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Author: Hyunhoi Koo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Hyunhoi Koo
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Arun Gautham Chandrasekhar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 210
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(cont.) substitutes for commitment. On net, savings allows individuals to smooth risk that cannot be shared interpersonally, with the largest benefits for those who are weakly connected in the network. The final chapter (co-authored with my classmates Horacio Larreguy and Juan Pablo Xandri) attempts to determine which models of social learning on networks best describe empirical behavior. Theory has focused on two leading models of social learning on networks: Bayesian and DeGroot rules of thumb learning. These models can yield greatly divergent behavior; individuals employing rules of thumb often double-count information and may not exhibit convergent behavior in the long run. By conducting a unique lab experiment in rural Karnataka, India, set up to exactly differentiate between these two models, we test which model best describes social learning processes on networks. We study experiments in which seven individuals are placed into a network, each with full knowledge of its structure. The participants attempt to learn the underlying (binary) state of the world. Individuals receive independent, identically distributed signals about the state in the first period only; thereafter, individuals make guesses about the underlying state of the world and these guesses are transmitted to their neighbors at the beginning of the following round. We consider various environments including incomplete information Bayesian models and provide evidence that individuals are best described by DeGroot models wherein they either take simple majority of opinions in their neighborhood.
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 151
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This dissertation is a collection of three essays on social networks and development economics. The first chapter examines the effect of peer networks on self-control problems. I construct a theoretical model to describe the way in which peer networks influence consumption behaviors through social norms, which guide individuals to conform to their friends' behavior. Using comprehensive data from a monthly survey conducted in 16 villages in Thailand from 1999 through 2004, I empirically examine peer effects on temptation consumption patterns, and test the mechanism underlying this relationship. Detailed social network information in the dataset allows the identification of impacts using a friend of a friend (excluded network) as the instrument. The empirical results provide evidence that peer decisions significantly impact individuals' temptation consumption such as alcohol and gambling, as well as savings. These peer effects are driven primarily by social norms, rather than by risk sharing. In the second chapter, co-authored with professor Laura Schechter, we first conduct an extensive review of the disparate literature studying the stability of preferences measured in experiments. Then, we test the stability of individuals' choices in panel data from rural Paraguay, including both experimental and survey measures of risk, time, and social preferences collected over almost a decade. Answers to survey questions are quite stable, while experimental measures are less so. If choices made in experiments are not stable, it may be because these choices are influenced by shocks, or because they include high levels of noise. We find no evidence that real-world shocks influence play in games. We suggest that in a developing country context, researchers may want to design simpler experiments or make more use of survey questions to measure preferences. The third chapter explores the impact of weather shocks on farmers' income diversification strategies. I combine historical weather data with household data in India to explore whether farmers employ different responses toward weather shocks in regions with different levels of historical variation. I find that weather shocks can negatively affect agricultural income, but this effect decreases in a riskier place where people have, over time, diversified their income into off-farm employment. I also find evidence that caste-networks can potentially determine people's income diversification strategies. Households who are within a different caste from the majority of their village peers will be more likely to seek for off-farm jobs, while households who are in a similar caste to the majority of the people within the village will seek agricultural wage jobs from others in the village.
Author: Chen, Xi
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 526
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This dissertation is composed of a literature review, Chapter 1, an in-depth analysis of data used in the dissertation, Chapter 2, and three main essays, Chapters 3-5, on relative concerns, social interactions and unintended consequences. To uncover the nature of social interactions, Chapter 3 studies how rural residents form social networks, and what explains the recent gift spending escalation. Chapter 4 focuses on a typical market that carries significant social stigma - paid blood plasma donation in China. I explore the role of peer interactions in the networks. Building upon it, Chapter 5 evaluates how in utero exposures to frequent and costly social events for the impoverished families impacts early child nutrients intake and health status. Chapter 1 This chapter reviews the recent literature on inequality and income distribution in rural China utilizing panel datasets. On the basis of the review, this chapter identifies new research areas with existing panel datasets and my new household panel dataset, i.e., the IFPRI-CAAS, which could shape future research. Chapter 2 The tradition of keeping written gift record in many Asian countries offers researchers an old-fashioned but underutilized means of data collection for development and social network study. This chapter documents a long-term spontaneous household gift record I collected from the field. I discuss the data collection and network structure, highlighting its unique features for studies at household and dyadic link level. Chapter 3 The growth rate of gift and festival spending in some developing countries has been much higher than that of consumption and income. I test three competing explanations of the phenomenon-peer effect, status concern, and risk pooling-based on the IFPRI-CAAS and the gift network data. I find that gift-giving behavior is largely influenced by peers in reference groups. Status concern is another key motive for keeping up with the Joneses in extending gifts. In contrast, risk pooling does not seem to be a key driver of the observed gift-giving patterns. I also show that large windfall income triggers the escalation of competitive gift-giving behavior. Chapter 4 Despite the resultant disutility, people are still engaged in behavior carrying social stigma. Empirical studies on stigma behavior are rare, largely due to the formidable challenges of collecting data on stigmatized goods and services. Combining the IFPRI-CAAS and the gift network data, I examine frequent blood sales, widely regarded as a stigmatized behavior and the driving force of public health crises. Using a novel spatial identification strategy, I find social interactions with heterogeneous intensities affect plasma sales decisions. Peer effects are directional and work through preference interactions that reduce stigma. Families with unmarried son are more likely to sell plasma to offset costs of getting married in a tight marriage market, such as a bigger house, a higher bride price and a more lavish wedding banquet. Chapter 5 Participating in and presenting gifts at funerals, weddings, and other ceremonies held by fellow villagers have been regarded as social norms. However, it is more burdensome for the poor to take part in these social occasions than the rich. Because the poor often lack the necessary resources, they are forced to cut back on basic consumption, such as food, in order to afford a gift to attend the social festivals. Using the IFPRI-CAAS and the gift dataset, this chapter shows that children born to mothers in poor families who are exposed to a greater number of ceremonies during their pregnancies are more likely to display a lasting detrimental health impact.
