Author: Warren J. Samuels
Publisher: Praeger
ISBN: 0313267782
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This study brings an original slant to the complex and much-debated question of the proper role of government in the economic sphere. Representing a broad range of disciplinary and ideological approaches, the authors identify and explore the most fundamental propositions concerning the economic role of government, as well as the generalizations, major themes, and conclusions that can be drawn from them. The essays focus on the deep levels of political and economic organization and on the values and underlying assumptions that are the bases of the institution of government. Written by a distinguished group of specialists, the work approaches the issue multidimensionally--from the standpoint of social science, history, law, and philosophy. Not mere ideological exercises, the essays focus on the deep levels of political and economic organization and on the values and underlying assumptions that are the bases of the institution of government. Connections between the government's economic role and ideology, free enterprise, power politics, and group interests are considered together with the constitutional implications of governmental economic powers. Other issues addressed include the changing economic role of government, contradictions and ambiguities in the government's economic functions, rules governing economic activity, and the role of economists in government. Providing a diversity of viewpoints and a wealth of fresh insights, this book can be used in graduate and undergraduate courses in economics, political science, philosophy, and law, and will appeal to the informed general worker.
Author: Peter J. Boettke
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 9781843763123
Category : Economic policy
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
Recoge: Introduction Peter J. Boettke and Peter T. Leeson PART ICLASSICAL ARGUMENTS FOR LAISSEZ FAIRE 1. David Hume (1985 [1777]), ‘Of the Independency of Parliament’, in Eugene F. Miller (ed.), Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, Essay VI, Indianapolis, IN, USA: Liberty Fund, Inc., 42–46 2. David Hume (2000), ‘Of the Origin of Justice and Property’, ‘Of the Rules, Which Determine Property’ and ‘Of the Transference of Property By Consent’, in David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (eds), A Treatise of Human Nature, Book 3: Part 2: Section 2, Section 3 and Section 4, Oxford, UK and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press, 311–31 3. Adam Smith (1961 [1776]), ‘Of the Sources of the General or Public Revenue of the Society’, in Edwin Cannan (ed.), An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth Of Nations, Book V, Chapter II, London, UK: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 341–440 4. Frédéric Bastiat (1850 [2007]), The Law, Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1–55 5. Jean-Baptiste Say (2001 [1880]), ‘Of the Effect of Government Regulations Intended to Influence Production’, in A Treatise on Political Economy, Book I, Chapter XVII, Ontario, Canada: Batoche Books, [translated by C.R. Prinsep], 60–83 6. Simon Newcomb (1870), ‘The Let-Alone Principle’, North American Review, CCXXVI (226), January, 1–33 7. Herbert Spencer (1981 [1843]), ‘The Proper Sphere of Government’, in The Man Versus the State: With Six Essays on Government, Society, and Freedom, Indianapolis, IN, USA: Liberty Fund, Inc., 181–263 PART IICRITICS OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 8. John Stuart Mill (1909 [1848]), ‘Of the Grounds and Limits of the Laisser-faire or Non-interference Principle’, in Principals of Political Economy with Some of Their Applications to Social Philosophy, Book IV, Chapter XI, London, UK: Longmans, Green and Co., 304–46 9. John Maynard Keynes (2012 [1926]), ‘The End of Laissez-Faire’, in Elizabeth Johnson and Donald Moggridge (eds), The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes. Volume IX: Essays in Persuasion, Cambridge, UK and New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 272–94 10. R.G. Tugwell (1932), ‘The Principle of Planning and the Institution of Laissez Faire’, American Economic Review, 22 (1), March, 75–92 11. J.E. Meade (1954), ‘External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation’, Economic Journal, 62 (245), March, 54–67 12. Paul A. Samuelson (1954), ‘The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 36 (4), November, 387–9 13. Francis M. Bator (1958), ‘The Anatomy of Market Failure’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 72 (3), August, 351–79 14. George J. Stigler and Paul A. Samuelson (1963), ‘A Dialogue on the Proper Economic Role of the State’, Selected Papers No. 7, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, 3–39 PART IIITHE RESTATEMENT OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 15. Ludwig von Mises (2005), ‘Liberal Economic Policy’, Liberalism: The Classical Tradition, Chapter 2, Indianapolis, IN, USA: Liberty Fund, Inc., 37–75 16. Friedrich A. Hayek (1980), ‘Individualism: True and False’, in Individualism and Economic Order, Chapter I, Chicago, IL, USA and London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 1–32 17. R.H. Coase (1959), ‘The Federal Communications Commission’, Journal of Law and Economics, II, October, 1–40 18. R.H. Coase (1960), ‘The Problem of Social Cost’, Journal of Law and Economics, III, October, 1–44 19. Murray N. Rothbard (1974), ‘The Anatomy of the State’, in Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature and Other Essays, Washington, DC, USA: Libertarian Review Press, 34–53 20. James M. Buchanan (1976), ‘The Justice of Natural Liberty’, Journal of Legal Studies, 5 (1), January, 1–16 21. Gordon Tullock (1967), ‘The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft’, Western Economic Journal, 5 (3), June, 224–32 