One Hundred Years After Keynes Published His 'A Treatise on Probability' in 1921, Edgeworth's Two Reviews Still Stand Out As Being Vastly Superior to the Assessments Made by Any Other Philosopher of the Logical Theory of Probability PDF Download
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Author: Michael Emmett Brady
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Languages : en
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F. Y. Edgeworth made the only correct assessment of Keynes's Logical Theory of Probability in his A Treatise on Probability among philosophers in the 100 years between 1921 and 2020. The reason is that he actually read the entire book, with the exception of Part II, which he was able to assess through his very careful reading of Part I.The major problem confronting any philosopher, who wants to take into consideration the various different aspects of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, is the unfortunate fact that there is no philosopher,with the one exception of Edgeworth (Bertrand Russell did not read Part V), who has read beyond chapters 1-4 plus some parts of chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability. This assessment includes every philosopher associated with SIPTA, as well as B. Koopman, I. J. Good, T. L. Fine, P. Suppes, H.E. Kyburg, I.Levi, S. Zabell, as well as younger philosophers, such as B. Weatherson, D. Rowbottom, R.Bradley, S. Bradley, J. Williamson, T. Siedenfeld, G. Wheeler, etc.The conclusion reached is that after 100 years there is only one sure path currently available to philosophers who want to know what it was that Keynes actually accomplished in the A Treatise on Probability-read and reread the two reviews made by Edgeworth. A reader is then in a good position to grasp what it was that Keynes had erected in 1921-the first mathematically and technically advanced interval valued approach to probability in history. Kyburg's claim, that he was the first to have put forth a detailed interval valued approach for a logical theory of probability, is simply a major oversight made by Kyburg.Edwin B. Wilson's conclusion, that Edgeworth was by the far the most qualified academic to review Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, still holds good 100 years after he published his reviews of Keynes's book.
Author: Michael Emmett Brady
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Languages : en
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F. Y. Edgeworth made the only correct assessment of Keynes's Logical Theory of Probability in his A Treatise on Probability among philosophers in the 100 years between 1921 and 2020. The reason is that he actually read the entire book, with the exception of Part II, which he was able to assess through his very careful reading of Part I.The major problem confronting any philosopher, who wants to take into consideration the various different aspects of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, is the unfortunate fact that there is no philosopher,with the one exception of Edgeworth (Bertrand Russell did not read Part V), who has read beyond chapters 1-4 plus some parts of chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability. This assessment includes every philosopher associated with SIPTA, as well as B. Koopman, I. J. Good, T. L. Fine, P. Suppes, H.E. Kyburg, I.Levi, S. Zabell, as well as younger philosophers, such as B. Weatherson, D. Rowbottom, R.Bradley, S. Bradley, J. Williamson, T. Siedenfeld, G. Wheeler, etc.The conclusion reached is that after 100 years there is only one sure path currently available to philosophers who want to know what it was that Keynes actually accomplished in the A Treatise on Probability-read and reread the two reviews made by Edgeworth. A reader is then in a good position to grasp what it was that Keynes had erected in 1921-the first mathematically and technically advanced interval valued approach to probability in history. Kyburg's claim, that he was the first to have put forth a detailed interval valued approach for a logical theory of probability, is simply a major oversight made by Kyburg.Edwin B. Wilson's conclusion, that Edgeworth was by the far the most qualified academic to review Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, still holds good 100 years after he published his reviews of Keynes's book.
