets strategically and how to grow more profitably. Rather than calculating prices to cover costs or achieve sales goals, students will learn to make strategic pricing decisions that proactively manage customer perceptions of value, motivate purchasing decisions, and shift demand curves. This edition features a new discussion on harnessing concepts from behavioral economics as well as a more streamlined "value cascade" structure to the topics. Readers will also benefit from: Major revisions to almost half of the chapters, including an expanded discussion of big data analytics and a revised chapter on "Specialized Strategies", which addresses timely technical issues like foreign exchange risks, reactions to market slumps, and managing transfer prices between independent profit centers. A completely rewritten chapter on "Creating a Strategic Pricing Capability", which shows readers how to implement the principles of value-based, strategic pricing successfully in their organizations. In-chapter textboxes, updated to provide walk-through examples of current pricing challenges, revenue models enabled by an increasingly digital economy, and advances in buyer decision-making, explained through classic principles that still apply today. Chapter summaries and visual aids, which help readers grasp the theoretical frameworks and actionable principles of pricing analysis. This comprehensive, managerially-focused text is a must-read for students and professionals with an interest in strategic marketing and pricing. A companion website features PowerPoint slides and an instructor’s manual, including exercises, mini-cases, and examination questions.

Experimentation in Markets

Experimentation in Markets PDF Author: Dick Bergemann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We present a model of entry and exit with Bayesian learning and price competition. A new product of initially unknown quality is introduced in the market, and purchases of the product yield information on its true quality. We assume that the performance of the new product is publicly observable. As agents learn from the experiments of others, informational externalities arise. We determine the Markov Perfect Equilibrium prices and allocations. In a single market, the combination of the informational externalities among the buyers and the strategic pricing by the sellers results in excessive experimentation. If the new product is launched in many distinct markets, the path of sales converges to the efficient path in the limit as the number of markets grows.

Pricing Decisions in the Presence of Interacting and Strategic Buyers Purchasing Multiple Units

Pricing Decisions in the Presence of Interacting and Strategic Buyers Purchasing Multiple Units PDF Author: Hale Catmakas
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

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Book Description
We study the pricing problem of a seller offering a single item to buyers purchasing multiple units in two periods. Each buyer aims to maximize her total utility over two periods, and is strategic in two dimensions: she may delay the purchase in anticipation of a price discount (at the expense of a reduced utility), and takes other buyers into account when determining her purchase quantity. The seller sequentially sets the price in each period to maximize his profit. We show the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium of the game between the buyers and derive the equilibrium of the two-stage sequential game between the seller and the buyers. Analysis reveals that strategic buyer interaction shifts the purchases to the later period, which in turn leads the seller to lower the price. Thus, buyer interaction decreases the seller's profit while almost always benefiting the buyers. The seller's profit decreases further if he ignores the buyer interaction. Through numerical analysis, we quantify the loss to the seller due to buyer interaction and due to ignoring the interaction. As a remedial policy to deter strategic buyer behavior, we study commitment pricing where the retailer announces a price path at the beginning of the selling horizon. The seller prefers commitment pricing over sequential pricing when the buyers are impatient or when the cost of the item in the earlier period is relatively low since the seller can induce early purchases in such cases.

Prices as Signals of Quality

Prices as Signals of Quality PDF Author: Carla Guadalupi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 79

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Book Description
This paper examines the optimal pricing strategy for newly introduced experience goods in a two-period monopoly market with experimentation and private information about quality. Consumers learn about quality through price signaling and experimentation, and communicate their ndings to other buyers via word of mouth. We show the existence of a unique separating equilibrium that satis es the intuitive criterion. In this equilibrium, a high-quality seller signals high quality through a low introductory price that rises in the next period (after experimentation has occurred), while a low-quality one charges a high introductory price, which declines over time because the revealed information is likely to be bad. This result helps explain recent empirical evidence and case studies on the introductory pricing strategies of rms entering foreign product markets.

Experiments and Competition Policy

Experiments and Competition Policy PDF Author: Jeroen Hinloopen
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521493420
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 329

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Book Description
Economists have begun to make much greater use of experimental methods in their research. This collection surveys these methods and shows how they can help us to understand firm behaviour in relation to various forms of competition policy.

Advances in Experimental Markets

Advances in Experimental Markets PDF Author: Timothy Cason
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642564488
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 255

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Book Description
Experimental methods are now a mainstream empirical methodology in economics. The papers in this volume represent some recent developments in research on experimental markets. The articles span a variety of topics related to experimental markets, including auctions, taxation, institutional differences, coordination in markets, and learning. Contributors to the volume include many of the most distinguished researchers in the area.

Experimental Economics

Experimental Economics PDF Author: Douglas D. Davis
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691233373
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 586

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Book Description
A small but increasing number of economists have begun to use laboratory experiments to evaluate economic propositions under carefully controlled conditions. Experimental Economics is the first comprehensive treatment of this rapidly growing area of research. While the book acknowledges that laboratory experiments are no panacea, it argues cogently for their effectiveness in selected situations. Covering methodological and procedural issues as well as theory, Experimental Economics is not only a textbook but also a useful introduction to laboratory methods for professional economists. Although the authors present some new material, their emphasis is on organizing and evaluating existing results. The book can be used as an anchoring device for a course at either the graduate or advanced undergraduate level. Applications include financial market experiments, oligopoly price competition, auctions, bargaining, provision of public goods, experimental games, and decision making under uncertainty. The book also contains instructions for a variety of laboratory experiments.

Dynamic Price Cometition with Capacity Constraints and Strategic Buyers

Dynamic Price Cometition with Capacity Constraints and Strategic Buyers PDF Author: Gary Biglaiser
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 43

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Book Description


Strategy, Predation, and Antitrust Analysis

Strategy, Predation, and Antitrust Analysis PDF Author: Steven C. Salop
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Antitrust law
Languages : en
Pages : 772

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Book Description