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Author: Ron Kasznik
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Computer software industry
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Book Description
Author: Ron Kasznik
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Computer software industry
Languages : en
Pages : 60
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Book Description
Author: Majella Percy
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This paper investigates the accounting and disclosure practices of Ramp;D firms in the discretionary reporting environment of Australia, by examining the relationship between the investment opportunity sets of high research intensive versus low research intensive firms and the mapping to accounting policy and disclosure choices. The results confirm the importance of the measures of research intensity, information asymmetry, the use of Ramp;D financing arrangements, and the issue of shares in explaining the selective capitalisation of Ramp;D expenditure. Furthermore, measures of research intensity and the use of an Ramp;D financing arrangement are significant in explaining voluntary disclosure of Ramp;D expenditure and activities. These relationships hold even after controlling for economic characteristics of the firms.
Author: William F. Floyd
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
This thesis is comprised of two essays that explore how investors' uncertainty over financial reporting quality influences firms' voluntary disclosures. I consider two shocks that cause investors to assign a higher likelihood of restatement and examine how managers respond using voluntary disclosures. Managers inform stakeholders of the firm through mandatory disclosures (e.g. financial statements) and voluntary disclosures (e.g. earnings forecasts, conference calls, press releases). Financial reporting quality represents the extent to which financial statements faithfully reflect the underlying economics of the firm, and therefore, how much stakeholders can learn from these mandatory disclosures alone. The focus of this thesis is on how managers use voluntary channels to inform stakeholders following shocks to investors' expectations of financial reporting quality.
Author: Jonathan Black
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
We identify a unique setting where managers decrease the precision of the financial statements by discontinuing to report financial statement values below one million and use it to shed light on materiality judgments made by managers. If investors perceive amounts below one million to be immaterial, this decrease in precision would not influence the market value of the firm. Alternatively, if amounts below one million are material to investors, or if investors believe managers exercised their discretion over materiality opportunistically, the decrease in precision would be viewed negatively and decrease firm value. Consistent with the latter, we observe that the initial release of financial statements rounded to one million is associated with a negative 1.2% market reaction and a lower earnings response coefficient. To explore whether managerial opportunism explains the negative investor reaction, we examine the determinants and consequences of the decrease in precision. We observe that managers tend to reduce precision when incentives (i.e., risk taking and anticipation of poor performance) and opportunity (low external monitoring) are high. Furthermore, we find reducing precision is associated with a decrease in financial statement disclosure and an increase in the propensity to manage earnings. These findings suggest management may exercise their materiality discretion opportunistically and has implications for studying voluntary disclosure decisions.
Author: Harri J. Seppänen
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Corporations
Languages : en
Pages : 214
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Book Description
Based on an analysis of disclosure data from 42 non-financial Finnish firms between 1990 and 1992, examines managers' information disclosure practices (disclosure frequency and timing). Investigates whether external financing arrangements are associated with managers' general accounting disclosure practices in an institutional setting that is considered to exhibit 'relationship' financing.
