Harold Jeffreys on J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability PDF Download
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Author: Michael Emmett Brady
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Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Harold Jeffreys' overall assessment of J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, 1921, requires a reader to consider, not only his official review in Nature, 1922, but also the comments in his books, Scientific Inference, 1931 and Theory of Probability, 1939, as well as the second edition of Theory of Probability, 1947. Jeffreys' problem was that his approach to measurement required that all probabilities had to be measured by a single, precise number .This is tantamount to assuming that Keynes's weight of the evidence, w, or William Johnson's worth of the evidence, also denoted by w, are always equal to one. Jefferys obviously did not pick up this concept from his interactions with Johnson, as opposed to Keynes, who not only picked it up, but then connected it to Boole's earlier logical approach to probability. Boole expressed this concept in terms of interval valued probability. Only if the weight or the worth of the evidence is equal, approaching to, or approximated by 1 will precise numbers be able to measure the probability relation. Jefferys' failure to connect Boole to Keynes means that Jeffreys never understood what Keynes was doing in his A Treatise on Probability at any time during his life.
Author: Michael Emmett Brady
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Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Harold Jeffreys' overall assessment of J M Keynes's A Treatise on Probability, 1921, requires a reader to consider, not only his official review in Nature, 1922, but also the comments in his books, Scientific Inference, 1931 and Theory of Probability, 1939, as well as the second edition of Theory of Probability, 1947. Jeffreys' problem was that his approach to measurement required that all probabilities had to be measured by a single, precise number .This is tantamount to assuming that Keynes's weight of the evidence, w, or William Johnson's worth of the evidence, also denoted by w, are always equal to one. Jefferys obviously did not pick up this concept from his interactions with Johnson, as opposed to Keynes, who not only picked it up, but then connected it to Boole's earlier logical approach to probability. Boole expressed this concept in terms of interval valued probability. Only if the weight or the worth of the evidence is equal, approaching to, or approximated by 1 will precise numbers be able to measure the probability relation. Jefferys' failure to connect Boole to Keynes means that Jeffreys never understood what Keynes was doing in his A Treatise on Probability at any time during his life.
Author: Michael Brady
Publisher: Xlibris Corporation
ISBN: 1524544892
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 179
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The standard view of the economics profession is that Keynes was a brilliant, intuitive, nonrigorous innovator. These essays show that Keynes backed up his intuitions with a rigorous mathematical and logical supporting analysis, which has been overlooked.
Author: John Maynard Keynes
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Probabilities
Languages : en
Pages : 494
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Author: John Keynes
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ISBN: 9781548119867
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 550
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John Maynard Keynes's classic work on the study of probability.
Author: John Maynard Keynes
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781724600080
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 556
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A Treatise on Probability: Large Print By John Maynard Keynes First published in 1920, this is the foundational work of probability theory, which helped establish the author's enormous influence on modern economic and even political theories. Exploring aspects of randomness and chance, inductive reasoning and logical statistics, this is a work that belongs in the library of any interested in numbers and their application in the real world. We are delighted to publish this classic book as part of our extensive Classic Library collection. Many of the books in our collection have been out of print for decades, and therefore have not been accessible to the general public. The aim of our publishing program is to facilitate rapid access to this vast reservoir of literature, and our view is that this is a significant literary work, which deserves to be brought back into print after many decades. The contents of the vast majority of titles in the Classic Library have been scanned from the original works. To ensure a high quality product, each title has been meticulously hand curated by our staff. Our philosophy has been guided by a desire to provide the reader with a book that is as close as possible to ownership of the original work. We hope that you will enjoy this wonderful classic work, and that for you it becomes an enriching experience.
