Multiple-Winner Award Rules in Online Procurement Auctions PDF Download
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Author: Qi Wang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This paper investigates a novel winner-determination mechanism: multiple-winner award rules that are widely used in e-procurement auctions and crowdsourcing sites. We focus on one unique award mechanism in e-procurement auctions, in which the auctioneer (i.e., the buyer) specifies three rules before the auction starts: (1) the size of the finalist set (from which the winner[s] will be chosen), (2) the number of winners, and (3) the proportion of contract volume allocated to each winner. We examine how these three rules affect auction performance using a data set of online procurement auctions across a variety of product categories. We find that all three award rules significantly impact the suppliers' participation decision, which is an important factor determining the economic performance of the auction (i.e., buyer's savings). Most interestingly, these three rules systematically induce opposite effects on auction participation for two types of suppliers: experienced bidders and first-time bidders. For example, enlarging the size of the finalist set or increasing the number of winners encourages experienced but discourages inexperienced suppliers to participate the auction, while raising the disparity in contract allocation among winning bidders (e.g., a 50/50 vs. 90/10 split) deters experienced but motivates inexperienced suppliers to participate. These findings provide useful guidelines for industrial buyers and crowdsourcing hosts on how to effectively make use of the three design levers to affect suppliers' participation when designing procurement auctions and crowdsourcing contests.
Author: Qi Wang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This paper investigates a novel winner-determination mechanism: multiple-winner award rules that are widely used in e-procurement auctions and crowdsourcing sites. We focus on one unique award mechanism in e-procurement auctions, in which the auctioneer (i.e., the buyer) specifies three rules before the auction starts: (1) the size of the finalist set (from which the winner[s] will be chosen), (2) the number of winners, and (3) the proportion of contract volume allocated to each winner. We examine how these three rules affect auction performance using a data set of online procurement auctions across a variety of product categories. We find that all three award rules significantly impact the suppliers' participation decision, which is an important factor determining the economic performance of the auction (i.e., buyer's savings). Most interestingly, these three rules systematically induce opposite effects on auction participation for two types of suppliers: experienced bidders and first-time bidders. For example, enlarging the size of the finalist set or increasing the number of winners encourages experienced but discourages inexperienced suppliers to participate the auction, while raising the disparity in contract allocation among winning bidders (e.g., a 50/50 vs. 90/10 split) deters experienced but motivates inexperienced suppliers to participate. These findings provide useful guidelines for industrial buyers and crowdsourcing hosts on how to effectively make use of the three design levers to affect suppliers' participation when designing procurement auctions and crowdsourcing contests.
Author: Jacob Gorm Larsen
Publisher: Kogan Page Publishers
ISBN: 1398600296
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 273
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Book Description
WINNER: 2021 Plume d'Or - Grand Prix ACA-Bruel Award. A Practical Guide to E-Auctions for Procurement provides guidance to procurement professionals on how to realize the potential of e-auctions. Now is the time to optimize your e-negotiation strategy using key insights from the author Jacob Gorm Larsen, who is responsible for one of the most successful and award-winning e-sourcing programs in the world. A Practical Guide to E-Auctions for Procurement presents a proven process for developing an e-auction and e-negotiation strategy, along with a catalogue of change management initiatives for securing buy-in internally in the organization. The different e-auction formats and benefits are explained in detail and demonstrated with practical examples, templates and advice that can be adopted by the reader. Jacob and the team at Maersk are at the forefront when it comes to developing robots that execute e-auctions from end-to-end and are kicking off a transformation that will fundamentally change how we consider e-auctions and negotiations. In addition, with learnings from more than 10,000 e-auctions globally, this is the book for those in procurement looking to implement, deliver and maintain a thriving e-auction program.
Author: Parente, Diane H.
Publisher: IGI Global
ISBN: 1599046385
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 402
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Book Description
Offers a systematic approach to the examination of online procurement auctions. Growth in online auctions reinforces the need for understanding the factors important in auctions and the caveats that both researchers and practitioners need to know in order to effectively study and use the auction tool.
Author: Ernan Haruvy
Publisher: Now Publishers Inc
ISBN: 1601983328
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 87
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Book Description
Internet Auctions reviews recent empirical and theoretical works on internet auctions with a focus on internet auction design, formats, and features that are currently debated in the marketing literature.
Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378
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Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.
Author:
Publisher: W.P. Carey School of Business
ISBN: 9780945968573
Category : Electronic commerce
Languages : en
Pages : 86
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Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Courts-martial and courts of inquiry
Languages : en
Pages : 908
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Author: Gian Luigi Albano
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107077966
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 357
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This book addresses the increasing demand for a logical understanding of how framework agreement should be used and implemented.
Author: Shulin Liu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
In practical multi-attribute procurement auctions, the profit and winning a contract have different importance to the suppliers. This paper assumes that the suppliers weight the profit and probability of winning a contract with Cobb-Douglas utility function, obtains the suppliers' equilibrium bidding strategies and the buyer' expected utilities in the first- and second-score auctions, and compares them with those under risk-neutral.
Author: Axel Ockenfels
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic commerce
Languages : en
Pages : 30
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