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Author: Agha Amin
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781546566373
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 234
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Book Description
CONCLUSION. The Pakistan Army in 1965 had the potential keeping in view its equipment, particularly tanks and artillery, vis a vis the state of Indian Armour and Artillery to inflict a decisive defeat on India.Poor Military leadership at the higher level in the final reckoning stands out as the principal cause of failure of the Pakistan Army to inflict a decisive military defeat on India.Ayub Khan was directly responsible for the leadership failure of the Pakistan Army. Conversely it was superior equipment and in particular tanks and artillery apart from the BRB in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor which enabled Pakistan to contain the Indians despite their considerable numerical superiority in infantry. Valour, Morale, Motivation played a part, but we must remember that valour alone did not save the Poles from being overrun by the Russians and Germans repeatedly during the period from late 18th Century till 1939!Valour did not save the Serbians from being over run by the German-Austrian-Bulgarian force in WW One. The tragedy of the Pakistan Army was that it failed to achieve even 50 % of what it was capable of achieving and only because of Qualitative reasons.The definite edge over equipment was lost after 1965 and in 1971 Pakistan was saved largely because of the fact that Indian superiority in infantry coupled with superior equipment was divided between the Eastern and Western Fronts. The year 1965 was crucial and Providence gave an opportunity to Pakistan to achieve something militarily.The Seeds of defeat were sowed long before partition and the seal of mediocrity was laid once the Ayub-Musa duo headed the army during the period 1951-1965! The Indian Army was handicapped because of an indifferent political leadership.Racially both the armies were largely similar and only fools can think that one was inherently braver than the other! Long ago Hobbes had rightly said; "Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body and mind;as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or quicker of mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he " . 126 The Pakistanis failed to do as well as they potentially could in 1965, keeping in view the on ground tangible realities, because in terms of intangible qualities, by virtue of a common historical experience;they were as qualitatively mediocre as the Indians! My service in Pakistan Army from 1981 to 1994, and an intense study of Sub Continental Military history, has reinforced this conviction that I first developed as a student of Forman Christian College Lahore during the period 1977-1978!The rest is Fiction!
Author: Agha Amin
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781546566373
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 234
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Book Description
CONCLUSION. The Pakistan Army in 1965 had the potential keeping in view its equipment, particularly tanks and artillery, vis a vis the state of Indian Armour and Artillery to inflict a decisive defeat on India.Poor Military leadership at the higher level in the final reckoning stands out as the principal cause of failure of the Pakistan Army to inflict a decisive military defeat on India.Ayub Khan was directly responsible for the leadership failure of the Pakistan Army. Conversely it was superior equipment and in particular tanks and artillery apart from the BRB in the Ravi-Sutlej Corridor which enabled Pakistan to contain the Indians despite their considerable numerical superiority in infantry. Valour, Morale, Motivation played a part, but we must remember that valour alone did not save the Poles from being overrun by the Russians and Germans repeatedly during the period from late 18th Century till 1939!Valour did not save the Serbians from being over run by the German-Austrian-Bulgarian force in WW One. The tragedy of the Pakistan Army was that it failed to achieve even 50 % of what it was capable of achieving and only because of Qualitative reasons.The definite edge over equipment was lost after 1965 and in 1971 Pakistan was saved largely because of the fact that Indian superiority in infantry coupled with superior equipment was divided between the Eastern and Western Fronts. The year 1965 was crucial and Providence gave an opportunity to Pakistan to achieve something militarily.The Seeds of defeat were sowed long before partition and the seal of mediocrity was laid once the Ayub-Musa duo headed the army during the period 1951-1965! The Indian Army was handicapped because of an indifferent political leadership.Racially both the armies were largely similar and only fools can think that one was inherently braver than the other! Long ago Hobbes had rightly said; "Nature hath made men so equal, in the faculties of the body and mind;as that though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or quicker of mind than another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he " . 126 The Pakistanis failed to do as well as they potentially could in 1965, keeping in view the on ground tangible realities, because in terms of intangible qualities, by virtue of a common historical experience;they were as qualitatively mediocre as the Indians! My service in Pakistan Army from 1981 to 1994, and an intense study of Sub Continental Military history, has reinforced this conviction that I first developed as a student of Forman Christian College Lahore during the period 1977-1978!The rest is Fiction!
Author: Hassan Abbas
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317463285
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 305
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Book Description
This book examines the rise of religious extremism in Pakistan, particularly since 1947, and analyzes its connections to the Pakistani army's corporate interests and U.S.-Pakistan relations. It includes profiles of leading Pakistani militant groups with details of their origins, development, and capabilities. The author begins with an historical overview of the introduction of Islam to the Indian sub-continent in 712 AD, and brings the story up to the present by describing President Musharraf's handling of the war on terror. He provides a detailed account of the political developments in Pakistan since 1947 with a focus on the influence of religious and military forces. He also discusses regional politics, Pakistan's attempt to gain nuclear power status, and U.S.-Pakistan relations, and offers predictions for Pakistan's domestic and regional prospects.