Author: Michael Emmett Brady
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F Y Edgeworth made the only correct assessment of Keynes's Logical Theory of Probability, as presented in his A Treatise on Probability, among economists in the 100 years between 1921 and 2020. The reason is that he actually read the entire book with the exception of Part II, which he was able to assess through his very careful reading of Part I.The major problem confronting any economist, who wants to take into consideration the various different aspects of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability ,is the unfortunate fact that there is no economist, with the one exception of Edgeworth, who has read beyond chapters 1-4, plus some parts of chapter 6 of the A Treatise on Probability. This includes practically every heterodox economist who has written on Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, such as R. Skidelsky, D. Moggridge, R.O'Donnell, A. Carabelli , V. Chick, S.Dow, G.Meeks, J.B.Davis, A. Fitzgibbons, E.R Weintraub, J . Runde, T. Winslow, C. McCann, Jr., T .Lawson ,G. Fioretti, P. Davidson, D. Dequech,and many more.The conclusion reached is that after 100 years there is only one path currently available to economists who want to know what it was that Keynes actually accomplished in the A Treatise on Probability-read and reread the two reviews made by Edgeworth. Such a reader is then in a good position to grasp what it was that Keynes had erected in 1921-the first mathematically and technically advanced interval valued approach to probability in history. The economists' claim that Keynes's discussions in chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability were only about Keynes's alleged ordinal theory of probability directly clash with the conclusions of every philosopher who has written on the A Treatise on Probability, since all philosophers support the conclusion that Keynes was suggesting or hinting at the use of an interval theory of probability in Chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability.
Author: John Maynard Keynes
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Category : Probabilities
Languages : en
Pages : 494
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Author: John Maynard Keynes
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Category : Probabilities
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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With this treatise, an insightful exploration of the probabilistic connection between philosophy and the history of science, John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) breathed new life into studies of both disciplines. Originally published in 1921, the famous economist's most important mathematical work represented a significant contribution to the theory regarding the logical probability of propositions. Keynes effectively dismantled the classical theory of probability, launching what has since been termed the "logical-relationist" theory. In so doing, he explored the logical relationships between classifying a proposition as "highly probable" and as a "justifiable induction." A Treatise on Probability argues that probability is a matter of logic, which renders it objective: a statement involving probability relations possesses a truth value independent of opinion. Keynes demonstrates that if a hypothesis has even the smallest finite probability, it can be transformed into certainty by a sufficient number of observations. This is his attempt to overcome Humean skepticism by asserting that theoretically grounded hypotheses need only exhibit finite probability to form the basis of science and rational action. Another key idea discussed in A Treatise on Probability is that probability relations constitute only a partially ordered set in the sense that two probabilities cannot necessarily always be compared. Keynes further maintains that probability is a basic concept that cannot be reduced to other concepts
Author: Michael Emmett Brady
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H. E. Kyburg never read beyond chapter 6 of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability. From 1959 till his death in 2007, Kyburg continually based his assessment of Keynes's accomplishments on pp. 30 and 34 of Chapter III of the A Treatise on Probability. Edgeworth's careful and judicious reading of Keynes's chapter III allowed him to conclude that Keynes's theory was an interval valued theory of probability, as opposed to Kyburg's claims that Keynes merely had made some comments that would lead one to conclude that Keynes had made some interesting “suggestions, hints, notions,i ntuitions, ideas,” that would lead to an interval valued theory of probability if they were developed mathematically and logically.Wheeler 's evaluation of Keynes is simply a repetition of Kyburg's nearly 50 years of evaluations ,which are vastly inferior to Edgeworth's evaluation, which skipped Part II of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability.A study of Part II of A Treatise on Probability reveals that Keynes had a very advanced mathematical and logical theory of interval valued probability based on Boole's original presentation on pp.265-268 of The Laws of Thought that was presented in chapters 15,16, and 17 of Part II. This was accepted by the American mathematician E .B. Wilson, who acknowledged this grudgingly in his second, disguised review of the A Treatise on Probability that concentrated on chapter 17 of Part II, while ignoring the crucial chapter 15 in the September, 1934 issue of the Journal of the American Statistical Association. Wilson's 1934 paper has never been cited by any academic in any field in the 20th or 21st centuries. It also leads to a total rejection of Ramsey's two reviews of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, as well as Wheeler's assessment about “... Ramsey's brilliant critique of Keynes's ideas about probability...” (Wheeler, 2012,p. 443).
