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![Optimal Linear [income] Taxation in Models with Occupational Choice PDF](https://books.google.com/books/content/images/frontcover/CoeijwEACAAJ?fife=w150-h200)
Author: Robin W. Boadway
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
![Optimal Linear [income] Taxation in Models with Occupational Choice PDF](https://books.google.com/books/content/images/frontcover/CoeijwEACAAJ?fife=w80-h100)
Author: Robin W. Boadway
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
Author: Robin W. Boadway
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
Author: Johann K. Brunner
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642838626
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 227
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Book Description
This study offers a systematic analysis of basic questions relating to equitable income taxation. Of course, a definite solution, resting on scientific arguments, cannot be expected for this important field of government activity. However, what is possible, is an exhaustive dis cussion of various aspects of equitable income taxation, thus preparing the ground for reasonable political decisions. I hope that the present book will contribute to this continuing discus sion, presenting results from modern social-choice theory and optimum taxation theory in order to gain further insights into the problem of income taxation. On a fundamental level, social-choice theory is applied in order to in vestigate the normative foundation of different tax rules. Arrow's im possibility theorem forms the starting point of the analysis; as was shown by recent contributions to social-choice theory, this impossibi lity result can be overcome if various degrees of interpersonal utility comparisons are admitted. Using this approach, one can work out the general norms of equity behind familiar tax rules. As a special point, the traditional principle of equal proportional sacrifice will be given a social-choice theoretic foundation in this book. The second level on which tax rules can be discussed, concerns their respective consequences in concrete taxation models. TWo such models are specified in this study, the first one takes gross income of the taxpayers as given, it is contrasted with the second, more complex mod el, where the individual labour-leisure decision is taken into account.
Author: Kari Syreeni
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Bible
Languages : en
Pages : 38
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Author: Casey Rothschild
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Choice (Psychology)
Languages : en
Pages : 39
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Book Description
We consider optimal redistribution in a model where individuals can self-select into one of several possible sectors based on heterogeneity in a multidimensional skill vector. We first show that when the government does not observe the sectoral choice or underlying skills of its citizens, the constrained Pareto frontier can be implemented with a single non-linear income tax. We then characterize this optimal tax schedule. If sectoral inputs are complements, a many-sector model with self-selection leads to optimal income taxes that are less progressive than the corresponding taxes in a standard single-sector model under natural conditions. However, they are more progressive than in canonical multi-sector economies with discrete types and without occupational choice or overlapping sectoral wage distributions.
Author: Robin Boadway
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
In this paper, we study optimal income taxation when different job types exist for workers of different skills. Each job type has some feasible range of incomes from which workers choose by varying labor supply. Workers are more productive than others in the jobs that suit them best. The model combines features of the classic optimal tax literature with labor variability along the intensive margin, with the extensive-margin approach where workers make discrete job choices and/or participation decisions. We find that first-best maximin utility can be achieved in the second-best, and marginal tax rates below the top can be negative or zero.
Author: Renato Gomes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 48
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Author: Joel Slemrod
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Income tax
Languages : en
Pages : 52
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Book Description
We investigate the optimal rate structure of an income tax system that is constrained to have only two brackets, plus a demogrant. We find that, in a two-class economy, Pareto efficient tax schedules feature at least one marginal tax rate equal to zero, and that the marginal tax rate may be increasing or declining. We next use numerical optimization techniques to study the optimal structure of such a tax system in a multi-person model that is a stylized version of an actual economy. We discover that in all cases the tax rate in the second (higher) bracket is less than the tax rate that applies to the first bracket but that progressivity, in the sense of a uniformly rising average tax rate, generally obtains. Compared to the optimal one-bracket (linear) tax system, both the highest and lowest income individuals are better off, while a middle range of taxpayers is worse off.
Author: Stefanie Stantcheva
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
This paper studies optimal linear and nonlinear redistributive income taxation when there is adverse selection in the labor market. Unlike in standard taxation models, firms do not know workers' abilities and competitively screen them through nonlinear compensation contracts. The equilibrium concept used is the Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence (MWS) one, adapted to a labor market with taxes. The government observes neither abilities nor the private market contracts and has to foresee the reaction of firms, in addition to workers. Adverse selection leads to different responses to taxes than in the standard Mirrlees (1971) model, because of the use of work hours as a screening tool by firms, which for higher talent workers results in a rat race. Accordingly, the new optimal income tax formulas include corrective terms for the rat race and redistributive terms take into account the informational rents and cross-subsidies received by lower productivity workers. The most surprising result is that, if the government has sufficiently strong redistributive goals, welfare is higher when there is adverse selection than when there is not. This result is due to the rat race in which high productivity workers are caught, which limits their flexibility to react adversely to distortive taxation. I draw the link to policy praxis by discussing various policies that a government can use to endogenously affect adverse selection. The model also has practical implications for the interpretation, estimation, and use of taxable income elasticities, which are central to optimal tax design.
Author: Robin W. Boadway
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262017113
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 301
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Book Description
The author examines the role of optimal tax analysis in informing and influencing tax policy design.
