Optimal Contracts When Agents Envy Each Other PDF Download
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Author: Anjan V. Thakor
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 51
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Book Description
We examine the characteristics of endogenously-determined optimal incentive contracts for agents who envy each other and work for a risk-neutral (non-envious) principal. Envy makes each agent care not only about absolute consumption but also about relative consumption. Incentive contracts in this setting display properties strikingly different from those associated with optimal contracts in standard principal-agent theory. We derive results that help explain some of the discrepancies between the predictions of principal-agent theory and the stylized facts about real-world contracts.
Author: Anjan V. Thakor
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 51
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Book Description
We examine the characteristics of endogenously-determined optimal incentive contracts for agents who envy each other and work for a risk-neutral (non-envious) principal. Envy makes each agent care not only about absolute consumption but also about relative consumption. Incentive contracts in this setting display properties strikingly different from those associated with optimal contracts in standard principal-agent theory. We derive results that help explain some of the discrepancies between the predictions of principal-agent theory and the stylized facts about real-world contracts.
Author: Luis C. Corchón
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 178536328X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 567
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Book Description
The first volume of this wide-ranging Handbook contains original contributions by world-class specialists. It provides up-to-date surveys of the main game-theoretic tools commonly used to model industrial organization topics. The Handbook covers numerous subjects in detail including, among others, the tools of lattice programming, supermodular and aggregative games, monopolistic competition, horizontal and vertically differentiated good models, dynamic and Stackelberg games, entry games, evolutionary games with adaptive players, asymmetric information, moral hazard, learning and information sharing models.
Author: Robert Dur
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
A worker's utility may increase with his income, but envy can make his utility decline with his employer's income. This article uses a principal-agent model to study profit-maximizing contracts when a worker envies his employer. Envy tightens the worker's participation constraint and so calls for higher pay and/or a softer effort requirement. Moreover, a firm with an envious worker can benefit from profit sharing, even when the worker's effort is fully contractible. We discuss several applications of our theoretical work: envy can explain why a lower-level worker is awarded stock options, why incentive pay is lower in nonprofit organizations, and how governmental production of a good can be cheaper than private production.
Author: Albertus Johannes Dur
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 29
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Book Description
Author: Carlos Alberto de Mello-e-Souza
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 308
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Book Description
Author: Sanjit Dhami
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192574647
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 510
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Book Description
Taken from the first definitive introduction to behavioral economics, The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis: Other-Regarding Preferences is an authoritative and cutting edge guide to this essential topic for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students. It considers the evidence from experimental games on human sociality, and gives models and applications of inequity aversion, intention based reciprocity, conditional cooperation, human virtues, and social identity. This updated extract from Dhami's leading textbook allows the reader to pursue subsections of this vast and rapidly growing field and to tailor their reading to their specific interests in behavioural economics.
Author: Jaeyoung Sung
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 22
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Book Description
We present a continuous-time contracting model under moral hazard with many agents. The principal contracts many agents as a team, and they jointly produce correlated outcomes. We show the optimal contract for each agent is linear in outcomes of all other agents as well as his/her own. The structure of the optimal contract strikingly reveals that the optimal aggregate performance measure in general can be orthogonally decomposed into two statistics: one is a sufficient statistic, and the other a non-sufficient statistic. As a consequence, the optimal aggregate performance measure in general is not a sufficient statistic, except when the principal is risk neutral. We further discuss agents' optimal effort choices using a quot;quadratic-costquot; example, which also strikingly suggests that team contracts sometimes provide lower-powered effort incentives than individually separate contracts do.
Author: Björn Bartling
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This paper derives optimal incentive contracts for agents with other-regarding preferences. It offers a behavioral explanation for the empirically observed lack of relative performance evaluation. We analyze a principal-multi agent model and assume that agents are inequity averse or status seeking. We show that team contracts can be optimal even if the agents' performance measures are positively correlated such that relative performance evaluation would be optimal with purely self-interested agents and even though relative performance evaluation provides additional incentives to provide effort if agents have other-regarding preferences. Furthermore, optimal incentive contracts for other-regarding agents can be low-powered as compared to contracts for purely self-interested agents.
Author: Keith J. Crocker
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Author: Sanjit S. Dhami
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198715528
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 1799
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Book Description
It considers the evidence against the exponential discounted utility model and describes several behavioral models such as hyperbolic discounting, attribute based models and the reference time theory. Part IV describes the evidence on classical game theory and considers several models of behavioral game theory, including level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, quantal response equilibrium, and psychological game theory. Part V considers behavioral models of learning that include evolutionary game theory, classical models of learning, experience weighted attraction model, learning direction theory, and stochastic social dynamics. Part VI studies the role of emotions; among other topics it considers projection bias, temptation preferences, happiness economics, and interaction between emotions and cognition. Part VII considers bounded rationality. The three main topics considered are judgment heuristics and biases, mental accounting, and behavioral finance.
