Price Discrimination in Hotelling's Dupoly [i.e. Duopoly] Model PDF Download
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![Price Discrimination in Hotelling's Dupoly [i.e. Duopoly] Model PDF](https://books.google.com/books/content/images/frontcover/jbuljwEACAAJ?fife=w150-h200)
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Languages : en
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![Price Discrimination in Hotelling's Dupoly [i.e. Duopoly] Model PDF](https://books.google.com/books/content/images/frontcover/jbuljwEACAAJ?fife=w80-h100)
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Author: Robert N. McCauley
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Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 18
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Author: Horst A. Eiselt
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Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Author: R. Kelly Pace
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Languages : en
Pages : 246
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Author: Tommaso M. Valletti
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Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This paper analyzes the problem of price discrimination in a market where consumers have heterogeneous preferences both over a horizontal parameter (brand) and a vertical one (quality). Discriminatory contracts are characterized for different market structures. It is shown that price dispersion, i.e., the observed range of prices for each class of customers, increases almost everywhere as competition is introduced in the market. The findings are discussed with reference to the U.K. mobile telecommunications market.
Author: Yasuhiro Sakai
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Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Author: Horst A. Eiselt
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Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Author: Sissel Jensen
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Languages : en
Pages : 25
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Author: Michael Kopel
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Languages : en
Pages : 0
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We show that a frequently used direct demand system with product differentiation in a duopoly market generates unexpected effects of increasing the substitutability of firms' products on prices, outputs, profits and welfare. Using the original demand system introduced by Bowley (The Mathematical Groundwork of Economics, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1924) as a reference, we argue that this alternative model does not capture a consumer's taste for variety. Moreover, we demonstrate that positive values for the parameter which represents cross-price effects in the alternative demand system corresponds to the regime of complementary products in the original Bowley model. As a consequence, for increasing values of this parameter--meant to capture increasing competition in the usual sense--prices do not converge towards marginal costs and profits do not vanish. Finally, we study a duopoly with international transfer pricing and demonstrate that conflicting policy conclusions are derived depending on which of the models is used to capture demand.
Author: Kieron Meagher
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Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Theoretical models of spatial competition usually assume an uniform consumer distribution. In the real world, firms frequently compete for consumers who are not uniformly located. The equilibrium duopoly locations of several types of commonly used distributions were discussed in Meagher, Teo and Wang (2008). Using the same set of symmetric and asymmetric distributions and specifications from Anderson, Goeree and Ramer (1997), this paper extends Meagher, Teo and Wang (2008) by examining the social-optimum locations. We derive a formula for the social-optimum duopoly locations as one mean-deviation away from the median in the symmetric case. While regulating firm locations are sufficient to optimize welfare for symmetric distributions, additional price regulation is required to ensure social optimality for asymmetric distributions. We also calculate welfare improvements arising from regulation of firm location and show how these vary with the distribution of consumers. The results are significant for urban policy over firm/store locations.