Author: C. Christine Fair
Publisher: Oxford University Press, USA
ISBN: 0199892709
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 369
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Book Description
The Pakistan Army is poised for perpetual conflict with India which it cannot win militarily or politically. What explains Pakistan's persistent revisionism despite increasing costs and decreasing likelihood of success? This book argues that an understanding of the army's strategic culture explains its willingness to fight to the end
Author: Shaukat Riza
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788185019604
Category : India-Pakistan Conflict, 1965
Languages : en
Pages : 650
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Book Description
Author: Agha Amin
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781546566304
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 324
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Book Description
The peculiar socio-political circumstances and historical factors amidst which a country is born, play a decisive and formative role in the qualitative efficiency as well as political outlook of an army. Thus the Israeli Army like the state of Israel was acutely conscious of the more than two thousand years of persecution which the Jews had suffered and determined to fight and die for the many century old dream of a Jewish state. The Red Army created by the military organisational genius of Leon Trotsky was again a highly motivated body of men resolved at all cost to fight for the preservation of the ideals of the Russian Revolution.The Khalsa Sikh Army created by Ranjit Singh was the final supreme qualitative result of the indomitable and legendary response of the Punjabi Sikhs to two centuries of oppression by the Mughals and Afghans. The Army of Ahmad Shah Abdali was imbued with the spirit of being the first independent army of the Pathan Muslim independent Kingdom of Afghanistan.The army of Cromwell was the result of a basically Puritan/Democratic sentiment, determined to stand against the tyranny of believers in Divine Rights of the Kings. The army of Sayyid Ahmad Shaheed was motivated by the desire to fight for the cause of their Pathan and Punjabi Muslim brethren who had been under the iron heal of an oppressive Sikh government for some three decades. The Prussian Army of 1813 was motivated by desire to expel the French who had occupied their fatherland since 1806, and the prime motivation in establishment of the famous German General Staff was in intense desire to qualitatively improve the defeated Prussian Army in such a manner that the humiliation of Jena and Auerstadt could be avenged.Similarly the motivational basis of the Wehrmacht of 1939 was an intense desire to avenge the humiliating peace treaty of Versailles. In short all armies created or owing their foundation to a state of revolutionary activity or an extraordinary situation were qualitatively superior than armies whose foundation rested on more unspectacular and ordinary political situation . The creation of India and Pakistan was not the result of an armed struggle bnt the result of a constitutional process started in 1858, and hastened by the First and Second World Wars.
Author: Agha Humayun Amin
Publisher: CreateSpace
ISBN: 9781493624744
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 216
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Book Description
ForewordMajor (retd) Agha Humayun Amin is a rare type of army officer. He is a philosopher, debater and a very keen scholar of military affairs. His writings are prolific. He does not hesitate to call into question received wisdom and dares to explode sacred myths behind which military establishments generally hide their blunders and failures. I have benefited a great deal from his scholarly contribution on the Pakistan Army and have cited and quoted him in my book, Pakistan: The Garrison State – Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947-2011). I particularly found his work very useful to understand the Kashmir War of 1947-48 and the 1965 war. I am therefore truly privileged to note that he has now presented a detailed analysis of the 1965 War in which he explains the reasons why neither India nor Pakistan made much headway in that conflict that lasted 17 days (6 – 23 September 1965). He writes with clarity not mincing words and therefore it is easy even for the general reader to follow his reasoning. However, he writes with an authority that comes only through a long and dedicated commitment to understanding the nature and purpose of war, the sociological and psychological underpinnings of warfare, the quality and competence needed to establish credible armed forces and above all the role and purpose of training for warfare. His knowledge is encyclopedic with regard to military philosophy. Since I have no background in military science or the art of modern warfare I am in no position to comment with authority on his evaluations of the reasons why the 1965 War ended in a stalemate. However, there is no doubt that he brings to bear his vast erudition on his analysis with great skill and persuasion. The roots of the problem are traced to the origins of the British Indian Army from whom both the Indian and Pakistani armies descend. The author argues that the Indians – Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs were recruited into that army essentially with the purpose of maintaining the status quo in the volatile tribal areas. They were never trained to be modern armies capable of independent responsibility to fight national wars. Famously, the British put little trust in the Indians with regard to leadership roles. Even when entry to the officer class or commissioned officers was granted to the Indians in 1919 they were not promoted to command positions beyond the rank of colonels. There were hardly one or two brigadiers when British rule ended in mid-August 1947. Amin asserts that the selection of officers and ordinary ranks was from amongst those sections of society which were traditionally known