Ownership Structure and the Temptation to Loot

Ownership Structure and the Temptation to Loot PDF Author: Robert Cull
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 39

Get Book Here

Book Description
Evidence from the Czech Republic shows that financial incentives and regulation are as important as ownership structure in the design of privatization.Using a new data set on privatized firms in the Czech Republic, Cull, Matesova, and Shirley examine how the design of privatization affects outcomes.Earlier studies of privatization in the Czech Republic focused largely on how the broad distribution of shares through vouchers may have motivated the new owners to strip assets from privatized firms.The authors find evidence for static asset stripping, but also for what Akerlof and Romer (1993) call looting - borrowing heavily with no intent to repay and using the loans for private purposes. This looting occurred because the larger privatized companies had privileged access to credit from state-controlled banks, which had little incentive to enforce debt contracts.The policy implications are significant: financial incentives and regulation are as important as ownership structure in the design of privatization.This paper - a product of Regulation and Competition Policy, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to understand the role of financial reform in economic development. The authors may be contacted at [email protected], [email protected], or [email protected].

Ownership Structure and the Temptation to Loot

Ownership Structure and the Temptation to Loot PDF Author: Robert J. Cull
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 2905305398
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 44

Get Book Here

Book Description


Ownership and the Temptation to Loot

Ownership and the Temptation to Loot PDF Author: Robert Cull
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
Using a new dataset on firms privatized in the Czech Republic from 1993 to 1996, we show that, even after controlling for size and structure, voucher-privatized joint stock companies perform worse than firms with concentrated shareholdings that had to be purchased for cash, i.e., limited liability companies and foreign joint stock companies. We argue that static asset stripping, or tunneling in Czech parlance, was combined with dynamic looting of the Akerlof and Romer (1993) type because these same joint stock companies had privileged access to soft credit from state controlled banks. Although we do not have direct evidence of looting, we show that liabilities increased at a much faster rate in joint stock companies than in limited liability companies.

From Users to Custodians

From Users to Custodians PDF Author: Liz Wily
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Agricultura - Tanzania
Languages : en
Pages : 40

Get Book Here

Book Description
In the face of scarce public resources and the burgeoning demand from the growing population for agricultural land and woodland products, Tanzania has increasingly recognized the need to bring individuals, local groups, and communities into the policy, planning, and management process if woodlands are to remain productive in the coming decades.

Asymmetries in Union Relative Wage Effects in Ghanaian Manufacturing

Asymmetries in Union Relative Wage Effects in Ghanaian Manufacturing PDF Author: Dorte Verner
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 4040532376
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 40

Get Book Here

Book Description


Privatisation and Structural Change in Transition Economies

Privatisation and Structural Change in Transition Economies PDF Author: Yelena Kalyuzhnova
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 0230378331
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 272

Get Book Here

Book Description
Privatisation and Structural Change in Transition Economies brings together specialists from different areas (governance, regulation, macro-econometrics, micro-econometrics, enterprise culture, foreign direct investment, technology transfer) to focus on the many different aspects of the privatization process in transition economies. The book does not dwell on the administrative or procedural aspects of privatisation. Instead it attempts to understand the bigger picture in terms of underlying policy environment and supporting legal and economic measures which helped to a large extent to determine the eventual success or failure of privatization programmes.

Under New Ownership

Under New Ownership PDF Author: Shahid Yusuf
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN: 0821356259
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 300

Get Book Here

Book Description
Although China's centrally planned economy is a little more than a shadow of its former self, the closely inter-linked reforms of the enterprise and banking sectors are still incomplete. The relative size of the state-owned enterprise sector has been much reduced, however, the sector remains the dominant borrower from the banking system and is responsible for the majority of bank non-performing assets. Thus in the interests of financial stability it is crucial to implement the remaining reform agenda. The accession to the WTO has also made it more urgent for China's most-dynamic state-owned en.

The Financial Economics of Privatization

The Financial Economics of Privatization PDF Author: William L. Megginson
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198034318
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 533

Get Book Here

Book Description
Since 1981, over 100 governments around the world have raised over $1 trillion through the sale of SOEs to private investors. Privatization programs have transformed the role of the state in virtually all-major economies, and have massively increased the capitalization and liquidity of all non-U.S. stock markets. The focus of this book lies on where privatization stands today and what are the next frontiers, the why and how behind countries who privatize certain industries, whether privatization works as an economic tool and important insights relevant to financial institutions such as how to value privatized industries, how share offerings differ from private offerings, and how countries go about harnessing private capital. The book will also represent a key and unique source for information related to the details of asset sales privatization, a summary of statistics of privatized companies from 54 international stock exchanges, regulatory changes and sources for privatization information for investors, government officials, bankers and financial specialists. The volume will serve as an invaluable reference for professionals and as a core or supplementary text in privatization courses.

Ownership and Governance of Enterprises

Ownership and Governance of Enterprises PDF Author: Laixiang Sun
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1403943907
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 275

Get Book Here

Book Description
Conventional wisdom recommends the superiority of private ownership of enterprises. The reality confronts it with a rich diversity in ownership and governance structures. This volume examines five types of unorthodox ownership and governance form emerging in the industrial sector across major economies. It analyzes two cases to demonstrate that there are alternative ways to harden budget constraints of state-owned enterprises. It investigates the driving forces behind these evolving dynamics and explores policy implications for developing and transition economies.

Market Value Maximizing Ownership Structure When Investor Protection is Weak

Market Value Maximizing Ownership Structure When Investor Protection is Weak PDF Author: Beni Lauterbach
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 31

Get Book Here

Book Description
We hypothesize that in a country with lax corporate governance rules Tobin's Q is maximized when controlholders' vote approaches the supermajority level. In this holding range controlholders do not possess extreme power (cannot pass supermajority decisions), nor do they feel a strong temptation to loot the firm (which largely belongs to them). Using a sample of 144 Israeli firms, we find that Tobin's Q is maximized when control group vote reaches 67%. This evidence is strong when ownership structure is treated as exogenous and weak when it is considered endogenous. Other ownership structure variables do not appear to have a significant valuation effect.