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Author: Bappaditya Mukhopadhyay
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 21
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Book Description
In this paper, we address the issue of possible moral hazard that rating agencies might have. We discuss the feasibility of possible incentive contracts that can ameliorate this problem. We find, that incentive payments to the rating agency based on expected returns on debt will do away with the moral hazard problem.
Author: Bappaditya Mukhopadhyay
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 21
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Book Description
In this paper, we address the issue of possible moral hazard that rating agencies might have. We discuss the feasibility of possible incentive contracts that can ameliorate this problem. We find, that incentive payments to the rating agency based on expected returns on debt will do away with the moral hazard problem.
Author: Herwig Langohr
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
ISBN: 0470714352
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 524
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Book Description
Credit rating agencies play a critical role in capital markets, guiding the asset allocation of institutional investors as private capital moves freely around the world in search of the best trade-off between risk and return. However, they have also been strongly criticised for failing to spot the Asian crisis in the early 1990s, the Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat collapses in the early 2000s and finally for their ratings of subprime-related structured finance instruments and their role in the current financial crisis. This book is a guide to ratings, the ratings industry and the mechanics and economics of obtaining a rating. It sheds light on the role that the agencies play in the international financial markets. It avoids the sensationalist approach often associated with studies of rating scandals and the financial crisis, and instead provides an objective and critical analysis of the business of ratings. The book will be of practical use to any individual who has to deal with ratings and the ratings industry in their day-to-day job. Reviews "Rating agencies fulfil an important role in the capital markets, but given their power, they are frequently the object of criticism. Some of it is justified but most of it portrays a lack of understanding of their business. In their book The Rating Agencies and their Credit Ratings, Herwig and Patricia Langohr provide an excellent economic background to the role of rating agencies and also a thorough understanding of their business and the problems they face. I recommend this book to all those who have an interest in this somewhat arcane but extremely important area." -Robin Monro-Davies, Former CEO, Fitch Ratings. "At a time of unprecedented public and political scrutiny of the effectiveness and indeed the basic business model of the Credit Rating industry, and heightened concerns regarding the transparency and accountability of the leading agencies, this book provides a commendably comprehensive overview, and should provide invaluable assistance in the ongoing debate." -Rupert Atkinson, Managing Director, Head of Credit Advisory Group, Morgan Stanley and member of the SIFMA Rating Agency Task Force "The Langohrs have provided useful information in a field where one frequently finds only opinions or misconceptions. They supply a firm base from which to understand changes now underway. A well-read copy of this monograph should be close to the desk of every investor, issuer and financial regulator, legislator or commentator." -John Grout, Policy and Technical Director, The Association of Corporate Treasurers
Author: Saltuk Ozerturk
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 39
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Book Description
This paper theoretically investigates the implications of the "skin in the game" requirements in the Dodd-Frank Act for the rating accuracy of a credit rating agency (CRA). An issuer solicits a rating from a CRA to sell a loan portfolio. The sale is subject to a retention requirement to mitigate a moral hazard problem on the issuer's side. The CRA's optimal rating accuracy is shown to be increasing in the skin that the issuer is required to retain. The analysis relates the optimal retention requirement to the specifics of the CRA's information acquisition problem. The results suggest that the issuers should be required to retain more skin in complex financial securities. Furthermore, the planned introduction of liability rules for CRAs should be accompanied with a reduction in the retention requirements.
Author: Juan Flores Zendejas
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1000515028
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 167
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Book Description
Moral Hazard is a core concept in economics. In a nutshell, moral hazard reflects the reduced incentive to protect against risk where an entity is (or believes it will be) protected from its consequences, whether through an insurance arrangement or an implicit or explicit guarantee system. It is fundamentally driven by information asymmetry, arises in all sectors of the economy, including banking, medical insurance, financial insurance, and governmental support, undermines the stability of our economic systems and has burdened taxpayers in all developed countries, resulting in significant costs to the community. Despite the seriousness and pervasiveness of moral hazard, policymakers and scholars have failed to address this issue. This book fills this gap. It covers 200 years of moral hazard: from its origins in the 19th century to the bailouts announced in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak. The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the ethics and other fundamental issues connected to moral hazard. Part II provides historical and empirical evidence on moral hazard in international finance. It examines in turn the role of the export credit industry, the international lender of last resort, and the IMF. Finally, Part III examines specific sectors such as automobile, banking, and the US industry at large. This is the first book to provide an interdisciplinary analysis of moral hazard and explain why addressing this issue has become crucial today. As such, it will attract interest from scholars across different fields, including economists, political scientists and lawyers.
