Price Discrimination in Hotelling's Duopoly Model PDF Download
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Author: Robert N. McCauley
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 18
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Author: Robert N. McCauley
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Equilibrium (Economics)
Languages : en
Pages : 18
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Book Description
![Price Discrimination in Hotelling's Dupoly [i.e. Duopoly] Model PDF](https://books.google.com/books/content/images/frontcover/jbuljwEACAAJ?fife=w80-h100)
Author:
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ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Tommaso M. Valletti
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business enterprises
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Author: Horst A. Eiselt
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Author: Tong Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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We relax two common assumptions in the Hotelling model with third-degree price discrimination: inelastic demand and exogenously assumed price discrimination. Based on the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) representative consumer model, we allow firms to endogenously choose whether to acquire consumer information and price discriminate. We find that when the information cost is sufficiently low, there exist two symmetric sub-game perfect Nash equilibria irrespective of the demand elasticity: both firms acquiring information and price discriminating, and neither firm acquiring information and charging a uniform price. This implies that the widely discussed prisoners' dilemma, in which both firms are exogenously assumed to price discriminate, is not in fact a dilemma. A comparison of social welfare shows that when the demand elasticity is large enough, price discrimination improves social welfare. This is in contrast to the finding -- price discrimination harms social welfare -- in the existing literature assuming perfect inelastic demand.
Author: Xiangkang Yin
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This paper investigates the market equilibrium and welfare effects of two-part tariff competition. When consumers are uniformly distributed on a Hotelling line, equilibrium prices are equal to marginal costs if and only if the demand of the marginal consumer is equal to the average demand. Entry fees are socially optimal in a symmetric equilibrium if all consumers participate in the market. In comparison with uniform pricing, two-part tariffs tend to have lower prices, higher profits and social welfare. In the logit model, marginal cost pricing holds but entry fees are higher than the social optimum. Two-part tariffs also lead to lower aggregate net consumer surplus but higher profits than uniform pricing.
Author: Thomas Joseph Holmes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Author: Horst A. Eiselt
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40
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Author: Lina Mallozzi
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3319526545
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 332
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Book Description
Facility location theory develops the idea of locating one or more facilities by optimizing suitable criteria such as minimizing transportation cost, or capturing the largest market share. The contributions in this book focus an approach to facility location theory through game theoretical tools highlighting situations where a location decision is faced by several decision makers and leading to a game theoretical framework in non-cooperative and cooperative methods. Models and methods regarding the facility location via game theory are explored and applications are illustrated through economics, engineering, and physics. Mathematicians, engineers, economists and computer scientists working in theory, applications and computational aspects of facility location problems using game theory will find this book useful.
Author: Stefano Quarta
Publisher:
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of the public firm in a spatial duopoly model a la Hotelling in the case of a low willingness to pay. We find that the presence of a public firm has the well known regulatory function in a market with a relative high willingness to pay; it is irrelevant in a market with a medium level of the willingness to pay; the relevance is for a low willingness to pay, where it ensures the full market coverage (as a result of the standard welfare maximization); finally, if the willingness to pay is very low, the public firm ensures a higher, but not full, market coverage with respect to the pure private case. Finally, we find that, for a low willingness to pay, the presence of the public firm is not sufficient to guarantee the optimal market configuration, so that the efficient level of welfare.
