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Author: Santiago Balseiro
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Dynamic mechanism design expands the scope of allocations that can be implemented and the performance that can be attained compared to static mechanisms. Even under stringent participation constraints and restrictions on transfers, recent work demonstrated that it is possible for a designer to extract the surplus of all players as revenue when players have quasilinear utilities and the number of interactions is large. Much of the analysis has focused on excludable environments (i.e., any player can be excluded from trade without affecting the utilities of others). The mechanisms presented in the literature, however, do not extend to non-excludable environments. Two prototypical examples of such environments are: (i) public projects, where all players must have the same allocation; and (ii) non-disposable goods, where each item must be allocated to some player. We show a general mechanism that can asymptotically extract full surplus as revenue in such environments. Moreover, we provide a tight characterization for general environments, and identify necessary and sufficient conditions on the possibility of asymptotic full surplus extraction. Our characterization is based on the geometry of achievable utility sets -- convex sets that delineate the expected utilities that can be implemented by static mechanisms. Our results provide a reduction from dynamic to static mechanism design: the geometry of the achievable utility set of static mechanisms completely determines whether it is possible to fully extract surplus in the limit.
Author: Santiago Balseiro
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Dynamic mechanism design expands the scope of allocations that can be implemented and the performance that can be attained compared to static mechanisms. Even under stringent participation constraints and restrictions on transfers, recent work demonstrated that it is possible for a designer to extract the surplus of all players as revenue when players have quasilinear utilities and the number of interactions is large. Much of the analysis has focused on excludable environments (i.e., any player can be excluded from trade without affecting the utilities of others). The mechanisms presented in the literature, however, do not extend to non-excludable environments. Two prototypical examples of such environments are: (i) public projects, where all players must have the same allocation; and (ii) non-disposable goods, where each item must be allocated to some player. We show a general mechanism that can asymptotically extract full surplus as revenue in such environments. Moreover, we provide a tight characterization for general environments, and identify necessary and sufficient conditions on the possibility of asymptotic full surplus extraction. Our characterization is based on the geometry of achievable utility sets -- convex sets that delineate the expected utilities that can be implemented by static mechanisms. Our results provide a reduction from dynamic to static mechanism design: the geometry of the achievable utility set of static mechanisms completely determines whether it is possible to fully extract surplus in the limit.
Author: Dirk Bergemann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 49
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Book Description
We provide an introduction into the recent developments of dynamic mechanism design with a primary focus on the quasilinear case. First, we describe socially optimal (or efficient) dynamic mechanisms. These mechanisms extend the well known Vickrey-Clark-Groves and D'Aspremont-Gérard-Varet mechanisms to a dynamic environment. Second, we discuss results on revenue optimal mechanism. We cover models of sequential screening and revenue maximizing auctions with dynamically changing bidder types. We also discuss models of information management where the mechanism designer can control (at least partially) the stochastic process governing the agent's types. Third, we consider models with changing populations of agents over time. This allows us to address new issues relating to the properties of payment rules. After discussing related models with risk-averse agents, limited liability, and different performance criteria for the mechanisms, we conclude by discussing a number of open questions and challenges that remain for the theory of dynamic mechanism design.
Author: Konrad Mierendorff
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 87
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Author: Sham Kakade
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We consider the problem of designing optimal mechanisms for settings where agents have dynamic private information. We present the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism, that is optimal in a large class of environments that satisfy a separability condition. The mechanism satisfies a rather strong equilibrium notion (it is periodic ex-post incentive compatible and individually rational). We provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for immediate incentive compatibility for mechanisms that satisfy periodic ex-post incentive compatibility in future periods. The result also yields a strikingly simple mechanism for selling a sequence of items to a single buyer. We also show the allocation rule of the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism has a very simple structure (a Virtual Index) in multi-armed bandit settings. Finally, we show through examples that the relaxation technique we use does not produce optimal dynamic mechanisms in general non-separable environments.
Author: Anqi Li
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This dissertation advocates dynamic mechanism design as a useful tool to tackle theoretical challenges in microeconomics and to solve real world institutional design problems. It is composed of two chapters. In the first chapter, I study durable goods sales with a dynamic population of buyers. My contribution is to devise a Multi-round Simultaneous Ascending Auction with Generalized Reserve Price (MSAAGR) to implement the efficient allocation, and to contrast MSAAGR with the standard uniform price auction to highlight the implication of population dynamics on the design of trading platforms. In the second chapter, I estalibsh the possibility of sustaining long-term cooperation in infinitely repeated private monitoring games with scarce signals. My contribution is to construct a novel Budget Mechanism with Cross-Checking (BMCC) which, by linking players' action choices over time, virtually implements the efficient outcome with a vanishing incentive cost as the horizon of the game grows and the players become increasingly patient.
