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Author: David B. Haight
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military planning
Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Book Description
An historical review of U.S. involvement in armed conflict consistently reveals that post-hostility activities, to include peacekeeping/enforcement, nation assistance, reconstruction, and stability operations, are the most vital yet difficult steps in bringing war to an acceptable conclusion. Given this, it would seem that mastery of this phase of any conflict would be a priority requirement. Remarkably, our military is reluctant and even neglectful in planning and executing these challenging operations; operations that are clearly essential to achieving our political objectives and securing our national interests. This paper explores the impact of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05, which directs DoD to embrace Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) as a core competency. The paper also provides the historical context and rationale for prioritizing related SSTRO equivalent to traditional and conventional combat operations. Additionally, it examines existing cultural impediments to institutionalizing proficiency in SSTRO and highlights the need for managing cultural change in order to embrace these operations. Finally, the paper presents recommendations for future training and leader professional development that inculcates in our future leaders a warrior ethos that includes the planning and execution of post-hostility SSTRO.
Author: David B. Haight
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Military planning
Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Book Description
An historical review of U.S. involvement in armed conflict consistently reveals that post-hostility activities, to include peacekeeping/enforcement, nation assistance, reconstruction, and stability operations, are the most vital yet difficult steps in bringing war to an acceptable conclusion. Given this, it would seem that mastery of this phase of any conflict would be a priority requirement. Remarkably, our military is reluctant and even neglectful in planning and executing these challenging operations; operations that are clearly essential to achieving our political objectives and securing our national interests. This paper explores the impact of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05, which directs DoD to embrace Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) as a core competency. The paper also provides the historical context and rationale for prioritizing related SSTRO equivalent to traditional and conventional combat operations. Additionally, it examines existing cultural impediments to institutionalizing proficiency in SSTRO and highlights the need for managing cultural change in order to embrace these operations. Finally, the paper presents recommendations for future training and leader professional development that inculcates in our future leaders a warrior ethos that includes the planning and execution of post-hostility SSTRO.
Author: Thomas S. Szayna
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833044311
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 277
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Book Description
Much activity is being aimed at revising the approach to planning and implementing Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations. The changes are meant to ensure a common U.S. strategy rather than a collection of individual departmental and agency efforts and on involving all available government assets in the effort. The authors find that some elements essential to the success of the process are not yet in place.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 12
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Book Description
Provides guidance on stability operations that will evolve over time as joint operating concepts, mission sets, and lessons learned develop. Future DoD policy will address these areas and provide guidance on the security, transition, and reconstruction operations components of SSTR operations and DoD's role in each. 1.2. Establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities within the Department of Defense for planning, training, and preparing to conduct and support stability operations pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense under reference (a) and the guidance and responsibilities assigned in reference (b).
Author:
Publisher: DIANE Publishing
ISBN: 1428980407
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 146
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Book Description
Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were characterized by the rapid defeat of enemy military forces, by relatively small deployments of American forces, and by a very limited destruction of the critical civilian infrastructure. This success can be credited in large part to the ongoing transformation of the U.S. military evident in its effective use of information superiority, precision strike, and rapid maneuver on the battlefield. The Armed Forces were not nearly as well prepared to respond promptly to the lawlessness, destruction of the civilian infrastructure, and attacks on coalition forces that followed hard on the defeat of the Iraqi military. This has set back plans to restore essential services and to pass the reins to a representative Iraqi government. Moreover, the failure to establish security concurrently with the defeat of the Iraqi military may well have emboldened those who oppose the United States, United Kingdom, and even United Nations presence. It is precisely the success of the U.S. military in transforming its forces to execute rapid decisive operations that makes it imperative to transform how it prepares for and executes stabilization and reconstruction (S AND R) operations. The very rapid defeat of the enemy military means the United States must be ready to field the resources needed to secure stability and begin the reconstruction process promptly-ideally concurrently-with the end of major combat. This can only be done if planning for the stabilization and reconstruction operations is integrated into planning for the conflict from the beginning and if the right skills are in theater to begin operations concurrently with the surrender or collapse of the enemy military.
