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Author: Chiaen John Wu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumers' preferences
Languages : en
Pages : 276
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Book Description
Author: Chiaen John Wu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumers' preferences
Languages : en
Pages : 276
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Book Description
Author: Dennis Eggert
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3638803473
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Economics - Industrial Economics, grade: 1,0, Helsinki School of Economics, course: Industrial Organisation, 18 entries in the bibliography, language: English, abstract: The main issue in the article is the derivation of a model in which prices can differ in equilibrium, even though the goods are homogeneous and there is asymmetric information in the market. The reason for this price dispersion is caused by consumer heterogeneity. Salop and Stiglitz explain, that "because of differences in preference or ability, some agents perform much better than others in market decisions." To model this kind of heterogeneity they assign different costs of gathering certain information to the consumers. For simplicity they part the consumers in two groups: The first one consists of low-cost information gatherer and the other group has higher cost to gain complete information. For further simplicity there are just two levels of information: to be completely informed or to be not informed at all. Furthermore the costs to become an informed consumer are fixed. The differences in information in this model regard the locations of the shops. All consumers know about all prices that are in the market, they just do not know where the shop with a certain (the lowest) price is. The shops on the other hand have complete information about the market. They know about the differences between the consumers and can compute the demand that will occur, when they ask a certain price. So they face a trade-off between higher prices and lower demand. It is important to state why there is a possibility of raising the price and not to loose all demand like it would be in a perfect market. When the rise in price is not too high, it does not pay for the high-cost information gatherer to become completely informed. Their expected loss by buying randomly either in low- or high-priced shops is lower than the fixed cost of gathering the information. All toget
Author: Dennis Eggert
Publisher: GRIN Verlag
ISBN: 3638801381
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 16
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Book Description
Seminar paper from the year 2006 in the subject Economics - Industrial Economics, grade: 1,0, Helsinki School of Economics, course: Industrial Organisation, language: English, abstract: The main issue in the article is the derivation of a model in which prices can differ in equilibrium, even though the goods are homogeneous and there is asymmetric information in the market. The reason for this price dispersion is caused by consumer heterogeneity. Salop and Stiglitz explain, that “because of differences in preference or ability, some agents perform much better than others in market decisions.” To model this kind of heterogeneity they assign different costs of gathering certain information to the consumers. For simplicity they part the consumers in two groups: The first one consists of low-cost information gatherer and the other group has higher cost to gain complete information. For further simplicity there are just two levels of information: to be completely informed or to be not informed at all. Furthermore the costs to become an informed consumer are fixed. The differences in information in this model regard the locations of the shops. All consumers know about all prices that are in the market, they just do not know where the shop with a certain (the lowest) price is. The shops on the other hand have complete information about the market. They know about the differences between the consumers and can compute the demand that will occur, when they ask a certain price. So they face a trade-off between higher prices and lower demand. It is important to state why there is a possibility of raising the price and not to loose all demand like it would be in a perfect market. When the rise in price is not too high, it does not pay for the high-cost information gatherer to become completely informed. Their expected loss by buying randomly either in low- or high-priced shops is lower than the fixed cost of gathering the information. All together this consumer heterogeneity and the fully informed shops can lead to price dispersion in equilibrium, even though the goods are homogeneous and there is the difference in information between the actors.
Author: Pierre Dubois
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Consumer behavior
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Book Description
Traditional demand models assume that consumers are perfectly informed about product characteristics, including price. However, this assumption may be too strong. Unannounced sales are a common supermarket practice. As we show, retailers frequently change position in the price rankings, thus making it unlikely that consumers are aware of all deals offered in each period. Further empirical evidence on consumer behavior is also consistent with a model with price information frictions. We develop such a model for horizontally differentiated products and structurally estimate the search cost distribution. The results show that in equilibrium, consumers observe a very limited number of prices before making a purchase decision, which implies that imperfect information is indeed important and that local market power is potentially high. We also show that a full information demand model yields severely biased price elasticities.
Author: Louis Phlips
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521313810
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 302
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Book Description
This book provides a systematic presentation of new microeconomic theories of imperfect information.
Author: Ambarish Chandra
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 35
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Book Description
This paper studies the role of imperfect information in explaining price dispersion. We use a new panel dataset on the U.S. retail gasoline industry, and propose a new test of temporal price dispersion to establish the importance of consumer search. We show that price rankings vary significantly over time; however, they are more stable among stations at the same street intersection. We establish the equilibrium relationships between price dispersion and key variables from consumer search models. Price dispersion increases with the number of firms in the market, decreases with the production cost and increases with search costs.
Author: Riemer Pieter Faber
Publisher: Rozenberg Publishers
ISBN: 9036101654
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 157
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Book Description
Author: Aaron Levine
Publisher: OUP USA
ISBN: 0195398629
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 715
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Book Description
Explores how Judaism as a religion and Jews as a people relate to the economic sphere of life in modern society as well as in the past.
Author: Avishay Braverman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 274
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Book Description
Author: Martina Eckardt
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3790819409
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 249
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Book Description
Insurance intermediaries can help consumers to economize on information and transaction costs in insurance markets. This book analyzes conduct and performance in the market for insurance information services by applying search theoretical and industrial organization approaches. Based on a sample of 927 insurance intermediaries, coverage empirically studies the factors that affect the quality of the information services provided by them.
