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Author: Hideshi Itoh
Publisher:
ISBN:
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Languages : en
Pages : 0
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The paper aims at obtaining new theoretical insights into organizational behavior by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal-agent relationships with theories of other-regarding (social or interdependent) preferences, in particular, inequity aversion theory. In the benchmark model, the principal and the agent are both risk neutral, while the agent is wealth constrained and hence the basic tradeoff between incentives and rent extraction arises. I show that other-regarding preferences interact with incentives in nontrivial ways. In particular, the principal is in general worse off as the agent cares more about the well-being of the principal. When there are multiple symmetric agents who care about each other's well-being, the principal can optimally exploit their other-regarding nature by designing an appropriate interdependent contract such as a "fair" team contract or a relative performance contract that creates inequality when their performance outcomes are different. The optimal contract depends on the nature of the agents' other-regarding preferences. The approach taken in this paper can shed light on issues on endogenous preferences within organizations, as suggested by sociologists and organizational economists.
Author: Hideshi Itoh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
The paper aims at obtaining new theoretical insights into organizational behavior by combining the standard moral hazard models of principal-agent relationships with theories of other-regarding (social or interdependent) preferences, in particular, inequity aversion theory. In the benchmark model, the principal and the agent are both risk neutral, while the agent is wealth constrained and hence the basic tradeoff between incentives and rent extraction arises. I show that other-regarding preferences interact with incentives in nontrivial ways. In particular, the principal is in general worse off as the agent cares more about the well-being of the principal. When there are multiple symmetric agents who care about each other's well-being, the principal can optimally exploit their other-regarding nature by designing an appropriate interdependent contract such as a "fair" team contract or a relative performance contract that creates inequality when their performance outcomes are different. The optimal contract depends on the nature of the agents' other-regarding preferences. The approach taken in this paper can shed light on issues on endogenous preferences within organizations, as suggested by sociologists and organizational economists.
Author: Thomas Daske
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: Juan Flores Zendejas
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1000515028
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 167
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Book Description
Moral Hazard is a core concept in economics. In a nutshell, moral hazard reflects the reduced incentive to protect against risk where an entity is (or believes it will be) protected from its consequences, whether through an insurance arrangement or an implicit or explicit guarantee system. It is fundamentally driven by information asymmetry, arises in all sectors of the economy, including banking, medical insurance, financial insurance, and governmental support, undermines the stability of our economic systems and has burdened taxpayers in all developed countries, resulting in significant costs to the community. Despite the seriousness and pervasiveness of moral hazard, policymakers and scholars have failed to address this issue. This book fills this gap. It covers 200 years of moral hazard: from its origins in the 19th century to the bailouts announced in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak. The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the ethics and other fundamental issues connected to moral hazard. Part II provides historical and empirical evidence on moral hazard in international finance. It examines in turn the role of the export credit industry, the international lender of last resort, and the IMF. Finally, Part III examines specific sectors such as automobile, banking, and the US industry at large. This is the first book to provide an interdisciplinary analysis of moral hazard and explain why addressing this issue has become crucial today. As such, it will attract interest from scholars across different fields, including economists, political scientists and lawyers.
Author: Amy Finkelstein
Publisher: Columbia University Press
ISBN: 0231538685
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 161
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Book Description
Addressing the challenge of covering heath care expenses—while minimizing economic risks. Moral hazard—the tendency to change behavior when the cost of that behavior will be borne by others—is a particularly tricky question when considering health care. Kenneth J. Arrow’s seminal 1963 paper on this topic (included in this volume) was one of the first to explore the implication of moral hazard for health care, and Amy Finkelstein—recognized as one of the world’s foremost experts on the topic—here examines this issue in the context of contemporary American health care policy. Drawing on research from both the original RAND Health Insurance Experiment and her own research, including a 2008 Health Insurance Experiment in Oregon, Finkelstein presents compelling evidence that health insurance does indeed affect medical spending and encourages policy solutions that acknowledge and account for this. The volume also features commentaries and insights from other renowned economists, including an introduction by Joseph P. Newhouse that provides context for the discussion, a commentary from Jonathan Gruber that considers provider-side moral hazard, and reflections from Joseph E. Stiglitz and Kenneth J. Arrow. “Reads like a fireside chat among a group of distinguished, articulate health economists.” —Choice
Author: Stefan Gregor Neuß
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: William J. Congdon
Publisher: Brookings Institution Press
ISBN: 0815705018
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 260
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Book Description
Traditional public finance provides a powerful framework for policy analysis, but it relies on a model of human behavior that the new science of behavioral economics increasingly calls into question. In Policy and Choice economists William Congdon, Jeffrey Kling, and Sendhil Mullainathan argue that public finance not only can incorporate many lessons of behavioral economics but also can serve as a solid foundation from which to apply insights from psychology to questions of economic policy. The authors revisit the core questions of public finance, armed with a richer perspective on human behavior. They do not merely apply findings from psychology to specific economic problems; instead, they explore how psychological factors actually reshape core concepts in public finance such as moral hazard, deadweight loss, and incentives. Part one sets the stage for integrating behavioral economics into public finance by interpreting the evidence from psychology and developing a framework for applying it to questions in public finance. In part two, the authors apply that framework to specific topics in public finance, including social insurance, externalities and public goods, income support and redistribution, and taxation. In doing so, the authors build a unified analytical approach that encompasses both traditional policy levers, such as taxes and subsidies, and more psychologically informed instruments. The net result of this innovative approach is a fully behavioral public finance, an integration of psychology and the economics of the public sector that is explicit, systematic, rigorous, and realistic.
Author: John Eatwell
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1349202150
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 321
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Book Description
This is an extract from the 4-volume dictionary of economics, a reference book which aims to define the subject of economics today. 1300 subject entries in the complete work cover the broad themes of economic theory. This volume concentrates on the topic of allocation information and markets.
Author: Chandra S. Mishra
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137371463
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 520
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Book Description
The Theory of Entrepreneurship examines the interiors of the entrepreneurial value creation process, and offers a new unified and comprehensive theory to afford empirical investigations as well as delineate a broader view of the entrepreneurial contextual milieu.
Author: Sanjit Dhami
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192574639
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 240
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Book Description
Taken from the first definitive introduction to behavioral economics, The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis: Other-Regarding Preferences is an authoritative and cutting edge guide to this essential topic for advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students. It considers the evidence from experimental games on human sociality, and gives models and applications of inequity aversion, intention based reciprocity, conditional cooperation, human virtues, and social identity. This updated extract from Dhami's leading textbook allows the reader to pursue subsections of this vast and rapidly growing field and to tailor their reading to their specific interests in behavioural economics.
Author: Jacques H. Drèze
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 33
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Book Description
