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Author: Martin Obradovits
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
In many (online) markets, consumers can readily observe prices, but need to examine individual products at positive cost in order to assess how well they match their needs. We propose a tractable model of price-directed sequential search in a market where firms compete in prices. Each product meets consumers' basic needs, however they are only fully satisfied with a certain probability. In our setup, four types of pricing equilibria emerge, some of which entail inefficiencies as not all consumers are (always) served. We then lend our model to analyze collusion. We find that for any number of firms, there exists a parameter region in which the payoff-dominant symmetric collusive equilibrium gives rise to a higher expected total social welfare than the repeated one-shot Nash equilibrium. In other regions, welfare is identical under collusion and merely consumer rents are transferred, or both welfare and consumer rents are reduced. An all-inclusive cartel maximizing industry profit increases welfare for an even larger set of parameters, but may also be detrimental to it.
Author: Martin Obradovits
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
In many (online) markets, consumers can readily observe prices, but need to examine individual products at positive cost in order to assess how well they match their needs. We propose a tractable model of price-directed sequential search in a market where firms compete in prices. Each product meets consumers' basic needs, however they are only fully satisfied with a certain probability. In our setup, four types of pricing equilibria emerge, some of which entail inefficiencies as not all consumers are (always) served. We then lend our model to analyze collusion. We find that for any number of firms, there exists a parameter region in which the payoff-dominant symmetric collusive equilibrium gives rise to a higher expected total social welfare than the repeated one-shot Nash equilibrium. In other regions, welfare is identical under collusion and merely consumer rents are transferred, or both welfare and consumer rents are reduced. An all-inclusive cartel maximizing industry profit increases welfare for an even larger set of parameters, but may also be detrimental to it.
Author: Gabor Virag
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 14
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Book Description
We consider a model of directed search where the sellers are allowed to post general mechanisms. Regardless of the number of buyers and sellers, the sellers are able extract all the surplus of the buyers by introducing entry fees and making their price schedule positively sloped in the number of buyers arriving to their shops. Therefore, shopping card membership fees - similar to our entry fee component - may act as a collusion device between sellers. If there is a lower bound on the prices or there is an upper bound on the entry fees that can be charged, then the equilibrium with full rent extraction may not exist any more. However, the seller optimal equilibrium still features positive entry fees and increasing price schedules. When the constraint is on the entry fees in the seller optimal equilibrium all sellers offer auctions. This implies that if the firms can coordinate on an equilibrium they would not choose a fixed price one (studied by Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001)) or one without entry fees (as in Coles and Eeckhout (2003)). When the market becomes infinitely large, and the sellers face constraints on the prices or entry fees they can choose, then any equilibrium yields the same profits and the sellers cannot sustain collusion in equilibrium.
Author: Dirk Engelmann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
With this study we resume the search for a collusive focal-point effect of price ceilings in laboratory markets. We argue that market conditions in previous studies were unfavorable for collusion which may have been responsible for not finding such a focal-point effect. Our design aims at maximizing the likelihood of a focal-point effect. Nevertheless, our results again fail to support the focal-point hypothesis. Collusion is as unlikely in markets with a price ceiling as in markets with unconstrained pricing. Overall, the static Nash equilibrium predicts the data fairly accurately. We argue that this might warrant re-interpretation of field studies on anti-competitive effects of price ceilings.
Author: Robert Bork
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781736089712
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 536
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Book Description
The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
Author: American Bar Association. House of Delegates
Publisher: American Bar Association
ISBN: 9781590318737
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 216
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Book Description
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides an up-to-date resource for information on legal ethics. Federal, state and local courts in all jurisdictions look to the Rules for guidance in solving lawyer malpractice cases, disciplinary actions, disqualification issues, sanctions questions and much more. In this volume, black-letter Rules of Professional Conduct are followed by numbered Comments that explain each Rule's purpose and provide suggestions for its practical application. The Rules will help you identify proper conduct in a variety of given situations, review those instances where discretionary action is possible, and define the nature of the relationship between you and your clients, colleagues and the courts.
Author: Nomi Prins
Publisher: Bold Type Books
ISBN: 1568585632
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 493
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Book Description
In this searing exposéformer Wall Street insider Nomi Prins shows how the 2007-2008 financial crisis turbo-boosted the influence of central bankers and triggered a massive shift in the world order. Central banks and international institutions like the IMF have overstepped their traditional mandates by directing the flow of epic sums of fabricated money without any checks or balances. Meanwhile, the open door between private and central banking has ensured endless opportunities for market manipulation and asset bubbles -- with government support. Through on-the-ground reporting, Prins reveals how five regions and their central banks reshaped economics and geopolitics. She discloses how Mexico navigated its relationship with the US while striving for independence and how Brazil led the BRICS countries to challenge the US dollar's hegemony. She explains how China's retaliation against the Fed's supremacy is aiding its ongoing ascent as a global superpower and how Japan is negotiating the power shift from the West to the East. And she illustrates how the European response to the financial crisis fueled instability that manifests itself in everything from rising populism to the shocking Brexit vote. Packed with tantalizing details about the elite players orchestrating the world economy -- from Janet Yellen and Mario Draghi to Ben Bernanke and Christine Lagarde -- Collusion takes the reader inside the most discreet conversations at exclusive retreats like Jackson Hole and Davos. A work of meticulous reporting and bracing analysis, Collusion will change the way we understand the new world of international finance.
