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Author: Gianni De Nicoló
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.
Author: Gianni De Nicoló
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN:
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 42
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Book Description
We study a banking model in which banks invest in a riskless asset and compete in both deposit and risky loan markets. The model predicts that as competition increases, both loans and assets increase; however, the effect on the loans-to-assets ratio is ambiguous. Similarly, as competition increases, the probability of bank failure can either increase or decrease. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003, and a panel data set of about 2600 banks in 134 non-industrialized countries for the period 1993-2004. With both samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is negatively and significantly related to measures of competition, and that the loan-to-asset ratio is positively and significantly related to measures of competition. Furthermore, several loan loss measures commonly employed in the literature are negatively and significantly related to measures of bank competition. Thus, there is no evidence of a trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition seems to foster banks' willingness to lend.
Author: Mr.Tito Cordella
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451851995
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 46
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Book Description
This paper studies the impact of competition on the determination of interest rates and banks’ risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of financial information. It finds that lower entry costs foster competition in deposit rate sand reduce banks’ incentives to limit risk exposure. Although higher insurance coverage amplifies this effect, two alternative arrangements (risk-based contributions to the insurance fund and public disclosure of financial information) help to reduce it. Moreover, uninsured but fully informed depositors and risk-based full deposit insurance yield the same equilibrium risk level, which is independent of entry costs. The welfare implications of the different arrangements are also explored.
Author: Tito Cordella
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
We study the impact of competition on banks' risk-taking behavior under different assumptions about deposit insurance and the dissemination of information. While financial opening increases banks' riskiness, a risk-based deposit insurance or, alternatively, the public disclosure of financial information, are likely to mitigate this effect. Moreover, the limiting cases of uninsured but fully informed depositors, and risk-based full deposit insurance, yield the same equilibrium risk level. Although the welfare consequences of increased competition depend on its impact on risk, financial opening unambiguously improves welfare as we approach the limiting cases.
Author: Mr.Gianni De Nicolo
Publisher: International Monetary Fund
ISBN: 1451865570
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 51
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Book Description
This paper studies two new models in which banks face a non-trivial asset allocation decision. The first model (CVH) predicts a negative relationship between banks' risk of failure and concentration, indicating a trade-off between competition and stability. The second model (BDN) predicts a positive relationship, suggesting no such trade-off exists. Both models can predict a negative relationship between concentration and bank loan-to-asset ratios, and a nonmonotonic relationship between bank concentration and profitability. We explore these predictions empirically using a cross-sectional sample of about 2,500 U.S. banks in 2003 and a panel data set of about 2,600 banks in 134 nonindustrialized countries for 1993-2004. In both these samples, we find that banks' probability of failure is positively and significantly related to concentration, loan-to-asset ratios are negatively and significantly related to concentration, and bank profits are positively and significantly related to concentration. Thus, the risk predictions of the CVH model are rejected, those of the BDN model are not, there is no trade-off between bank competition and stability, and bank competition fosters the willingness of banks to lend.
Author: Xavier Vives
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 0691210039
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 344
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Book Description
A distinguished economist examines competition, regulation, and stability in today's global banks Does too much competition in banking hurt society? What policies can best protect and stabilize banking without stifling it? Institutional responses to such questions have evolved over time, from interventionist regulatory control after the Great Depression to the liberalization policies that started in the United States in the 1970s. The global financial crisis of 2007–2009, which originated from an oversupply of credit, once again raised questions about excessive banking competition and what should be done about it. Competition and Stability in Banking addresses the critical relationships between competition, regulation, and stability, and the implications of coordinating banking regulations with competition policies. Xavier Vives argues that while competition is not responsible for fragility in banking, there are trade-offs between competition and stability. Well-designed regulations would alleviate these trade-offs but not eliminate them, and the specificity of competition in banking should be accounted for. Vives argues that regulation and competition policy should be coordinated, with tighter prudential requirements in more competitive situations, but he also shows that supervisory and competition authorities should stand separate from each other, each pursuing its own objective. Vives reviews the theory and empirics of banking competition, drawing on up-to-date analysis that incorporates the characteristics of modern market-based banking, and he looks at regulation, competition policies, and crisis interventions in Europe and the United States, as well as in emerging economies. Focusing on why banking competition policies are necessary, Competition and Stability in Banking examines regulation's impact on the industry's efficiency and effectiveness.
