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Author: Susanne Bobzien
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198866739
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 340
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Book Description
Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility features nine essays on determinism, freedom, and moral responsibility in ancient thought. Bobzien shows how the concept of free will entered metaphysical and moral debates only at a relatively late stage.
Author: Susanne Bobzien
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0198866739
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 340
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Book Description
Determinism, Freedom, and Moral Responsibility features nine essays on determinism, freedom, and moral responsibility in ancient thought. Bobzien shows how the concept of free will entered metaphysical and moral debates only at a relatively late stage.
Author: John Lemos
Publisher: Hackett Publishing
ISBN: 1603849866
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 121
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Book Description
John Lemos' Freedom, Responsibility, and Determinism offers an up-to-date introduction to free will (and associated) debates in an engaging, dialogic format that recommends it for use by beginning students in philosophy as well as by undergraduates in intermediate courses in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and action theory.
Author: Joseph Keim Campbell
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262532570
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 342
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Book Description
A state-of-the-art collection of previously unpublished essays on the topics of determinism, free will, moral responsibility, and action theory, written by some of the most important figures in these fields of study.
Author: Neil Campbell
Publisher: Pearson
ISBN: 9780130485175
Category : Education
Languages : en
Pages : 244
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Book Description
This collection introduces the central views and issues involved in the philosophical problem of free will. While the selections represent some of the most important works in the field, they are also accessible enough for readers with very little background in philosophy. KEY TOPICS: Includes classical and contemporary readings to give readers a feel both for the history of the problem and how it is confronted by modern philosophers. Includes section-opening introductions that provide more detailed explanations of subsequent readings than most philosophy books.Features a broad historical perspective that is not restricted to the philosophical views of a particular century. Presents diverse views on issues discussed. MARKET: A readable, comprehensive reference for anyone interested in learning about philosophy.
Author: Bruce N. Waller
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262553813
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 365
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Book Description
A vigorous attack on moral responsibility in all its forms argues that the abolition of moral responsibility will be liberating and beneficial. In Against Moral Responsibility, Bruce Waller launches a spirited attack on a system that is profoundly entrenched in our society and its institutions, deeply rooted in our emotions, and vigorously defended by philosophers from ancient times to the present. Waller argues that, despite the creative defenses of it by contemporary thinkers, moral responsibility cannot survive in our naturalistic-scientific system. The scientific understanding of human behavior and the causes that shape human character, he contends, leaves no room for moral responsibility. Waller argues that moral responsibility in all its forms—including criminal justice, distributive justice, and all claims of just deserts—is fundamentally unfair and harmful and that its abolition will be liberating and beneficial. What we really want—natural human free will, moral judgments, meaningful human relationships, creative abilities—would survive and flourish without moral responsibility. In the course of his argument, Waller examines the origins of the basic belief in moral responsibility, proposes a naturalistic understanding of free will, offers a detailed argument against moral responsibility and critiques arguments in favor of it, gives a general account of what a world without moral responsibility would look like, and examines the social and psychological aspects of abolishing moral responsibility. Waller not only mounts a vigorous, and philosophically rigorous, attack on the moral responsibility system, but also celebrates the benefits that would result from its total abolition.
Author: Ursula Coope
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0192558285
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 288
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Book Description
The Neoplatonists have a perfectionist view of freedom: an entity is free to the extent that it succeeds in making itself good. Free entities are wholly in control of themselves—they are self-determining, self-constituting, and self-knowing. Neoplatonist philosophers argue that such freedom is only possible for non-bodily things. The human soul is free insofar as it rises above bodily things and engages in intellection, but when it turns its desires to bodily things, it is drawn under the sway of fate and becomes enslaved. Ursula Coope discusses this notion of freedom and its relation to questions about responsibility. She explains the important role of notions of self-reflexivity in Neoplatonist accounts of both freedom and responsibility. In Part I, Coope sets out the puzzles Neoplatonist philosophers face about freedom and responsibility and explains how these puzzles arise from earlier discussions. Part II explores the metaphysical underpinnings of the Neoplatonist notion of freedom (concentrating especially on the views of Plotinus and Proclus). In what sense, if any, is the ultimate first principle of everything (the One) free? If everything else is under this ultimate first principle, how can anything other than the One be free? What is the connection between freedom and nonbodiliness? Finally, Coope considers in Part III questions about responsibility, arising from this perfectionist view of freedom. Why are human beings responsible for their behaviour, in a way that other animals are not? If we are enslaved when we act viciously, how can we be to blame for our vicious actions and choices?