Author: John Eatwell
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349202150
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 321
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Book Description
This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Author: Amy Finkelstein
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231538685
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 161
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Book Description
Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Author: Fouad Sabry
Publisher: One Billion Knowledgeable
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 579
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Book Description
What is Moral Hazard The term "moral hazard" refers to a circumstance that occurs in the field of economics and describes a situation in which an economic actor has an incentive to expand its exposure to risk because it does not face the full costs of that risk. As an illustration, when a company is insured, it may be willing to take on additional risk since it is aware that its insurance will cover the costs connected with the risk. It is possible for a moral hazard to take place when, after a financial transaction has taken place, the actions of the party that is taking the risk change in a way that is detrimental to the party that is suffering the costs. How you will benefit (I) Insights, and validations about the following topics: Chapter 1: Moral hazard Chapter 2: Economic bubble Chapter 3: Debt Chapter 4: Contract theory Chapter 5: Adverse selection Chapter 6: Information asymmetry Chapter 7: Savings and loan crisis Chapter 8: Asset-backed security Chapter 9: Mortgage loan Chapter 10: Subprime mortgage crisis Chapter 11: Flight-to-quality Chapter 12: Subordinated debt Chapter 13: Subprime crisis impact timeline Chapter 14: Credit crunch Chapter 15: Subprime crisis background information Chapter 16: Interbank lending market Chapter 17: Government policies and the subprime mortgage crisis Chapter 18: Subprime mortgage crisis solutions debate Chapter 19: Securitization Chapter 20: Financial fragility Chapter 21: 2007-2008 financial crisis (II) Answering the public top questions about moral hazard. (III) Real world examples for the usage of moral hazard in many fields. Who this book is for Professionals, undergraduate and graduate students, enthusiasts, hobbyists, and those who want to go beyond basic knowledge or information for any kind of Moral Hazard.
Author: Carol Anne Heimer
Publisher: Univ of California Press
ISBN: 9780520052024
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 288
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Book Description
Author: Amadeus Gabriel
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This thesis explores the question of how credit rating agencies became financial market authorities and studies subsequently their contribution to the current financial crisis. The prerequisites for the growth of the credit rating industry have been set by government officials. Governments and similar institutions not only attributed ''regulatory'' licenses to credit rating agencies, thereby creating an income guarantee, but they are also the most important driver of the explosion in securities which require a rating. Credit rating agencies became financial market authorities because governments and policy-makers were in favor of it. International and domestic regulatory authorities created incentives to purchase sovereign debt, either directly or indirectly via the use of credit ratings. Financial regulations incentivized banks to hold large amounts of highly rated debts, i.e. government obligations until the occurrence of structured finance. These conditions significantly reduced the cost of debt for the banking sector through lower equity and provided more favorable refinancing costs for governments despite their high debt levels. However, the main reason for the financial fragility is monetary policy. Fractional-reserve banking and fiat money at a global scale since the 1970s increased moral hazard and excessive risk-taking in financial markets. Taking these factors into account, this thesis studies the role of credit rating agencies in the current financial crisis and sketches practical implications for the rating industry based on the findings of the work at hand.
Author: Francesco Sangiorgi
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781680833805
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The Economics of Credit Rating Agencies explores the economic and regulatory issues and frictions associated with credit rating agencies in the aftermath of the financial crisis. While ratings and other public signals are important, they can discourage independent due diligence and be a source of systemic risk. The authors highlight the diverse underlying views towards these competing approaches to reducing systemic risk and discuss the subtle contrasts between credit rating agencies and other types of due diligence providers, such as auditors, analysts and proxy-voting advisors. After an introduction, Section 2 provides a broad discussion of ratings in the regulatory framework, as well as how ratings potentially crowd out private information production and the risks associated with overreliance on ratings in market pricing. Section 3 contrasts credit rating agencies with alternative gatekeepers, such as auditors, analysts and proxy-voting advisers. Section 4 describes the difficulty of selling information and the underpinnings of the payment model for various financial information intermediaries under alternative assumptions. Section 5 discusses of rating agency analyst conflict of interest. An important aspect of credit ratings is the feedback effect that arises when a firm's behavior responds to the change in the cost of funding that is influenced by the rating. Feedback effects arise because of contractual triggers, but also through coordination and learning channels. Section 6 discusses these channels and especially the learning channel. Section 7 discusses selection issues including rating shopping and the contrast between solicited and unsolicited credit ratings. Section 8 contrasts ratings across products, including sovereign debt, and rating agencies. The nature of competition and the role of entry and reputation in the credit rating agency space are explored in Section 9. Section 10 examines why ratings matter, as well as techniques for identifying the real effects of ratings. The authors provide concluding observations and takeaways about rating agencies that emerged as a byproduct of the financial crisis in Section 11.
