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Author: Folke Tersman
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521853385
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 172
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Book Description
Folke Tersman explores the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement.
Author: Folke Tersman
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521853385
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 172
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Book Description
Folke Tersman explores the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement.
Author: Rach Cosker-Rowland
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 0429957718
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 275
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Book Description
Widespread moral disagreement raises ethical, epistemological, political, and metaethical questions. Is the best explanation of our widespread moral disagreements that there are no objective moral facts and that moral relativism is correct? Or should we think that just as there is widespread disagreement about whether we have free will but there is still an objective fact about whether we have it, similarly, moral disagreement has no bearing on whether morality is objective? More practically, is it arrogant to stick to our guns in the face of moral disagreement? Must we suspend belief about the morality of controversial actions such as eating meat and having an abortion? And does moral disagreement affect the laws that we should have? For instance, does disagreement about the justice of heavily redistributive taxation affect whether such taxation is legitimate? In this thorough and clearly written introduction to moral disagreement and its philosophical and practical implications, Rach Cosker-Rowland examines and assesses the following topics and questions: How does moral disagreement affect what we should do and believe in our day-to-day lives? Epistemic peerhood and moral disagreements with our epistemic peers Metaethics and moral disagreement Relativism, moral objectivity, moral realism, and non-cognitivism Moral disagreement and normative ethics Liberalism, democracy, and disagreement Moral compromise Moral uncertainty. Combining clear philosophical analysis with summaries of the latest research and suggestions for further reading, Moral Disagreement is ideal for students of ethics, metaethics, political philosophy, and philosophical topics that are closely related such as relativism and scepticism. It will also be of interest to those in related disciplines such as ethics and public policy and philosophy of law.
Author: Michele S. Moses
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 022634438X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 148
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Book Description
In this book, Michele S. Moses offers a crucial new way for thinking about the affirmative action debate, one that holds up the debate itself as an important emblem of the democratic process. Central to her analysis is the argument that we need to understand disagreements about affirmative action as products of conflicts between deeply held beliefs about race consciousness as either a pernicious political force or a necessary variable in political equality. --Back cover.
Author: Christopher W. Gowans
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1134604556
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 288
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Book Description
Can moral disagreements be rationally resolved? Can universal human rights be defended in face of moral disagreements? The problem of moral disagreement is one of the central problems in moral thinking. It also provides a stimulating stepping-stone to some of the perennial problems of philosophy, such as relativism, scepticism, and objectivity. Moral Disagreements is the first anthology to bring together classic and contemporary readings on this key topic. Clearly divided into five parts; The Historical Debate; Voices from Anthropology; Challenges to Moral Objectivity; Defenses of Moral Objectivity; and New Directions, the anthology presents readings from the following key thinkers: * Sextus, Empiricus, Chagnon, Wong, MacIntyre * Aquinas, Shweder, Brink, Rawls * Montaigne, Turner, Nussbaum, Narayan * Hume, Mackie, Gewirth * Nietzsche, Williams, Berlin. A distinctive feature of the anthology is that it brings philosophers into dialogue with well-known anthropologists. Also included is a comprehensive introduction by Christopher Gowans, introducing the problem of moral disagreement to those coming to the topic for the first time.
Author: David B Wong
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0199724849
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 312
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Book Description
In this book, David B. Wong defends an ambitious and important new version of moral relativism. He does not espouse the type of relativism that says anything goes, but he does start with a relativist stance against alternative theories such that there need not be only one universal truth. Wong proposes that there can be a plurality of true moralities existing across different traditions and cultures, all with one core human question as to how we can all live together.
Author: Michael Bergmann
Publisher: Berkeley Tanner Lectures
ISBN: 0199669775
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 321
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Book Description
Fourteen original essays by philosophers, theologians, and social scientists explore the challenges to moral and religious belief posed by disagreement and evolution. The collection represents both sceptical and non-skeptical positions about morality and religion, cultivates new insights, and moves the discussion forward in illuminating ways.