Author: John Maynard Keynes
Publisher:
ISBN: 9780333496374
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 514
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Author: John Maynard Keynes
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Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 552
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Author: Michael Emmett Brady
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 14
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Richard E Braithwaite's Oct,1931 review article in Mind on Jefferys' work on probability also summarized what the current assessment of Keynes's A Treatise on Probability and logical theory of probability was. This assessment is based on a complete and total ignorance on Braithwaite's part about what Keynes actually accomplished in the A Treatise on Probability. He had no idea about what an interval valued, indeterminate probability is. He had no idea about how Keynes built on Boole's upper-lower bound approach. He had no idea about the concept of the weight of the evidence, w, and how it is connected to the size of the difference between the lower and upper bound. He apparently forgot that Keynes's logical approach to probability was carefully laid out in 1907 and 1908, which would be 12 or 13 years before Harold Jeffreys published his articles in 1919 with Wrinch.Finally, Braithwaite had no idea about how to compare objects using a relation of similarity and/or dissimilarity which, of course, is the basic requirement needed for pattern recognition, which is recognized as fundamental by cognitive psychologists and cognitive scientists if decision makers are to successfully use their intuition and induction. He is totally oblivious to the connection between degrees of similarity and Keynes's logical probability relations. In short, he was an ignorant fool who failed abysmally, like Hugh Townshend, to make use of the clues Keynes periodically sent his way.
Author: John Keynes
Publisher: Createspace Independent Publishing Platform
ISBN: 9781505480481
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 550
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The subject matter of this book was first broached in the brain of Leibniz, who, in the dissertation, written in his twenty-third year, on the mode of electing the kings of Poland, conceived of Probability as a branch of Logic. A few years before, "un probl�me," in the words of Poisson, "propos� � un aust�re jans�niste par un homme du monde, a �t� l''origine du calcul des probabiliti�s." In the intervening centuries the algebraical exercises, in which the Chevalier de la M�r� interested Pascal, have so far predominated in the learned world over the profounder enquiries of the philosopher into those processes of human faculty which, by determining reasonable preference, guide our choice, that Probability is oftener reckoned with Mathematics than with Logic. There is much here, therefore, which is novel and, being novel, unsifted, inaccurate, or deficient. I propound my systematic conception of this subject for criticism and enlargement at the hand of others, doubtful whether I myself am likely to get much further, by waiting longer, with a work, which, beginning as a Fellowship Dissertation, and interrupted by the war, has already extended over many years.It may be perceived that I have been much influenced by W. E. Johnson, G. E. Moore, and Bertrand Russell, that is to say by Cambridge, which, with great debts to the writers of Continental Europe, yet continues in direct succession the English tradition of Locke and Berkeley and Hume, of Mill and Sidgwick, who, in spite of their divergences of doctrine, are united in a preference for what is matter of fact, and have conceived their subject as a branch rather of science than of the creative imagination, prose writers, hoping to be understood.J. M. KEYNES.King''s College, Cambridge"J''ai dit plus d''une fois qu''il faudrait une nouvelle esp�ce de logique, qui traiteroit des degr�s de Probabilit�."-Leibniz.1. Part of our knowledge we obtain direct; and part by argument. The Theory of Probability is concerned with that part which we obtain by argument, and it treats of the different degrees in which the results so obtained are conclusive or inconclusive. In most branches of academic logic, such as the theory of the syllogism or the geometry of ideal space, all the arguments aim at demonstrative certainty. They claim to be conclusive. But many other arguments are rational and claim some weight without pretending to be certain. In Metaphysics, in Science, and in Conduct, most of the arguments, upon which we habitually base our rational beliefs, are admitted to be inconclusive in a greater or less degree. Thus for a philosophical treatment of these branches of knowledge, the study of probability is required.The course which the history of thought has led Logic to follow has encouraged the view that doubtful arguments are not within its scope. But in the actual exercise of reason we do not wait on certainty, or doom it irrational to depend on a doubtful argument. If logic investigates the general principles of valid thought, the study of arguments, to which it is rational to attach some weight, is as much a part of it as the study of those which are demonstrative.2. The terms certain and probable describe the various degrees of rational belief about a proposition which different amounts of knowledge authorise us to entertain. All propositions are true or false, but the knowledge we have of them depends on our circumstances; and while it is often convenient to speak of propositions as certain or probable, this expresses strictly a relationship in which they stand to a corpus of knowledge, actual or hypothetical, and not a characteristic of the propositions in themselves. A proposition is capable at the same time of varying degrees of this relationship, depending upon the knowledge to which it is related, so that it is without significance to call a proposition probable unless we specify the knowledge to which we are relating it.
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Languages : en
Pages : 466
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