Investor Access to Conference Call Disclosures PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Investor Access to Conference Call Disclosures PDF full book. Access full book title Investor Access to Conference Call Disclosures by Shyam V. Sunder. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Shyam V. Sunder
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 53
Get Book Here
Book Description
This study provides evidence on the impact of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) on information asymmetry. Reg. FD prohibits firms from disclosing quot;materialquot; information selectively to analysts and institutional investors. The regulation has triggered a debate on mainly three issues: (a) whether use of nonpublic channels for selective disclosure (such as, analyst conference calls) results in information asymmetry among investors, (b) whether prohibiting nonpublic communications is contributing to leveling of information asymmetry among investors, and (c) whether Reg. FD has caused firms to reduce the quality of their public voluntary disclosures. The present study addresses all of these issues. I use a sample of earnings conference calls and classify firms as either, (1) quot;openquot; firms, which always held conference calls accessible to all investors; or (2) quot;restrictedquot; firms, which held conference calls for only analysts and institutional investors in the pre- Reg. FD period. I find that restricted firms faced higher information asymmetry compared to open firms in the pre- Reg. FD period. However, in the post- Reg. FD period the differences in information asymmetry between open and restricted firms do not persist. Taken together it suggests that selective disclosure was causing greater information asymmetry among investors and Reg. FD has contributed to the leveling of such information asymmetry. In additional tests, I do not find evidence that Reg. FD has caused firms to reduce quality of information conveyed in conference calls. The study adds to our understanding of how voluntary and mandated disclosure impact information asymmetry among investors.
Author: Shyam V. Sunder
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 53
Get Book Here
Book Description
This study provides evidence on the impact of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) on information asymmetry. Reg. FD prohibits firms from disclosing quot;materialquot; information selectively to analysts and institutional investors. The regulation has triggered a debate on mainly three issues: (a) whether use of nonpublic channels for selective disclosure (such as, analyst conference calls) results in information asymmetry among investors, (b) whether prohibiting nonpublic communications is contributing to leveling of information asymmetry among investors, and (c) whether Reg. FD has caused firms to reduce the quality of their public voluntary disclosures. The present study addresses all of these issues. I use a sample of earnings conference calls and classify firms as either, (1) quot;openquot; firms, which always held conference calls accessible to all investors; or (2) quot;restrictedquot; firms, which held conference calls for only analysts and institutional investors in the pre- Reg. FD period. I find that restricted firms faced higher information asymmetry compared to open firms in the pre- Reg. FD period. However, in the post- Reg. FD period the differences in information asymmetry between open and restricted firms do not persist. Taken together it suggests that selective disclosure was causing greater information asymmetry among investors and Reg. FD has contributed to the leveling of such information asymmetry. In additional tests, I do not find evidence that Reg. FD has caused firms to reduce quality of information conveyed in conference calls. The study adds to our understanding of how voluntary and mandated disclosure impact information asymmetry among investors.
Author: Brian J. Bushee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 43
Get Book Here
Book Description
This paper investigates the effect of regulation that mandates open access to information on managers' disclosure choices and investors' reactions to disclosures. The recently passed Regulation FD (Reg FD) requires firms to make material disclosures broadly available. Using a sample of firms that previously restricted access to conference calls and a sample of firms that voluntarily allowed unlimited access to their calls in the pre-Reg FD period, we examine the effect of the new rule on managers' decisions regarding the timing, use, and information content of calls, as well as the effect on investors' trading behavior during the call. Our results indicate that Reg FD had a significant negative impact on managers' decisions to continue hosting conference calls and on their decisions regarding the optimal time to hold the call. However, contrary to the concerns of many critics, the magnitudes of these changes are not large. We do not find evidence that Reg FD decreased the amount of information disclosed during the call period, contrary to the concerns of Reg FD opponents. Finally, we find evidence that the new rule increased price volatility for firms that previously restricted access to their calls (relative to firms that previously held open calls) and that the amount of individual investor trading increased following the rule change. Overall, our results suggest that Reg FD impacted trading during the conference call window for firms most affected by the new regulation.
Author: Brian J. Bushee
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 46
Get Book Here
Book Description
Recent advances in information technology allow firms to provide broader access to their disclosures. We examine the determinants and effects of the decision to provide unlimited real-time access to conference calls (i.e., quot;openquot;conference calls). Our evidence suggests that the decision to provide open calls is associated with the composition of a firm's investor base and, to some degree, the complexity of its financial information. We also find that open calls are associated with a greater increase in small trades (consistent with individuals trading on information released during the call) and higher price volatility during the call period.Key Words: Conference calls, corporate disclosure, selective disclosure, price volatility, institutional investors.
Author: Alina Lerman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
Get Book Here
Book Description
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reviews companies' mandatory filings and issues comment letters to ensure compliance with applicable financial reporting requirements. We explore the nature, determinants, and consequences of SEC comment letters that refer to information disclosed in voluntary earnings conference calls. First, we provide a rich descriptive analysis of the subject and format of conference call disclosures targeted by the SEC. Next, we document that conference call comment letters are more likely when filing reviews are more complex and conference calls are informative; these comment letters are less likely when SEC staff are resource-constrained. We find that factors associated with overall regulatory scrutiny and firm visibility are not strong drivers of SEC attention to conference calls. In terms of consequences, we find that comment letters referencing calls are associated with higher-quality reviews, and we observe higher remediation costs for these letters. Finally, we show that relative to the typical filing review process, SEC use of conference call disclosures leads to more changes in firms' future mandatory disclosures along with an increase in overall information asymmetry.
