Franco-American Relations in the 1954 Indochina Crisis PDF Download
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Author: David Alexis Sulzberger
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 412
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Book Description
Author: David Alexis Sulzberger
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 412
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Book Description
Author: Lawrence S. Kaplan
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 312
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Book Description
Author: Christopher L. Groves
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : France
Languages : en
Pages : 154
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Book Description
Author: Mary Lynn Hawkins
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : France
Languages : en
Pages : 484
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Book Description
Author: Kevin Ruane
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1350021164
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 352
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Book Description
In the spring of 1954, after eight years of bitter fighting, the war in Vietnam between the French and the communist-led Vietminh came to a head. With French forces reeling, the United States planned to intervene militarily to shore-up the anti-communist position. Turning to its allies for support, first and foremost Great Britain, the US administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to create what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called a “united action” coalition. In the event, Winston Churchill's Conservative government refused to back the plan. Fearing that US-led intervention could trigger a wider war in which the United Kingdom would be the first target for Soviet nuclear attack, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was determined to act as Indochina peacemaker – even at the cost of damage to the Anglo-American “special relationship”. In this important study, Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones revisit a Cold War episode in which British diplomacy played a vital role in settling a crucial question of international war and peace. Eden's diplomatic triumph at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina is often overshadowed by the 1956 Suez Crisis which led to his political downfall. This book, however, recalls an earlier Eden: a skilled and experienced international diplomatist at the height of his powers who may well have prevented a localised Cold War crisis escalating into a general Third World War.
Author: Kevin Ruane
Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
ISBN: 1350021180
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 352
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Book Description
In the spring of 1954, after eight years of bitter fighting, the war in Vietnam between the French and the communist-led Vietminh came to a head. With French forces reeling, the United States planned to intervene militarily to shore-up the anti-communist position. Turning to its allies for support, first and foremost Great Britain, the US administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower sought to create what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles called a “united action” coalition. In the event, Winston Churchill's Conservative government refused to back the plan. Fearing that US-led intervention could trigger a wider war in which the United Kingdom would be the first target for Soviet nuclear attack, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, was determined to act as Indochina peacemaker – even at the cost of damage to the Anglo-American “special relationship”. In this important study, Kevin Ruane and Matthew Jones revisit a Cold War episode in which British diplomacy played a vital role in settling a crucial question of international war and peace. Eden's diplomatic triumph at the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina is often overshadowed by the 1956 Suez Crisis which led to his political downfall. This book, however, recalls an earlier Eden: a skilled and experienced international diplomatist at the height of his powers who may well have prevented a localised Cold War crisis escalating into a general Third World War.
Author: Ronald Eckford Mill Irving
Publisher: Croom Helm
ISBN:
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 200
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Book Description
Author: Irwin M. Wall
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 0521402174
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 340
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Book Description
A study of the American government's influence in France during the critical postwar period.
Author: U. S. Military
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781520593562
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 68
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Book Description
The stunning defeat of the French Third Republic by the German Third Reich at the start of the Second World War underscored the vulnerable condition of both France's political apparatus and her army. The political groups of the Fourth Republic experienced turbulence, particularly in the development of a coherent foreign policy regarding Indochina. The French Army emerged from the Second World only to face dwindling troop strength, poor equipment and training, an overreliance on colonial troops, and low morale. France started war with the Viet Minh in hopes of retaining Indochina as a French-controlled territory. France quickly found that this control would not come easy. A rigid foreign policy seeking colonial control and seemingly constant turnovers of leadership within both the government and the French Far East Command in Indochina hindered France's efforts in the region. In 1950, Southeast Asia gained international focus as a new front in the war on Communism. The French continued fighting for control over Indochina under the guise of anti-communism. The war would continue until 1954 when France suffered a strategic defeat at Dien Bien Phu. In the end, an uncompromising foreign and colonial policy required military leaders to view force as the only means to achieve success in Indochina. The French struggle to pacify Viet Minh nationalists during the First Indochina War from 1945 to 1954 should have cautioned US policymakers and military leaders. Unfortunately, it did not, and the United States picked up where France left off. Nearly twenty years later, America signed a cease-fire with Vietnamese communists in 1973, providing an unexpected end to the Vietnam War. While the US military had success on the battlefield, rigid political goals hindered military leaders from employing an effective strategy to achieve lasting results. France experienced a similar situation after the Second World War as French politicians struggled to develop coherent domestic and foreign policies. The political elite hoped to return France to greatness by restoring their colonial empire, particularly their "crown jewel" of Indochina.1 French forces in Indochina experienced considerable success during the eight-year war, yet France suffered its worst colonial defeat since losing Quebec to the British in 1759.2 Harry G. Summers, Jr. posed the question regarding the American experience in Vietnam: How can one succeed so well yet fail so miserably?3 This monograph addresses a similar question by focusing on the interaction of policy, strategy, and military operations: Did political instability in the French Fourth Republic limit the successful use of military action to achieve political objectives? The collapse of the French Third Republic and their near-civil war during the Second World War serves a starting point to investigate this question.
Author: James Waite
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1136273344
Category : History
Languages : en
Pages : 302
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Book Description
The French withdrawal from Vietnam in 1954 was the product of global pressures and triggered significant global consequences. By treating the war as an international issue, this book places Indochina at the center of the Cold War in the mid-1950s. Arguing that the Indochina War cannot be understood as a topic of Franco-US relations, but ought to be treated as international history, this volume brings in Vietnamese and other global agents, including New Zealand, Australia, and especially Britain, as well as China and the Soviet Union. Importantly, the book also argues that the successful French withdrawal from Vietnam – a political defeat for the Eisenhower administration – helped to avert outright warfare between the major powers, although with very mixed results for the inhabitants of Vietnam who faced partition and further bloodshed. The End of the First Indochina War explores the complexities of intra-alliance competition over global strategy – especially between the United States and British Commonwealth – arguing that these rivalries are as important to understanding the Cold War as east-west confrontation. This is the first truly global interpretation of the French defeat in 1954, based on the author’s research in five western countries and the latest scholarship from historians of Vietnam, China, and Russia. Readers will find much that is new both in terms of archival revelations and original interpretations.