Author: Hilary Bok
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400822734
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 232
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Book Description
Can we reconcile the idea that we are free and responsible agents with the idea that what we do is determined according to natural laws? For centuries, philosophers have tried in different ways to show that we can. Hilary Bok takes a fresh approach here, as she seeks to show that the two ideas are compatible by drawing on the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning. Bok argues that when we engage in practical reasoning--the kind that involves asking "what should I do?" and sifting through alternatives to find the most justifiable course of action--we have reason to hold ourselves responsible for what we do. But when we engage in theoretical reasoning--searching for causal explanations of events--we have no reason to apply concepts like freedom and responsibility. Bok contends that libertarians' arguments against "compatibilist" justifications of moral responsibility fail because they describe human actions only from the standpoint of theoretical reasoning. To establish this claim, she examines which conceptions of freedom of the will and moral responsibility are relevant to practical reasoning and shows that these conceptions are not vulnerable to many objections that libertarians have directed against compatibilists. Bok concludes that the truth or falsity of the claim that we are free and responsible agents in the sense those conceptions spell out is ultimately independent of deterministic accounts of the causes of human actions. Clearly written and powerfully argued, Freedom and Responsibility is a major addition to current debate about some of philosophy's oldest and deepest questions.
Author: Susanne Bobzien
Publisher: Clarendon Press
ISBN: 0191519316
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 454
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Book Description
Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy is the first comprehensive study of one of the most important intellectual legacies of the ancient Greek world: the Stoic theory of causal determinism. The book identifies the main problems that the Stoics addressed and reconstructs the theory, and explores how they squared their determinism with their conceptions of possibility, action, freedom, and moral responsibility, and how they defended it against objections and criticism by other philosophers. It shows how the Stoics distinguished their causal determinism from ancient theories of logical determinism, fatalism, and necessitarianism. Along the way an authoritative account is given of many other related aspects of Stoic thought, including their views on the predictability of the future, the role of empirical sciences, the determination of character, and moral freedom. Bobzien's study of these central doctrines of Stoicism reveals the considerable philosphical richness and power that they retain today.
Author: Kevin Timpe
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1441115048
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 166
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Book Description
Much contemporary scholarship on free will focuses on whether it is compatible with causal determinism. According to compatibilists, it is possible for an agent to be determined in all her choices and actions and still be free. Incompatibilists, on the other hand, think that the existence of free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. There are two dominant general conceptions of the nature of free will. According to the first of these, free will is primarily a function of being able to do otherwise than one in fact does. On this view, free will centrally depends upon alternative possibilities. The second approach focuses instead on issues of sourcehood, holding that free will is primarily a function of an agent being the source of her actions in a particular way. This book demarcates these two different conceptions free will, explores the relationship between them, and examines how they relate to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. It ultimately argues for a version of Source Incompatibilism.
Author: Dana Kay Nelkin
Publisher: OUP Oxford
ISBN: 0191619426
Category : Philosophy
Languages : en
Pages : 207
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Book Description
Dana Kay Nelkin presents a simple and natural account of freedom and moral responsibility which responds to the great variety of challenges to the idea that we are free and responsible, before ultimately reaffirming our conception of ourselves as agents. Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility begins with a defense of the rational abilities view, according to which one is responsible for an action if and only if one acts with the ability to recognize and act for good reasons. The view is compatibilist?that is, on the view defended, responsibility is compatible with determinism?and one of its striking features is a certain asymmetry: it requires the ability to do otherwise for responsibility when actions are blameworthy, but not when they are praiseworthy. In defending and elaborating the view, Nelkin questions long-held assumptions such as those concerning the relation between fairness and blame and the nature of so-called reactive attitudes such as resentment and forgiveness. Her argument not only fits with a metaphysical picture of causation?agent-causation?often assumed to be available only to incompatibilist accounts, but receives positive support from the intuitively appealing Ought Implies Can Principle, and establishes a new interpretation of freedom and moral responsibility that dovetails with a compelling account of our inescapable commitments as rational agents.