to have mercenary tendencies. British imperial policy conferred respectability upon them with the dubious “martial races theory”. In reality it was people from the least politically and socially aware sections of society who were employed in the Indian Army. In these circumstances, the partition of India and the division of the Indian Army resulted in sudden quick promotions. Men with little command experience and much less knowledge of strategic planning took over on both countries. While on the Indian side, Mahatma Gandhi's non-violence known as the doctrine of ahmisa resulted in the army being neglected and not being prepared to take upon the task of maintaining a credible defence of that huge country – something Nehru realized to his great horror during the 1962 Sino-Indian boundary war in which his men suffered humiliating defeat. In Pakistan, the military boss General Ayub Khan was content with the acquisition of weapons from the United States as sufficient to safeguard Pakistan. However, the problem was more serious than just two diametrically opposite philosophies on war. It was a lack of perspective on the tasks which devolve upon independent states and their armed forces. Quite simply national armies had to be fully prepared to take up the tasks commensurate with the realities of the territorial state.The author undertakes a detailed and
Author: Farooq Bajwa
Publisher: Hurst Publishers
ISBN: 1849042306
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 421
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Book Description
Decades of Pakistani resentment over India’s stance on Kashmir, and its subsequent attempt to force a military solution on the issue, led to the 1965 war between the two neighbours. It ended in a stalemate on the battlefield, and after a mere twenty-one days, the war was brought to a dramatic end with the signing of a peace treaty at Tashkent. The opposing sides both claimed victory, however, and also catalogues of heroic deeds that have since taken on the character of mythology. Although neither prevailed outright, the one undoubted loser in the conflict was the incumbent President of Pakistan, General Ayub Khan, who staked his political and military reputation on Pakistan emerging victorious. With the superpowers unwilling assist in negotiations, and Pakistan reluctant to damage its alliance with America, the agreement that followed only reinforced India’s position not to surrender anything during diplomacy that Pakistan had failed to gain militarily. This book examines in detail the politics, diplomacy and military manoeuvres of the war, using British and American declassified documents and memoirs, as well as some unpublished interviews. It provides a comprehensive overview of the conflict and makes sense of the morass of diplomacy and the confusion of war.
Author: Agha Amin
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781546613145
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 434
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Book Description
This book is the history of the post 1947 Pakistan Army as seen through the eyes of an officer who served in this army for a certain period of time. Unlike many books it is not an attempt to glorify an organisation. It does not aim to prove that one religion is better than another is or one country is more pure than another is, while the other is an evil state. It does not project any party or political leader like many post 1958, post 1971 or post 1977 works pertaining to the history of the Pakistan Army do. There are no silent soldiers or visionary soldiers, projected as heroes, as has been done in many post 1988 books, financed off course by dirty money of US dollars siphoned off from the Afghan war! There are however some forgotten or neglected heroes, which this book seeks to, rehabilitate or at least endeavour to restore them to their rightful position. The prime motivation to write this book was disgust with deliberate distortion of history, to a lesser or greater degree in both Pakistan and India. The Indian military history situation is far better than Pakistan because a democratic system ensured that the Indian Army officers were more free to write critical accounts of all three wars, a right which was denied to their Pakistani counterparts by two paper tiger soldiers who not only destroyed all political institutions in Pakistan, but also inflicted incalculable loss on the army as an institution. Ironically a substantial part of Pakistani military history has been distorted by the negative effects of the deliberate efforts of military and civilian dictators who usurped power from 1958 to 1988, three fateful decades, which disrupted intellectual growth of the Pakistani nation and ensured that no progress is made in real intellectual terms in anything to do with history. When freedom of opinion was destroyed and intellectual growth was suffocated under able sycophantic civil servants and army officers in the role of intellectual watchdogs of Ayub Zia and Bhntto regimes. A significant part of the work deals with the various myths and misconception pertaining to Indo Muslim political and military history. Unfortunately modern authors without sufficient scrutiny accepted many of these mvths, and resultantly many 0f these myths have acquired the status of reliable and irrefutable facts. Since the Pakistan Army like the Indian Army is essentially the continuation of the old British Indian Army, an effort has been made to highlight the formative and decisive influence of the colonial heritage on the post 1947 performance of both the armies. In this regard an attempt has been made to analyse the failures and successes of the post 1947 army in relation to the pre 1947 British operational and tactical concepts.
Author: Brian Cloughley
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 311
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Author: United States. Department of State. Office of Media Services
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 8
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