Author: Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262042541
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 415
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Book Description
Explicit deposit insurance (DI) is widely held to be a crucial element of modern financial safety nets. This book draws on an original cross-country dataset on DI systems and design features to examine the impact of DI on banking behavior and assess the policy complications that emerge in developing countries.
Author:
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Deposit insurance
Languages : en
Pages : 244
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Book Description
Author: Anjan V. Thakor
Publisher: Elsevier
ISBN: 0080559921
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 605
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Book Description
The growth of financial intermediation research has yielded a host of questions that have pushed "design" issues to the fore even as the boundary between financial intermediation and corporate finance has blurred. This volume presents review articles on six major topics that are connected by information-theoretic tools and characterized by valuable perspectives and important questions for future research. Touching upon a wide range of issues pertaining to the designs of securities, institutions, trading mechanisms and markets, industry structure, and regulation, this volume will encourage bold new efforts to shape financial intermediaries in the future. - Original review articles offer valuable perspectives on research issues appearing in top journals - Twenty articles are grouped by six major topics, together defining the leading research edge of financial intermediation - Corporate finance researchers will find affinities in the tools, methods, and conclusions featured in these articles
Author: Robert J. Cull
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Banking law
Languages : en
Pages : 66
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Book Description
Do deposit insurance programs contribute to financial developmen? Yes, but only if the regulatory environment is sound.
Author: Xavier Freixas
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 026230385X
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 389
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Book Description
The second edition of an essential text on the microeconomic foundations of banking surveys the latest research in banking theory, with new material that covers recent developments in the field. Over the last thirty years, a new paradigm in banking theory has overturned economists' traditional vision of the banking sector. The asymmetric information model, extremely powerful in many areas of economic theory, has proven useful in banking theory both for explaining the role of banks in the economy and for pointing out structural weaknesses in the banking sector that may justify government intervention. In the past, banking courses in most doctoral programs in economics, business, or finance focused either on management or monetary issues and their macroeconomic consequences; a microeconomic theory of banking did not exist because the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium model of complete contingent markets (the standard reference at the time) was unable to explain the role of banks in the economy. This text provides students with a guide to the microeconomic theory of banking that has emerged since then, examining the main issues and offering the necessary tools for understanding how they have been modeled. This second edition covers the recent dramatic developments in academic research on the microeconomics of banking, with a focus on four important topics: the theory of two-sided markets and its implications for the payment card industry; “non-price competition” and its effect on the competition-stability tradeoff and the entry of new banks; the transmission of monetary policy and the effect on the functioning of the credit market of capital requirements for banks; and the theoretical foundations of banking regulation, which have been clarified, although recent developments in risk modeling have not yet led to a significant parallel development of economic modeling. Praise for the first edition: "The book is a major contribution to the literature on the theory of banking and intermediation. It brings together and synthesizes a broad range of material in an accessible way. I recommend it to all serious scholars and students of the subject. The authors are to be congratulated on a superb achievement."—Franklin Allen, Nippon Life Professor of Finance and Economics, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania "This book provides the first comprehensive treatment of the microeconomics of banking. It gives an impressive synthesis of an enormous body of research developed over the last twenty years. It is clearly written and apleasure to read. What I found particularly useful is the great effort that Xavier Freixas and Jean-Charles Rochet have taken to systematically integrate the theory of financial intermediation into classical microeconomics and finance theory. This book is likely to become essential reading for all graduate students in economics, business, and finance."—Patrick Bolton, Barbara and David Zalaznick Professor of Business, Columbia University Graduate School of Business "The authors have provided an extremely thorough and up-to-date survey of microeconomic theories of financial intermediation. This work manages to be both rigorous and pleasant to read. Such a book was long overdue and shouldbe required reading for anybody interested in the economics of banking and finance."—Mathias Dewatripont, Professor of Economics, ECARES, Universit