Author: Gary Previts
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0080545459
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 347
Get Book Here
Book Description
The scope of service provided by professional accountants is influenced by legislation and case law as well as the dictates of a variety of government and private sector agencies: including State Boards of Accountancy, Academic Accreditation Bodies, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, independent standard setting bodies such as the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board (US), the Financial Accounting Standards Board (US), the International Accounting Standards Board and self-regulatory organizations such as State Societies of CPA and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. There are equivalent and emerging local international bodies that exist in most developed countries. It is important for academics, students, practitioners, regulators and researchers to consider, study and understand the role and relationship of such bodies with the practice and content of our discipline.Research in Accounting Regulation is a refereed annual serial that seeks to publish high quality manuscripts, which address regulatory issues and policy affecting the practice of accountancy, broadly defined. Topics of interest include research based on: 1) Self-regulatory activities. 2) Case law and litigation. 3) Governmental and quasi-governmental regulation. 4) The economics of regulation, including modelling.This research series aims to encourage the submission of original empirical, behavioural or applied research manuscripts that consider strategic and policy implications for regulation, regulatory models and markets. It is intended for individual researchers, practitioners, regulators and students of accountancy who desire to increase their understanding of the regulation of accountancy.
Author: J. Jay Choi
Publisher: Emerald Group Publishing
ISBN: 1780527640
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 388
Get Book Here
Book Description
For this volume we have collected 12 original research papers dealing with various issues relating to transparency. This topic spans many disciplines beyond accounting and finance, intersecting economics, law and management, embracing sociology and political science, and offering opportunities for creative interdisciplinary research. We hope this v
Author: Benjamin M. Blau
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45
Get Book Here
Book Description
Recent research finds that investors, broadly defined, react to the linguistic tone of quarterly earnings conference calls; there is a positive relation between firms' stock returns and call tone (a measure of “sentiment” related word tabulations). However, this type of soft information can be subtle, context-specific, and difficult to interpret. Moreover, the literature suggests cross-sectional variation in information processing skills among investors. Thus, we test whether sophisticated investors interpret earnings conference call tone differently than investors at large by examining short selling activity and its relation to earnings conference call tone. We find that short sellers target firms with simultaneous high earnings surprise and abnormally high management tone. The combination of positive earnings surprise and unusually positive tone strengthens short sellers' return predictability. This result indicates that short sellers interpret revealed “inflated” call language by managers more completely than naïve investors. The incomplete stock price reaction by naïve investors due to the lack of reliability they place on this soft information results in overpricing of the stock. However, it also suggests that managers are unable to maintain prolonged overvaluation of their stock by striking an overly optimistic posture in the interactive conference call disclosure forum since short sellers' trades provide additional price discovery.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781321223897
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 102
Get Book Here
Book Description
Using a combination of field experimental, survey and archival empirical design, I study investors' access to corporate management in the context of public disclosure. Main findings include: (1) high willingness of senior management to engage in 1-on-1-calls with outsiders of the firm to discuss disclosure-related questions, (2) better corporate access when management's communication benefits are higher (3) quarterly quiet periods are not widely practiced and (4) lower information asymmetry and smaller return reactions pre-earnings release are associated with better management access. In my field experiment, 2,563 publicly-traded firms receive two identical emails seeking 1-on-1-calls to clarify MD&A related questions. Emails are sent from two distinct audiences, identifiable via web domain names, as (unknown) investors and consultants. Almost 58% of firms reply. A majority of responses come from senior management offering phone numbers and best times to call. Management access is lower for the consultant-audience which differs in perceived (proprietary) costs and (capital market) benefits from the investor-audience. To investors, management is more accessible when shareholder activism is high, short interest is low and MTB is low. Further, better management access is associated with reduced bid-ask spreads and lower informational content in stock prices shortly before earnings announcement. Together, this paper analyzes an important but academically uninvestigated source for gaining an enhanced understanding of public disclosure. It also serves as a starting point for a new line of work in disclosure-related accounting research that combines field experiments with archival empirical techniques to exploit randomized induced variation in real-world settings.
Author: Anne Heinrichs
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 50
Get Book Here
Book Description
Using a set of proprietary records, we examine who consumes quarterly earnings conference calls and under which circumstances the calls are consumed. While there is significant interest in calls by institutional investors and sell-side analysts, we find that investors who do not hold a position in the firm are a leading consumer. We show that buy-side non-holders who consume calls are more likely to hold positions in competitors and to purchase the stock in the future. In addition, many investors who hold large positions only consume calls periodically. We also document a benefit of consuming calls by finding that the consumption of calls is associated with more informed trading decisions. Overall, our investigation illuminates the actual consumption of conference calls by different consumers and the potential benefits of consuming additional firm disclosures.
Author: Ted Trautmann
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Disclosure of information
Languages : en
Pages : 296
Get Book Here
Book Description