Author: Michael Emmett Brady
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Languages : en
Pages : 36
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F. Y. Edgeworth, in 1922, demonstrated a very deep and penetrating understanding of the technical, mathematical, logical and statistical analysis provided by J M Keynes in 1921 in his magnum opus, the A Treatise on Probability. No other reviewer, except Bertrand Russell, showed such a great understanding of Keynes's book. Edgeworth's two reviews are, however, carried out with very high technical and analytic standards of mathematical, logical, statistical, and philosophical care. Edgeworth understood, like no other reviewer at that time or since, the great strengths of Keynes's breakthroughs, as well as what the limitations of Keynes's theory were.The Keynesian Fundamentalists lacked the technical training in mathematics, logic, and statistics that would be required to follow and duplicate what Edgeworth was doing in these reviews. Therefore, the two Edgeworth reviews and their content were skipped over by the Keynesian Fundamentalists, as well as by all other philosophers and economists. This unfortunate result was probably strengthened by the appearance in 2002 of a strange piece written on the history of economic thought at the interface between economics and statistics by Steven Stigler that erroneously claimed that Edgeworth's reviews of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability were as highly critical of Keynes's work as was the empty diatribe published by Ronald Fisher in 1923 in the Eugenics Review. Nothing could be further from the truth.This paper demonstrates that there is no Keynesian Fundamentalist, philosopher or economist who is even close to Edgeworth in his grasp and understanding of the detailed mathematical and logical analysis provided by Keynes in 1921.All of the valuable summaries, analysis, commentary, support, and criticism of the positions presented by Keynes in the formulation of his logical approach to probability, made by Edgeworth in his two reviews of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability (1921) in 1922, were lost in the years between 1922 and 2016.
Author: John Maynard Keynes
Publisher: Theclassics.Us
ISBN: 9781230339115
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Languages : en
Pages : 164
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This historic book may have numerous typos and missing text. Purchasers can usually download a free scanned copy of the original book (without typos) from the publisher. Not indexed. Not illustrated. 1921 edition. Excerpt: ... CHAPTER XXXIII OUTLINE OF A CONSTRUCTIVE THEORY 1. There is a great difference between the proposition "It is probable that every instance of this generalisation is true" and the proposition " It is probable of any instance of this generalisation taken at random that it is true." The latter proposition may remain valid, even if it is certain that some instances of the generalisation are false. It is more likely than not, for example, that any number will be divisible either by two or by three, but it is not more likely than not that all numbers are divisible either by two or by three. The first type of proposition has been discussed in Part III. under the name of Universal Induction. The latter belongs to Inductive Correlation or Statistical Induction, an attempt at the logical analysis of which must be my final task. 2. What advocates of the Frequency Theory of Probability wrongly believe to be characteristic of all probabilities, namely, that they are essentially concerned not with single instances but with series of instances, is, I think, a true characteristic of statistical induction. A statistical induction either asserts the probability of an instance selected at random from a series of propositions, or else it assigns the probability of the assertion, that the truth frequency of a series of propositions {i.e. the proportion of true propositions in the series) is in the neighbourhood of a given value. In either case it is asserting a characteristic of a series of propositions, rather than of a particular proposition. Whilst, therefore, our unit in the case of Universal Induction is a single instance which satisfies both the condition and the conclusion of our generalisation, our unit in the case of Statistical Induction is not a...
