Investment Incentives in Auctions: an Experiment

Investment Incentives in Auctions: an Experiment PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34

Get Book Here

Book Description

Investment Incentives in Auctions: an Experiment

Investment Incentives in Auctions: an Experiment PDF Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 34

Get Book Here

Book Description


Investment Incentives and Market Power

Investment Incentives and Market Power PDF Author: Dean V. Williamson
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Investment analysis
Languages : en
Pages : 68

Get Book Here

Book Description


Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions

Investment Incentives in Procurement Auctions PDF Author: Leandro Arozamena
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0

Get Book Here

Book Description
This paper investigates firms' incentives to invest in cost reduction in the first price sealed bid auction, a format largely used for procurement. Two central features of the model are that we allow firms to be heterogeneous and that investment is observable. We find that firms will tend to underinvest in cost reduction because they anticipate fiercer head-on competition. Using the second price auction as a benchmark, we also find that the first price auction will elicit less investment from market participants and that this is socially inefficient. These results have implications for market design when investment is important.

Putting Auction Theory to Work

Putting Auction Theory to Work PDF Author: Paul Milgrom
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139449168
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 378

Get Book Here

Book Description
This book provides a comprehensive introduction to modern auction theory and its important new applications. It is written by a leading economic theorist whose suggestions guided the creation of the new spectrum auction designs. Aimed at graduate students and professionals in economics, the book gives the most up-to-date treatments of both traditional theories of 'optimal auctions' and newer theories of multi-unit auctions and package auctions, and shows by example how these theories are used. The analysis explores the limitations of prominent older designs, such as the Vickrey auction design, and evaluates the practical responses to those limitations. It explores the tension between the traditional theory of auctions with a fixed set of bidders, in which the seller seeks to squeeze as much revenue as possible from the fixed set, and the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, in which bidder profits must be respected to encourage participation.

Experiments and Competition Policy

Experiments and Competition Policy PDF Author: Jeroen Hinloopen
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521493420
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 329

Get Book Here

Book Description
Economists have begun to make much greater use of experimental methods in their research. This collection surveys these methods and shows how they can help us to understand firm behaviour in relation to various forms of competition policy.

Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment and Bidding Parity

Repeated Auctions of Incentive Contracts, Investment and Bidding Parity PDF Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 57

Get Book Here

Book Description


Experimental Studies on Partnership Dissolution, R&D Investment, and Gift Giving

Experimental Studies on Partnership Dissolution, R&D Investment, and Gift Giving PDF Author: Nadja Trhal
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 3658246677
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 182

Get Book Here

Book Description
In recent years, traditional economic theory has been enriched by behavioral components. There is huge and rapidly growing evidence from empirical and experimental studies that mere profit maximization is in many cases not a good proxy of real-life decision-making and interaction in economic situations. Yet, although the concept of homo oeconomicus has subsequently been dismissed by many authors, behavior is not random or arbitrary, but follows systematic patterns and rules that researchers in the field of behavioral economics aim at understanding. This thesis adds to the understanding of actual economic decision-making by analyzing behavior in three different economic applications. The first application concerns experimental studies on the performance of partnership dissolution mechanisms. The second application studies the effects of policy instruments on a firm`s incentives to invest in R&D. Finally, the third application tests the impact of responsibility for being in a disadvantageous situation through deliberate risk-taking on solidarity behavior of economic agents. Potential readership includes scholars of experimental economics in the fields of mechanism design, industrial organization and social preferences as well as interested students and practitioners involved in these areas.

Auctioning Incentive Contracts

Auctioning Incentive Contracts PDF Author: Alexander Marinus Onderstal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 24

Get Book Here

Book Description


Auctions with External Incentives

Auctions with External Incentives PDF Author: Miguel A. Fonseca
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :

Get Book Here

Book Description


Experimental Auctions

Experimental Auctions PDF Author: Jayson L. Lusk
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521671248
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 316

Get Book Here

Book Description
Economists, psychologists, and marketers are interested in determining the monetary value people place on non-market goods for a variety of reasons: to carry out cost-benefit analysis, to determine the welfare effects of technological innovation or public policy, to forecast new product success, and to understand individual and consumer behavior. Unfortunately, many currently available techniques for eliciting individuals' values suffer from a serious problem in that they involve asking individuals hypothetical questions about intended behavior. Experimental auctions circumvent this problem because they involve individuals exchanging real money for real goods in an active market. This represents a promising means for eliciting non-market values. Lusk and Shogren provide a comprehensive guide to the theory and practice of experimental auctions. It will be a valuable resource to graduate students, practitioners and researchers concerned with the design and utilization of experimental auctions in applied economic and marketing research.