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Author: Joe Straten Bain
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 438
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Book Description
Author: Joe Straten Bain
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 438
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Book Description
Author: A. Thomas Nelson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Accountants
Languages : en
Pages : 97
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Book Description
Author: Joe Staten Bain
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Lester G Telser
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
ISBN: 1351527177
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 401
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Book Description
This original, quantitatively oriented analysis applies the theory of the core to define competition in order to describe and deduce the consequences of competitive and non-competitive behavior. Written by one of the world's leading mathematical economists, the book is mathematically rigorous. No other book is currently available giving a game theoretic analysis of competition with basic mathematical tools.Economic theorists have been working on a new and fundamental approach to the theory of competition and market structure, an approach inspired by appreciation of the earlier work of Edgeworth and Bohm-Bawerk and making use of the new tools of the theory of games as developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern. This new approach bases itself on the analysis of competitive behavior and its implications for the characteristics of market equilibrium rather than on assumptions about the characteristics of competitive and monopolistic markets. Its central concept is ""the theory of the core of the market,"" and it is concerned, with the conditions under which markets will or will not achieve the characteristics of uniform prices and welfare optimality.Telser provides a number of insights into the symptoms of competition, when and how competition is bought into play, the mechanisms of competition and collusion, the results of competition and collusion, and the results of competition and collusion for the economy and for the general public. Many misconceptions about the nature of a competitive equilibrium are dispelled. The book is not only a mathematical analysis of core price theory but also contains extensive empirical research in private industry. These empirical findings, from research pursued over several years, enhance understanding of how competition works and of the determinants of the returns to manufacturing industries.
Author: Lawrence R. Klein
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 1118236866
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 403
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Book Description
A guide to curbing monopoly power in stock markets Engaging and informative, Regulating Competition in Stock Markets skillfully analyzes the impact of the recent global financial crisis on health and happiness, and uses this opportunity to put regulatory systems in perspective. Happiness is lost because of emotional and physical health deterioration resulting from the crisis. Therefore, the authors conclude that financial crisis prevention should be the focus of public policy. This book is the most comprehensive study so far on potential risks to the stock market, especially various forms of market manipulation that lead to mania and eventual crisis. Based on litigation cases from international stock markets, and borrowing multidisciplinary findings in the fields of finance, economics, accounting, media studies, criminology, legal studies, psychology, and medicine, this book is the first to provide thorough micro-level regulatory proposals rooted in financial reality. By focusing on securities trading, they apply antitrust measures to limiting monopolistic power that is used for the manipulation of investors' perception and monopolistic profit. These proposals are quantifiable, adjustable, inexpensive, and can be easily implemented by any securities regulating agency for real-time oversight and daily operations. The recommendations found here are intended to improve the fairness and transparency of the financial markets, thereby perfecting the market competition, protecting investors, stabilizing the market, and preventing crises Explores how avoiding crises can to contribute to a more scientific, health aware, and civilized economic and social development Written by a team of authors who have extensive experience in this dynamic field, including Nobel Laureate Lawrence R. Klein Since the founding of the first, organized stock exchange in Amsterdam 400 years ago, no systematic economic research results on stock markets have been implemented in stock market regulation around the world. Regulating Competition in Stock Markets aims to fill this void.
Author: Ralph Cassady (Jr.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 118
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Book Description
Author: Jutta Dönges
Publisher: Springer-Verlag
ISBN: 3663077349
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : de
Pages : 296
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Book Description
Jutta A. Dönges applies the recent theory of global games to a model of intermarket competition and shows the existence of a unique equilibrium. The author investigates whether and under which circumstances alternative trading systems can co-exist with established securities markets or even replace them.
Author: Isabel Grilo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 19
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Book Description
Author: Song Zheng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Competition
Languages : en
Pages : 74
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Book Description
Author: K. Sudhir
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
In a competitive marketplace, the effectiveness of any element of the marketing mix is determined not only by its absolute value, but its relative value with respect to the competition. For example, the effectiveness of a price cut in increasing demand is critically related to competitors' reaction to the price change. Managers therefore need to know the nature of competitive interactions among firms. In this paper, we take a theory-driven empirical approach to gain a deeper understanding of the competitive pricing behavior in the US auto market. The ability-motivation paradigm posits that a firm needs both the ability and the motivation to succeed in implementing a strategy (Boulding and Staelin, 1995). We use arguments from the game theoretic literature to understand firm motivation and abilities in different segments of the auto market. We then combine these insights from the game theoretic literature and the ability-motivation paradigm to develop hypotheses about competition in different segments of the US auto market. To test our hypotheses of competitive behavior, we estimate a structural model that disentangles the competition effect from the demand and cost effects on prices. The theory of repeated games predicts that firms with a long run profitability objective will try to sustain cooperative pricing behavior as a stable equilibrium if conditions permit. For example, markets with high concentration and stable market environments are favorable for sustaining cooperative behavior and therefore provide firms with the ability to cooperate. The theory of switching costs suggests that in markets where a firm's current customers tend to be loyal, firms have a motivation to compete very aggressively for new customers, recognizing the positive benefits of loyalty from the customer base in the long run. As consumer loyalty in the market increases, the gains from increasing market share by aggressive competitive behavior are more than offset by losses in profit margins. Firms therefore have the motivation to price cooperatively. Empirically, we find aggressive behavior in the mini-compact and subcompact segments, cooperative behavior in the compact and midsize segments and Bertrand behavior in the full-size segment. These findings are consistent with our theory-based hypotheses about competition in different segments. In estimating a structural model of the auto market, we address several methodological issues. A particular difficulty is the large number of car models in the US auto market. Existing studies have inferred competitive behavior only in markets with two to four products. They also use relatively simple functional forms of demand to facilitate easy estimation. Functional forms of demand however impose structure on cross-elasticities between products. Such structure if inappropriate can bias the estimates of competitive interaction. We therefore use the random coefficients logit demand model to allow flexibility in cross-elasticities. We also use recent advances in New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) to extend structural estimation of competitive behavior to markets with a large number of products. We use the simulation based estimation approach developed by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) to estimate our model. A frequent criticism of the NEIO approach is that its focus on industry specific studies limits the generalizability of its findings. In this study, we retain the advantages of NEIO methods, but partially address the issue of generalizability by analyzing competitive behavior in multiple segments within the auto industry to see if there is a consistent pattern that can be explained by theory. Theoretical modelers can use our results to judge the appropriateness of their models in predicting competitive outcomes for the markets that they analyze. A by-product of our analysis is that we also get estimates of demand and cost apart from competitive interactions for the market. Managers can use these estimates to perform "what-if" analysis. They can answer questions such as what prices to charge when a new product is introduced or when an existing product's characteristics are changed.