Author: U. S. Military
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781976811272
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 98
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Book Description
The 21st Century has been dubbed an era of persistent conflict by U.S. military leaders. As a result, United States' defense forces will have to operate in environments requiring a variety of "full spectrum operations" for the near future. Stability operations are now considered as having equal importance to major combat operations and this thesis will explore an institutional approach to prepare U.S. military forces to conduct these types of operations. This thesis will analyze four themes: U.S. views on future stability and security operations, the United States' conventional force role in future stability and security operations, current efforts to institutionalize stability and security operations, and past U.S. institutional changes in response to threats in the strategic environment. Unfortunately, there is little unity of effort and ownership to institutionalize stability operations in the U.S. Army. This thesis recommends a new institution to educate and develop leaders to maximize unity of effort, flexibility and responsiveness for stability operations: the Stability and Security Center of Excellence. CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION * Introduction to the Problem * Background of Study. * Primary Research and Secondary Questions * Significance of the Study * CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW * CHAPTER 3 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY * Summary * CHAPTER 4 - ANALYSIS * U.S. Views on Future Stability and Security Operations * The Conventional Force Role in Future Stability and Security Operations * Current Efforts to Institutionalize Stability and Security Operations * Past Institutional Changes in Response to Threats in the Strategic Environment * Conclusion * CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS * Summary * Recommendation * Command Structure * Advisory Team Department * The SSCOE and U.S. Army Officer Career Path * Suggestions for Further Research * Conclusion * REFERENCE LIST
Author: David P. Cavaleri
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781478155683
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 104
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Book Description
Easier Said Than Done: Making the Transition Between Combat Operations and Stability Operations is another in the Combat Studies Institute's (CSI) Global War On Terrorism (GWOT) Occasional Papers series. The impetus for this series that concerns topics relevant to ongoing and future operations came from the Commanding General, Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth. Lieutenant General William S. Wallace, V Corps commander in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, directed CSI to examine historical topics that would benefit American and coalition soldiers and planners in both Iraq today, and in the broader GWOT spectrum now and in the future. One of those topics was the transition from combat (Phase III) operations to stability (Phase IV) operations, to use the current phasing construct familiar to campaign planners. Mr. David Cavaleri, a retired Armor lieutenant colonel and current CSI historian, has produced a study that examines nine critical factors that should be addressed in stabilization planning and execution. Mr. Cavaleri then presents a case study of the US occupation of Japan after World War II, followed by a parallel analysis of the case study and ongoing stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq through the lens of the critical planning factors. This study serves as a bridge between the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) found in stability operations “how-to” manuals and the broader military operations other than war (MOOTW) concepts found in joint doctrine. Its purpose was to identify key themes that merit consideration when planning or conducting transitions between combat operations and stability operations. These themes were identified by combining a review of joint and US Army stability operations doctrine with a specific case study analysis of the US occupation of Japan from 1945 to 1952 and then extrapolated those themes to current stability operations to assess their applicability. The Japanese occupation is useful as a case study because it required that occupation forces address several challenges similar to those facing current stability operations in the Middle East, such as a fundamental change in governance philosophy, a long-term democratization program, a critical regional security challenge, and a complex economic reconstruction challenge. This analysis is not designed to serve as a “one answer fits all challenges” solution set, but rather as a practical vehicle for informing time-constrained professionals operating at the tactical and operational levels. One can easily identify several instances where the US Army has faced stability operations challenges; Cuba, Germany, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Vietnam immediately come to mind. Each case involved stability operations challenges unique to its environment, but only one time during the 20th century did the United States take the lead in stabilizing the entire infrastructure—political, economic, industrial, military, educational, and even societal—of a former enemy. During this complex stability operation, the US Army implemented a number of planning themes related to transitioning between the full spectrum operations components of offense/defense and stability/support. These themes were applied, depending on the US Army's ability to manipulate each, with varying degrees of success. A RAND Corporation study published in 2003, titled America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq, developed six such themes, traced each through seven case studies, and concluded by drawing implications for future US military operations.
Author: United States Institute of Peace
Publisher: US Institute of Peace Press
ISBN: 1601270461
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 244
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Book Description
Claude Chabrol's second film follows the fortunes of two cousins: Charles, a hard-working student who has arrived in Paris from his small hometown; and Paul, the dedicated hedonist who puts him up. Despite their differences in temperament, the two young men strike up a close friendship, until an attractive woman comes between them.
Author: Nora Bensahel
Publisher: Rand Corporation
ISBN: 0833046985
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 105
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Book Description
U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that improving U.S. capacity for stabilization and reconstruction operations is critical to national security. To help craft a way ahead, the authors provide an overview of the requirements posed by stabilization and reconstruction operations and recommend ways to improve U.S. capacity to meet these needs.