22. Armen A. Alchian (2006), ‘Some Economics of Property Rights’, in The Collected Works of Armen A. Alchian, Volume 2: Property Rights and Economic Behavior, Part 1, Indianapolis, IN, USA: Liberty Fund, Inc., 52–67 23. Mancur Olson (1993), ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’, American Political Science Review, 87 (3), September, 567–76 PART IVMODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LAISSEZ FAIRE 24. David Friedman (1989), ‘What is Anarchy? What is Government?’, in The Machinery of Freedom: Guide to a Radical Capitalism, Chapter 28, New Rochelle, NY, USA: Arlington Publishers, 151–4 25. Jack Hirshleifer (1995), ‘Anarchy and its Breakdown’, Journal of Political Economy, 103 (1), February, 26–52 26. Avinash K. Dixit (2004), ‘Economics With and Without the Law’, in Lawlessness and Economics: Alternative Modes of Governance, Chapter 1, Princeton, NJ, USA and Oxford, UK: Princeton University Press, 1–23, references 27. James E. Rauch (2005), ‘Getting the Properties Right to Secure Property Rights: Dixit’s Lawlessness and Economics’, Journal of Economic Literature, XLIII (2), June, 480–7 28. Timothy Frye and Andrei Shleifer (1997), ‘The Invisible Hand and the Grabbing Hand’, American Economic Review, 87 (2), May, 354–8 29. Andrei Shleifer (2009), ‘The Age of Milton Friedman’, Journal of Economic Literature, XLVII (1), March, 123–35 30. Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson (2005), ‘Unbundling Institutions’, Journal of Political Economy, 113 (5), October, 949–95 31. Barry R. Weingast (1995), ‘The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development’, Journal of Law and Economic Organization, 11 (1), April, 1–31.
Author: Philippe Wingender
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 292
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Book Description
This dissertation explores the impact of government interventions on economic outcomes. In the first chapter, my colleague Juan Carlos Suárez Serrato and I propose a new identification strategy to measure the causal impact of government spending on the economy. Our methodology isolates exogenous cross-sectional variation in government spending using a novel instrument. We use the fact that a large number of federal spending programs depend on local population levels. Every ten years, the Census provides a count of local populations. A different method is used to estimate non-Census year populations and this discontinuous change in methodology leads to variation in the allocation of billions of dollars in federal spending. We use this variation to analyze the effect of exogenous changes in federal spending across counties on local economic outcomes. Our IV estimates imply that government spending has a local income multiplier of 1.88 and an estimated cost per job of $30,000 per year. These estimates are robust to the inclusion of potential confounders, such as local demand shocks. We also show that the local effects of government spending are not larger than aggregate effects at the MSA and state levels. Finally, we characterize the cross-sectional heterogeneity of the impacts of government spending. These results confirm that government spending has a higher impact in low growth areas and leads to reduction of inequality in economic outcomes. The second chapter uses timing of childbirth to measure the income effect of taxes on parents' labor supply. The IRS Residency Test states that families can claim a dependent for the entire fiscal year if the child was born at any time during the year. This rule provides an exogenous source of variation in tax liabilities for births that occur late in the year versus those that occur early the following year. By measuring the difference in earnings in the subsequent year for parents of December and January births, I can identify the impact of a one-time non-labor income shock on parents' labor supply since both groups face on average the same future stream of tax schedules after birth. Using data from two large scale household surveys in the United States, I find that a temporary increase in after-tax income leads to a significant decrease in mothers' earnings with an estimated income effect of -0.9. This result demonstrates that the income effect of taxes on labor supply can potentially be very large. It also highlights the crucial role of liquidity constraints in parents' labor supply decisions around the time of birth. The third chapter also uses timing of childbirth to measure the income effect of taxes on mothers' labor supply. The analysis is done using Canadian data. Until 1992, various provisions in the Canadian tax code gave important tax reductions to low and middle-income parents of eligible children. Families could claim a child as a dependent for the entire fiscal year if the child was born at any time during the year. In 1992, the last year the Canadian tax code featured these fiscal benefits, a two parent family claiming a dependent could save nearly a thousand dollars in taxes due to the Child Tax Credit, the dependent amount and the GST credit. Using this variation in tax liabilities, it is possible to identify the impact of a one-time non-labor income shock on mothers' labor supply. This important parameter has not been systematically measured in the literature on the effect of taxes on labor supply. Using natural experiments provided by tax reforms in various countries, the literature has mostly focused on changes in earnings due to the price effect of marginal tax rate changes. However, if the income effect of a tax change is large, observed elasticities of income with respect to net-of-tax rates understate the distortions associated with these changes.
Author: Warren J. Samuels
Author: Warren J. Samuels
Author: Warren J. Samuels
Author: Warren J. Samuels
Author: Steven G. Medema
Author: Warren J. Samuels
Author: David S. Evans
Author: Frédéric Bastiat