Author: Ling Tuo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
The importance of an effective corporate communication with all stakeholders including shareholders has been extensively debated in the business literature in the aftermath of 2007-2009 global financial crisis. The key indicator of business value have shifted from accounting profits and stock market performance, formerly, to firm reputation and sustainability performance, currently. Therefore, the transparency and value-relevance of conventional financial reporting has been questioned in terms of its capability to satisfy increasing information needs of all stakeholders. Many doubt whether those traditional financial metrics derived from financial statements can appropriately capture firm & rsquo;s long-term value creation ability. In recent years, users of corporate reports are demanding more relevant financial and non-financial on key performance indicators and forward looking information above and beyond conventional financial statements. To satisfy the demands of information users and decision makers, companies are expected to not only increase their reporting transparency in conventional financial statements but also disclose more inside information to outside public through different types of voluntary disclosure. The first dissertation investigates the role of sustainability report through examining the associations among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality and audit fee. Recently more and more firms begin to release sustainability reports, one important channel of voluntary disclosure, to satisfy the needs of information users and increase the transparency of financial reporting. In this paper, I especially examine the effect of voluntary disclosure quality on those associations. Through Difference-in-Difference test, I find that the release of sustainability report is positively correlated with innate earnings quality and negatively correlated with discretionary earnings quality. Moreover, the positive (negative) correlation between sustainability report and innate (discretionary) earnings quality is more (less) pronounced when the voluntary disclosure quality is high. I also find that the release of sustainability report is associated with higher audit fees and thus it suggests that the sustainability report cannot substitute the traditional financial statement. My conclusions are robust through additional tests of OLS regressions. This paper has important political, academic and industry application. The second dissertation investigates how the firm & rsquo;s cost stickiness strategy is associated with the firm & rsquo;s management earnings forecast (MEF). I conjecture that the managerial incentive regarding the cost strategy and voluntary disclosure strategy are interdependent. When managers choose their cost management, they will also choose the corresponding management earnings forecast strategy to align their interests. Through the empirical tests with a sample between year 2005 and 2011, I find that the firm & rsquo;s level of sticky cost is positively associated with the firm & rsquo;s propensity to issue MEF and the frequency of MEF. Moreover, I find that the firm & rsquo;s level of sticky cost is associated with more good earnings news forecasted by managers. Finally, I find that the relation between cost stickiness and MEF behaviors is more pronounced when the MEF is long-horizon oriented and when the firm efficiency is high. My research builds a link between financial accounting information and managerial accounting information, and also provides new evidence to understand the managerial incentives behind each strategy chosen by managers. This third dissertation investigates how industry peer firms tend to influence the specific firm & rsquo;s voluntary disclosure strategy. Through examining the empirical example of management earnings forecast between 2005 and 2011 and implementing the 2SLS regressions, I find that the specific firm & rsquo;s disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and the disclosure of bad news are significantly influenced by its peers firms & rsquo; disclosure behaviors. Specifically, the increase in the peers & rsquo; disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad news tend to encourage the specific firm to increase its disclosure frequency, disclosure horizon and disclosure of bad news. Moreover, certain firms (such as firms with S & P credit rating, higher profit, larger size or higher market-to-book ratio) tend to be more sensitive to their peer firms & rsquo; voluntary disclosure strategy. Finally, I find that the specific leader-follower relation doesn & rsquo;t exist in the peer effects of disclosure strategy and thus the signaling theory, litigation risk and CEO reputation are more major reasons than herding theory and free rider theory in explaining this phenomenon.
Author: Ron Kasznik
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 45
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Book Description
This paper examines the effects on the informativeness of software companies' financial statements of limiting the amount of discretion with respect to software revenue recognition following the issuance of Statement of Position 91-1 in 1992. The requirement that companies adopt SOP 91-1 by restating earnings for prior periods allows to compare the value-relevance of two sets of data, the originally reported and the restated earnings numbers. I find that the originally reported numbers provide incremental information content over the more conservative restated earnings numbers. This finding is consistent with managers using their discretion in pre-SOP 91-1 periods to convey private information about their firms' underlying economics. Furthermore, relative to a control group of software firms less sensitive to the accounting change, I document a significant decline in the information content of sample firms' reported earnings following the issuance of SOP 91-1, as well as a significant increase in the voluntary disclosure of long-term earnings projections and non-financial information. I interpret these findings as evidence that limiting the amount of discretion has adversely affected managers' ability to communicate effectively with investors through the financial statements.
Author: Ron Kasznik
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Disclosure in accounting
Languages : en
Pages : 44
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Book Description
Author: Sarah L. C. Zechman
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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Book Description
I investigate how the use and voluntary disclosure of synthetic leases is affected by incentives to defer cash outflows and keep debt off the balance sheet. I find that managers of cash-constrained firms with incentives to defer cash payments are more likely to finance asset purchases with synthetic leases. The mandated reporting for synthetic leases allows managers to avoid disclosing the financial consequences of these transactions. I find that managers of firms with incentives to use off-balance-sheet financing do not provide transparent disclosure about their synthetic leases. However, managers of cash-constrained firms, which are less likely to use synthetic leases for financial reporting reasons, do voluntarily disclose the existence and financial consequences of these contracts. Alternative tests around FIN 46 adoption corroborate these findings.
Author: Peddina Mohana Rao
Publisher: Deep and Deep Publications
ISBN: 9788176292030
Category : Disclosure in accounting
Languages : en
Pages : 388
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Book Description