Author: Andrew C. McCarthy
Publisher: Encounter Books
ISBN: 1641771232
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 387
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Book Description
The real collusion in the 2016 election was not between the Trump campaign and the Kremlin. It was between the Clinton campaign and the Obama administration. The media–Democrat “collusion narrative,” which paints Donald Trump as cat’s paw of Russia, is a studiously crafted illusion. Despite Clinton’s commanding lead in the polls, hyper-partisan intelligence officials decided they needed an “insurance policy” against a Trump presidency. Thus was born the collusion narrative, built on an anonymously sourced “dossier,” secretly underwritten by the Clinton campaign and compiled by a former British spy. Though acknowledged to be “salacious and unverified” at the FBI’s highest level, the dossier was used to build a counterintelligence investigation against Trump’s campaign. Miraculously, Trump won anyway. But his political opponents refused to accept the voters’ decision. Their collusion narrative was now peddled relentlessly by political operatives, intelligence agents, Justice Department officials, and media ideologues—the vanguard of the “Trump Resistance.” Through secret surveillance, high-level intelligence leaking, and tireless news coverage, the public was led to believe that Trump conspired with Russia to steal the election. Not one to sit passively through an onslaught, President Trump fought back in his tumultuous way. Matters came to a head when he fired his FBI director, who had given explosive House testimony suggesting the president was a criminal suspect, despite privately assuring Trump otherwise. The resulting firestorm of partisan protest cowed the Justice Department to appoint a special counsel, whose seemingly limitless investigation bedeviled the administration for two years. Yet as months passed, concrete evidence of collusion failed to materialize. Was the collusion narrative an elaborate fraud? And if so, choreographed by whom? Against media–Democrat caterwauling, a doughty group of lawmakers forced a shift in the spotlight from Trump to his investigators and accusers. This has exposed the depth of politicization within American law-enforcement and intelligence agencies. It is now clear that the institutions on which our nation depends for objective policing and clear-eyed analysis injected themselves scandalously into the divisive politics of the 2016 election. They failed to forge a new Clinton administration. Will they succeed in bringing down President Trump?
Author: Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk
Publisher: Ludwig von Mises Institute
ISBN: 1610163648
Category : Capital
Languages : en
Pages : 468
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Book Description
Author: George Norman
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139428586
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 309
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Book Description
This 2000 text applies modern advances in game theory to the analysis of competition policy and develops some of the theoretical and policy concerns associated with the pioneering work of Louis Phlips. Containing contributions by leading scholars from Europe and North America, this book observes a common theme in the relationship between the regulatory regime and market structure. Since the inception of the new industrial organization, economists have developed a better understanding of how real-world markets operate. These results have particular relevance to the design and application of anti-trust policy. Analyses indicate that picking the most competitive framework in the short run may be detrimental to competition and welfare in the long run, concentrating the attention of policy makers on the impact on the long-run market structure. This book provides essential reading for graduate students of industrial and managerial economics as well as researchers and policy makers.
Author: Michael Dennis Whinston
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 272
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Book Description
Antitrust law regulates economic activity but differs in its operation from what is traditionally considered "regulation." Where regulation is often industry-specific and involves the direct setting of prices, product characteristics, or entry, antitrust law focuses more broadly on maintaining certain basic rules of competition. In these lectures Michael Whinston offers an accessible and lucid account of the economics behind antitrust law, looking at some of the most recent developments in antitrust economics and highlighting areas that require further research. He focuses on three areas: price fixing, in which competitors agree to restrict output or raise price; horizontal mergers, in which competitors agree to merge their operations; and exclusionary vertical contracts, in which a competitor seeks to exclude a rival. Antitrust commentators widely regard the prohibition on price fixing as the most settled and economically sound area of antitrust. Whinston's discussion seeks to unsettle this view, suggesting that some fundamental issues in this area are, in fact, not well understood. In his discussion of horizontal mergers, Whinston describes the substantial advances in recent theoretical and empirical work and suggests fruitful directions for further research. The complex area of exclusionary vertical contracts is perhaps the most controversial in antitrust. The influential "Chicago School" cast doubt on arguments that vertical contracts could be profitably used to exclude rivals. Recent theoretical work, to which Whinston has made important contributions, instead shows that such contracts can be profitable tools for exclusion. Whinston's discussion sheds light on the controversy in this area and the nature of those recent theoretical contributions. Sponsored by the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