Author: John Keynes
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781548189280
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 548
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A Treatise on Probability was printed by John Maynard Keynes while at Cambridge University. The Treatise criticized the classical theory of probability and introduced a "logical-relationist" theory instead. Bertrand Russell, the co-author of Principia Mathematica, described it as "undoubtedly the most important work on probability that has emerged for a very long time," and a "book as a whole is one which it is impossible to praise too highly." The Treatise is primarily philosophical in nature notwithstanding extensive mathematical formulations. The Treatise presented a proposal to probability that was more subject to variation with evidence than the profoundly quantified standard version. Keynes's notion of probability is that it is a rigorously logical relation between proof and hypothesis, a degree of partial association. Keynes's Treatise is the definitive account of the reasonable interpretation of probabilistic logic, a view of probability that has been maintained by such later efforts as Carnap's Logical Foundations of Probability and E.T. Jaynes Probability Theory: The Logic of Science. Keynes saw numerical probabilities as special cases of probability, that did not have to be quantifiable or even comparable.
Author: John Keynes
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781505480481
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Languages : en
Pages : 550
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The subject matter of this book was first broached in the brain of Leibniz, who, in the dissertation, written in his twenty-third year, on the mode of electing the kings of Poland, conceived of Probability as a branch of Logic. A few years before, "un probl�me," in the words of Poisson, "propos� � un aust�re jans�niste par un homme du monde, a �t� l''origine du calcul des probabiliti�s." In the intervening centuries the algebraical exercises, in which the Chevalier de la M�r� interested Pascal, have so far predominated in the learned world over the profounder enquiries of the philosopher into those processes of human faculty which, by determining reasonable preference, guide our choice, that Probability is oftener reckoned with Mathematics than with Logic. There is much here, therefore, which is novel and, being novel, unsifted, inaccurate, or deficient. I propound my systematic conception of this subject for criticism and enlargement at the hand of others, doubtful whether I myself am likely to get much further, by waiting longer, with a work, which, beginning as a Fellowship Dissertation, and interrupted by the war, has already extended over many years.It may be perceived that I have been much influenced by W. E. Johnson, G. E. Moore, and Bertrand Russell, that is to say by Cambridge, which, with great debts to the writers of Continental Europe, yet continues in direct succession the English tradition of Locke and Berkeley and Hume, of Mill and Sidgwick, who, in spite of their divergences of doctrine, are united in a preference for what is matter of fact, and have conceived their subject as a branch rather of science than of the creative imagination, prose writers, hoping to be understood.J. M. KEYNES.King''s College, Cambridge"J''ai dit plus d''une fois qu''il faudrait une nouvelle esp�ce de logique, qui traiteroit des degr�s de Probabilit�."-Leibniz.1. Part of our knowledge we obtain direct; and part by argument. The Theory of Probability is concerned with that part which we obtain by argument, and it treats of the different degrees in which the results so obtained are conclusive or inconclusive. In most branches of academic logic, such as the theory of the syllogism or the geometry of ideal space, all the arguments aim at demonstrative certainty. They claim to be conclusive. But many other arguments are rational and claim some weight without pretending to be certain. In Metaphysics, in Science, and in Conduct, most of the arguments, upon which we habitually base our rational beliefs, are admitted to be inconclusive in a greater or less degree. Thus for a philosophical treatment of these branches of knowledge, the study of probability is required.The course which the history of thought has led Logic to follow has encouraged the view that doubtful arguments are not within its scope. But in the actual exercise of reason we do not wait on certainty, or doom it irrational to depend on a doubtful argument. If logic investigates the general principles of valid thought, the study of arguments, to which it is rational to attach some weight, is as much a part of it as the study of those which are demonstrative.2. The terms certain and probable describe the various degrees of rational belief about a proposition which different amounts of knowledge authorise us to entertain. All propositions are true or false, but the knowledge we have of them depends on our circumstances; and while it is often convenient to speak of propositions as certain or probable, this expresses strictly a relationship in which they stand to a corpus of knowledge, actual or hypothetical, and not a characteristic of the propositions in themselves. A proposition is capable at the same time of varying degrees of this relationship, depending upon the knowledge to which it is related, so that it is without significance to call a proposition probable unless we specify the knowledge to which we are relating it.
Author: John Maynard Keynes
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ISBN: 9781295970216
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 486
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