Author: Dominic Wilkinson
Publisher: Elsevier Health Sciences
ISBN: 0702077828
Category : Medical
Languages : en
Pages : 192
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Book Description
What should happen when doctors and parents disagree about what would be best for a child? When should courts become involved? Should life support be stopped against parents’ wishes? The case of Charlie Gard, reached global attention in 2017. It led to widespread debate about the ethics of disagreements between doctors and parents, about the place of the law in such disputes, and about the variation in approach between different parts of the world. In this book, medical ethicists Dominic Wilkinson and Julian Savulescu critically examine the ethical questions at the heart of disputes about medical treatment for children. They use the Gard case as a springboard to a wider discussion about the rights of parents, the harms of treatment, and the vital issue of limited resources. They discuss other prominent UK and international cases of disagreement and conflict. From opposite sides of the debate Wilkinson and Savulescu provocatively outline the strongest arguments in favour of and against treatment. They analyse some of the distinctive and challenging features of treatment disputes in the 21st century and argue that disagreement about controversial ethical questions is both inevitable and desirable. They outline a series of lessons from the Gard case and propose a radical new ‘dissensus’ framework for future cases of disagreement. This new book critically examines the core ethical questions at the heart of disputes about medical treatment for children. The contents review prominent cases of disagreement from the UK and internationally and analyse some of the distinctive and challenging features around treatment disputes in the 21st century. The book proposes a radical new framework for future cases of disagreement around the care of gravely ill people.
Author: Christopher McMahon
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 052176288X
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 215
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Book Description
This book-length treatment of reasonable disagreement in politics sheds light on this important and overlooked aspect of political life.
Author: Christopher Landau
Publisher: SCM Press
ISBN: 0334060478
Category : Religion
Languages : en
Pages : 240
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Book Description
Even the most casual contemporary observer of Christianity must recognise that the notion of Christian community being identifiable through the mutual love of its members (John 13:35) is difficult to reconcile with the schismatic reality of current ecclesial life. Nonetheless, disagreement remains an ethical subject neglected by theologians. A Theology of Disagreement: New Testament Ethics for Ecclesial Conflicts examines how New Testament texts inform Christian approaches to disagreement. Drawing on New Testament themes, the book explores the nature of an ethic of disagreement, and its practical implications for the church’s public theological witness, as well as its liturgy
Author: David Allen Merli
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Ethics
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
Appendix: In order to have genuine disagreement, interlocutors must share terms, meanings, and concepts. Without this, their dispute is merely verbal; it rests on linguistic confusion. This is true of all conversation, but many philosophers have thought that moral discourse poses special problems. Moral discourse seems to contain intractable disagreements and lacks the sorts of authority and deference relations that are typical in straightforward empirical disagreement. This yields a potent philosophical puzzle: how is it that moral evaluators can share a subject matter while thinking such different things? I argue that noncognitivist attempts to make sense of disagreement fail. The noncognitivist is obliged to provide an account of the mental states at work in moral discourse. These accounts either fail to identify a distinct species of moral evaluation, or to provide for genuine incompatibility between competing moral judgments, or to avoid circularity. Thus one of the most important motivations for noncognitivist accounts is undermined. I show how naturalistic moral realism can be defended against popular arguments against its ability to make sense of univocity. This criticism has been revived in recent work by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons. I develop three objections to their so-called "Moral Twin Earth" argument, and conclude that it has no force against moral realism. I then show that naturalistic realism faces a different problem accounting for univocity. This problem results from the fact that the path of moral inquiry is underdetermined: there is no fact of the matter about the referents of speakers' terms. I argue that common realistic appeals to the resolution of moral dispute are not sufficient, because they fail to note a distinction between different readings of the convergence claim. The most plausible ways of understanding that claim are of no help to the realist's semantic requirements. Finally, I consider a rejoinder suggested by recent work in the philosophy of language. Though not compatible with realism's moral semantics, this rejoinder suggests that moral and non-moral language are on a par. I offer some reasons for doubting this claim, and suggest that moralizing poses unique interpretive challenges.
