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Author: Theodore Groves
Publisher: U of Minnesota Press
ISBN: 1452908044
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 410
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Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session
Author: Theodore Groves
Publisher: U of Minnesota Press
ISBN: 1452908044
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 410
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Book Description
Printbegrænsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session
Author: Theodore Groves
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
ISBN: 9780631137986
Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 399
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Book Description
Author: Leonid Hurwicz
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 113945434X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 321
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Book Description
A mechanism is a mathematical structure that models institutions through which economic activity is guided and coordinated. There are many such institutions; markets are the most familiar ones. Lawmakers, administrators and officers of private companies create institutions in order to achieve desired goals. They seek to do so in ways that economize on the resources needed to operate the institutions, and that provide incentives that induce the required behaviors. This book presents systematic procedures for designing mechanisms that achieve specified performance, and economize on the resources required to operate the mechanism. The systematic design procedures are algorithms for designing informationally efficient mechanisms. Most of the book deals with these procedures of design. When there are finitely many environments to be dealt with, and there is a Nash-implementing mechanism, our algorithms can be used to make that mechanism into an informationally efficient one. Informationally efficient dominant strategy implementation is also studied.
Author: Donald E. Campbell
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1107035244
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 699
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Book Description
This book examines incentives at work to see how and how well coordination is achieved by motivating individual decision makers.
Author: Theodore Groves
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : es
Pages : 399
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Book Description
Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198294247
Category : Fiction
Languages : en
Pages : 270
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Book Description
Mainstream economics has recognized only recently the necessity to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. Incentives and Political Economy uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach to constitutional design in economic environments.The first part of the book remains in the tradition of benevolent constitutional design with complete contracting. It treats politicians as informed supervisors and studies how the Constitution should control them, in particular to avoid capture by interest groups. Incentive theories for the separation of powers or systems of checks and balances are developed.The second part of the book recognises the incompleteness of the constitutional contract which leaves discretion to the politicans selected by the electoral process. Asymmetric information associates information rents with economic policies and the political game becomes a game of costly redistribution of those rents. Professor Laffont investigates the trade-offs between an inflexible constitution which leaves little discretion to politicians but sacrifices ex post efficiency and a constitutionweighted towards ex post efficiency but also giving considerable discretion to politicians to pursue private agendas.The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterise the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institution in which group behavior is important.
Author: Inés Macho-Stadler
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0191512079
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
In this revised second edition, An Introduction to the Economics of Information covers the consequences for the character and efficiency of the interaction between individuals and organizations when one party has more or better information on some aspect of the relationship. This is the condition of asymmetric information, under which the information gap will be exploited if, by doing so, the better-informed party can achieve some advantage. The book is written for a one-semester course for advanced undergraduates taking specialized course options, and for first-year postgraduate students of economics or business. After an introduction to the subject and the presentation of a benchmark model in which both parties share the same information throughout the relationship, chapters are devoted to the three main asymmetric information topics of Moral Hazard, Adverse Selection, and Signalling. The wide range of economic situations where the conclusions are applied includes such areas as finance, regulation, insurance, labour economics, health economics, and even politics. Each chapter presents the basic theory before moving on to applications and advanced topics. The problems are presented in the same framework throughout to allow easy comparison of the different results. This new edition incorporates extended exercises to test the student's understanding of the material, and to develop the tools and skills provided by the main text to solve other, original problems.
Author: Donald E. Campbell
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521478571
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 367
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Book Description
This book investigates situations in which incentives, contracts or other economic devices can be employed in a wide range of settings to prevent the pursuit of self-interest from being institutionally- or self-defeating. Campbell's treatment of these issues in the economics of information, mechanism design, and game theory can be followed by anyone with a basic knowledge of single-variable calculus and microeconomic theory. Readers learn to grasp economic principles by working carefully through examples, rather than by following proofs of general theorems.
Author: Jean-Jacques Laffont
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400829453
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 436
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Book Description
Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
Author: G. C. Archibald
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521330459
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 191
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Book Description
This 1992 book examines alternative methods for achieving optimality without all the apparatus of economic planning (such as information retrieval, computation of solutions, and separate implementation systems), or a vain reliance on sufficiently 'perfect' competition. All rely entirely on the self-interest of economic agents and voluntary contract.
