Price Dispersion and Learning in a Dynamic Differential-goods Duopoly PDF Download
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Author: Godfrey Keller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Author: Godfrey Keller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31
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Author: Godfrey Keller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Duopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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Author: Godfrey Keller
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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We study the evolution of prices in a symmetric duopoly where firms are uncertain about the degree of product differentiation. Customers sometimes perceive the products as close substitutes, sometimes as highly differentiated. Firms learn about their competitive environment from the quantities sold and a background signal. As the information of the market outcomes increases with the price differential, there is scope for active learning. In a setting with linear demand curves, we derive firms' pricing strategies as payoff-symmetric mixed or correlated Markov perfect equilibria of a stochastic differential game where the common posterior belief is the natural state variable. When information has low value, firms charge the same price as would be set by myopic players, and there is no price dispersion. When firms value information more highly, on the other hand, they actively learn by creating price dispersion. This market experimentation is transient, and most likely to be observed when the firms' environment changes sufficiently often, but not too frequently.
Author: Ahmad Naimzada
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Lijia Ge
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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In this paper, we formulate a differential game model to investigate firms' competition in both price and product R&D. The significant features of our research include: (i) incorporating the factor of network effects into the framework of continuous dynamic competition; (ii) considering the consumers' adaptive learning about the network size in the spirit of behavioral economics. Our analysis mainly suggests: (i) The network effects and consumers' adaptive learning comprehensively have negative effects on the result of price competition but has nothing to do with the result of R&D competition under duopoly, which is not true as the number of firms increases; (ii) the incentive to acquire competitors' state information is increasing with the intensity of network effects and the consumers' learning speed; (iii) when we consider the competition among more than three firms under feedback information structure, the competition intensity has negative effect on the steady-state quality stock; (iv) in a market where the consumers show strong price sensitivity, the product quality is under-provided compared with the first-best optimal level regardless of the choice of solution concept.
Author: Compiled by the British Library of Political and Economic Science
Publisher: Psychology Press
ISBN: 9780415354776
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 698
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First published in 1952, the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (anthropology, economics, political science, and sociology) is well established as a major bibliographic reference for students, researchers and librarians in the social sciences worldwide. Key features * Authority: Rigorous standards are applied to make the IBSS the most authoritative selective bibliography ever produced. Articles and books are selected on merit by some of the world's most expert librarians and academics. * Breadth: today the IBSS covers over 2000 journals - more than any other comparable resource. The latest monograph publications are also included. * International Coverage: the IBSS reviews scholarship published in over 30 languages, including publications from Eastern Europe and the developing world. * User friendly organization: all non-English titles are word sections. Extensive author, subject and place name indexes are provided in both English and French.
Author: Ching-jen Sun
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Prices
Languages : en
Pages : 120
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Abstract: This dissertation develops three essays on dynamic pricing to investigate two important topics in industrial organization: price dispersion and price discrimination. The first essay considers a stylized model of dynamic price competition in which each seller sells one unit of a homogeneous commodity by posting prices in every period to maximize the expected profits with discounting. A random number of buyers come to the market in each period. Each buyer demands at most one unit of the good, and they all have a common reservation price. They know all prices posted by all firms in the market; hence search is costless. I show that when there is a positive probability of excess demand, the model has a unique (symmetric) mixed-strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium, each seller posts a price in every period according to a non-degenerate distribution, which is determined by the number of sellers remaining in the market in that period. Sellers play mixed strategies as they are indifferent between selling sooner at a lower price and waiting to sell at a higher price later. Thus, price dispersion not only exists in every period among firms, but also persists over time. In the second essay, I consider a monopolist who can sell vertically differentiated products over two periods to heterogeneous consumers. Consumers each demand one unit of the product in each period. In the second period, consumers are sorted into different segments according to their first-period choice, and the monopolist can offer different menus of contracts to different segments. In this way, the monopolist can price discriminate consumers not only by product quality, but also by purchase history. I fully characterize the monopolist's optimal pricing strategy when the type space is discrete and a simple condition is given to determine whether the monopolist should price discriminate consumers by product quality in the first period. When the consumers' type space is a continuum, I show that there is no fully separating equilibrium, and some properties of the optimal menu of contracts (price-quality pairs) are characterized within the class of partition PBE (Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium). The monopolist will offer only one quality in the first period when the social surplus function is log submodular or the firm and consumers are patient. If it is optimal for the firm to offer only one quality in the first period, the optimal market coverage in the first period is smaller than that in the static model. Furthermore, in equilibrium there are some high-type consumers choosing to downgrade the product in the second period, a phenomenon that has never been addressed in the literature. In the second essay, when the consumers' type space is a continuum, the analysis of the optimal menu of contracts is restricted within the class of partition PBE. The third essay provides a justification for this qualification. I ask whether an optimal menu of contracts can induce a non-partition continuation equilibrium by scrutinizing the example constructed by Laffont and Tirole (1988). They construct a non-partition continuation equilibrium for a given first-period menu of incentive contracts and conjecture that this continuation equilibrium need not be suboptimal for the whole game under small uncertainty. I construct two first-period incentive schemes leading to a partition continuation equilibrium and show that, regardless of the extent of uncertainty, their non-partition continuation equilibrium generates a smaller payoff than one of two partition continuation equilibria for the principal. In this sense, Laffont and Tirole's menu of contracts, giving rise to a non-partition continuation equilibrium, is not optimal. I provide an intuition behind this result, hoping to shed light on the problem of dynamic contracting without commitment.
Author: Pradeep K. Chintagunta
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Duopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 39
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Author: Richard Levitan
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Oligopolies
Languages : en
Pages : 16
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Author: Thomas W. Paulsen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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