Author: Sean P. Davis
Publisher: Createspace Independent Pub
ISBN: 9781480023895
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 90
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Book Description
In the wake of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, T.E. Lawrence's description of counterinsurgency (COIN) analogous to “eating soup with a knife,” has new meaning in our contemporary military. It describes our kinetic conventional army (the knife) painstakingly operating in a nebulous environment (the soup), attempting to kill or capture terrorists. This monograph adapts the US military's sustainment and support capabilities to provide the military a counterinsurgency “spoon,” through the theory of stability power. This thesis determines if the US Military's conduct of COIN operations requires the assignment of combat sustainment and support units as the main effort. In assigning these units this new decisive role, the military maximizes their intrinsic organizational advantages in nonkinetic stability operations. Such stability operations encompass what is decisive in defeating an insurgency. However, the design of current combat power analysis tools is not applicable for stability operations. The determination of a unit's capability in stability operations requires a new analysis model. Therefore, the military needs Relative Stability Power Analysis. Defining an organization's relative stability power is its ability to simultaneously represent all the elements of national power in proportion to the scale of the intervention, to stabilize a failing state. Assessing a unit's ability to do this is a hybrid model of systems theory, the military's logistical estimate model, and the relative combat power analysis tool. Military affairs experts require such a model to justify how many troops are required in the “clear” and “hold” phases and the requirements of the “build phase” in COIN operations. Placing these “build” requirements against the capabilities of the coalition determines operational shortfalls. Requirements-capabilities-shortfalls in Security, Water, Electricity, Academics, Transportation, Medical, and Sanitation (SWEAT-MS) describe Relative Stability Power Analysis. As the theory of stability power requires a new analytical model, it also requires a new concept of employment. A concept of employing stability power is a hybrid of subject matter on counterinsurgency, crisis response, and domestic policing. Testing this concept in a realistic scenario assists in evaluating its advantages and disadvantages. The scenario is a sustainment brigade (SUS BDE) operating as a Stability Reconstruction Sustainment Brigade (SRSB) securing the northern Iraqi city of Mosul in 2004. A commander that actually operated in this region during this time (COL H.R. McMaster, 3d Armor Cavalry Regiment) determines if it is feasible, acceptable, and suitable to employ sustainment units in this new capacity. This work concludes by submitting recommendations on how to employ stability power immediately, in the next few years and long term. Short-run recommendations include implementing attributes of stability power under Brigade Combat Team (BCT) control. Such attributes as assigning forward support companies to Iraqi security forces, and building combat outpost or micro operating bases securing the deliverance of essential public goods. In the midterm, relieving BCTs with SRSBs allows for the full economy of force advantages in employing stability power. The major significance of instituting SRSBs is expanding the pool of available units from only BCTs to all brigades capable of fighting COIN. This facilitates the army's ability to maximize the inherent advantages of all its forces. In the long-term, much as the US Army Air Corps became the US Air Force, this Stability and Reconstruction Forces (SRF) splits from the Army into a separate service. A SRF corps advances the US national capacity to conduct stability and reconstruction operations. In all, this vision of a force with balanced combat and stability power may prove the only acceptable alternative to meet the immediate emergency and security requirements of a failing state.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 23
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Book Description
In future conflicts, strategic and operational commanders must make the determination to disband or use the former enemy's military during the post-combat Stability and Security Operations (SASO) phase. Although not practical in every conflict, there will be wars, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom-1 (OIF-1), in which using the former military as part of the occupation force is the right decision. To prepare for future use of the enemy's military, the operational commander should follow the CENTCOM model used in preparation for OIF-1 by conducting integrated psychological, information, and intelligence operations targeting the willingness of susceptible enemy units to partner with Coalition Forces. Commanders must have a prepared plan, task organization, and maneuver concept that capitalize on the enemy soldiers' readiness to be co-opted by the Coalition and quickly transition individual soldiers and units into partners. Within 4 months of the end of major combat operations, former enemy forces should be employed as constabulary units and used in economy of force missions in areas more accepting to the American-led occupation. A 20-to-1,000 occupation force-to-civilian ratio is necessary in nation-building operations for an overwhelming occupation force presence to be felt by the defeated nation. Strong security measures (i.e., martial law) must be enforced to maintain a high level of security. This will deter an insurgency and convince the civilian population that the former regime was defeated and that the occupation force is capable of maintaining security during the reconstruction process. Operational commanders should use the former military to augment the Coalition Force. This study analyzes the pros and cons of disbanding the Iraqi Army during OIF-1, and recommends to future operational commanders that under the right conditions, such as existed during OIF-1, they use former enemy soldiers to augment coalition forces during the post-combat SASO phase.