Author: Santiago Balseiro
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 89
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Book Description
We study the dynamic mechanism design problem of a seller that repeatedly auctions independent items over a discrete time horizon to buyers that face a cumulative budget constraint. A driving motivation behind our model is the emergence of real-time bidding markets for online display advertising in which such budgets are prevalent. We assume the seller has a strong form of limited commitment: she commits to the rules of the current auction but cannot commit to those of future auctions. We show that the celebrated Myersonian approach that leverages the envelope theorem fails in this setting, and therefore, characterizing the dynamic optimal mechanism appears intractable. Despite these challenges, we derive and characterize a near-optimal dynamic mechanism. To do so, we show that the Myersonian approach is recovered in a corresponding fluid continuous time model in which the time interval between consecutive items becomes negligible. Then, we leverage this approach to characterize the optimal dynamic direct-revelation mechanism, highlighting novel incentives at play in settings with buyers' budget constraints and seller's limited commitment. We show through a combination of theoretical and numerical results that the optimal mechanism arising from the fluid continuous time model approximately satisfies incentive compatibility for the buyers and is approximately sequentially rational for the seller in the original discrete time model.
Author: Tshilidzi Marwala
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0443239835
Category : Mathematics
Languages : en
Pages : 314
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Book Description
Recent advances in AI and Mechanism Design provide a vital tool for solving collective action problems, common in international relations. By using AI to optimize mechanisms for cooperation and coordination, we can better address issues such as climate change, trade, and security. Mechanism Design, Behavioral Science and Artificial Intelligence in International Relations shows readers how the intersection of Mechanism Design and Artificial Intelligence is revolutionizing the way we approach international relations. By using AI to optimize mechanisms, we can design better institutions, policies, and agreements that are more effective and efficient. Dr. Tshilidzi Marwala, United Nations University Rector and UN Under-Secretary General, presents the essential technologies used in Game Theory, Mechanism Design and AI and applies these to significant global issues such as interstate conflict, cybersecurity, and energy. International relations are a complex field, with many different actors and interests in play. By incorporating AI into our analysis and decision-making processes, we can better understand and predict the behavior of multiple actors and design mechanisms that take these behaviors into account, thereby producing more desirable and creative interdisciplinary approaches. The book presents real-world applications of these rapidly evolving technologies in crucial research fields such as Interstate Conflict, International Trade, Climate Change, Water management, Energy, cybersecurity, and global finance. Provides insights for computer scientists, researchers, practitioners, and policymakers on how to develop practical tools to solve many complex problems in international relations, such as climate change, cybersecurity, and interstate conflict Presents the necessary computer science, mathematical methods, and techniques in AI, game theory, mechanism design, and algorithm development Includes real-world applications of AI and mechanism design in a wide variety of research topics, such as international conflict, international trade, climate change, water management, energy management, cybersecurity, and global finance
Author: Cristiano Antonelli
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134091184
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 424
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Book Description
Pt. 1. The ingredients -- pt. 2. The governance of localised technological knowledge -- pt. 3. The introduction of localised technological change.
Author: Prateep Kumar Nayak
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 042964759X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 317
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Book Description
With an emphasis on the challenges of sustaining the commons across local to global scales, Making Commons Dynamic examines the empirical basis of theorising the concepts of commonisation and decommonisation as a way to understand commons as a process and offers analytical directions for policy and practice that can potentially help maintain commons as commons in the future. Focusing on commonisation–decommonisation as an analytical framework useful to examine and respond to changes in the commons, the chapter contributions explore how natural resources are commonised and decommonised through the influence of multi-level internal and external drivers, and their implications for commons governance across disparate geographical and temporal contexts. It draws from a large number of geographically diverse empirical cases – 20 countries in North, South, and Central America and South- and South-East Asia. They involve a wide range of commons – related to fisheries, forests, grazing, wetlands, coastal-marine, rivers and dams, aquaculture, wildlife, tourism, groundwater, surface freshwater, mountains, small islands, social movements, and climate. The book is a transdisciplinary endeavour with contributions by scholars from geography, history, sociology, anthropology, political studies, planning, human ecology, cultural and applied ecology, environmental and development studies, environmental science and technology, public policy, Indigenous/tribal studies, Latin American and Asian studies, and environmental change and governance, and authors representing the commons community, NGOs, and policy. Contributors include academics, community members, NGOs, practitioners, and policymakers. Therefore, commonisation–decommonisation lessons drawn from these chapters are well suited for contributing to the practice, policy, and theory of the commons, both locally and globally.
Author: Tilman Borgers
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0190244682
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 263
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Book Description
What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