Author: Richard Anthony Ramsawak
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Climatic changes
Languages : en
Pages : 408
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Author: Tomas Rodriguez Barraquer
Publisher: Stanford University
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 210
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Over the last few decades some analytic tools intensely used by economics have produced useful insights in topics formerly in the exclusive reach of other social sciences. In particular game theory, justifiable from either a multi-person decision theoretic perspective or from an evolutionary one, often serves as a generous yet sufficiently tight framework for interdisciplinary dialogue. The three essays in this collection apply game theory to answer questions with some aspects of economic interest. The three of them have in common that they are related to topics to which other social sciences, specially sociology, have made significant contributions. While working within economics I have attempted to use constructively and faithfully some of these ideas. Chapter 1, coauthored with Xu Tan, studies situations in which a set of agents take actions in order to convey private information to an observing third party which then assigns a set of prizes based on its beliefs about the ranking of the agents in terms of the unobservable characteristic. These situations were first studied using game theoretic frameworks by Spence and Akerlof in the early seventies, but some of the key insights date back to the foundational work of Veblen. In our analysis we focus on the competitive aspect of some of these situations and cast signals as random variables whose distributions are determined by the underlying unobservable characteristics. Under this formulation different signals have inherent meanings, preceding any stable conventions that may be established. We use these prior meanings to propose an equilibrium selection criterion, which significantly refines the very large set of sequential equilibria in this class of games. In Chapter 2, coauthored with Matthew O. Jackson and Xu Tan, we study the structure of social networks that allow individuals to cooperate with one another in settings in which behavior is non-contractible, by supporting schemes of credible ostracism of deviators. There is a significant literature on the subject of cooperation in social networks focusing on the role of the network in transmitting the information necessary for the timely punishment of deviators, and deriving properties of network structures able to sustain cooperation from that perspective. Ours is one of the first efforts to understand the network restrictions that emerge purely from the credibility of ostracism, carefully considering the implications that the dissolution of any given relationship may have over the sustainability of other relations in the community. In Chapter 3 I study the sets of Pure Strategy Nash equilibria of a variety of binary games of social influence under complete information. In a game of social influence agents simultaneously choose one of two possible strategies (to be inactive or be active), and the optimal choice depends on the strategies of the agents in their social environment. Different social environments and assumptions on the way in which they influence the behavior of the agents lead to different classes of games of varying degrees of tractability. In any such game an equilibrium can be described by the set of agents that are active, and the full set of equilibria can be thus represented as a collection of subsets of the set of agents. I build the analysis of each of the classes of games that I consider around the question: What collections of sets are expressible as the set of equilibria of some game in the class? I am able to provide precise answers to these questions in some of the classes studied, and in other cases just some pointers.
Author: Ira Matuschke
Publisher: Intl Food Policy Res Inst
ISBN:
Category : Social Science
Languages : en
Pages : 36
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Author: Norihiko Matsuda
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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My dissertation consists of three chapters. The first chapter examines social networks in labor markets. While existing theories such as models of screening and peer effects imply that social networks improve job match quality, these theories do not well explain the stylized fact, which we call negative selection---workers and employers with lower socio-economic status use social networks more frequently. By proposing an equilibrium search model, we show that social networks create mismatched jobs in the context where negative selection occurs. Our model sheds light on a neglected aspect of social networks: they help to match, but not necessarily with good-match partners. In the presence of search frictions, workers and firms can be tempted by bad-match encounters through social networks. This temptation is stronger for less productive, poorer workers and firms because costly formal channels are less rewarding for them. Using linked employer-employee data in Bangladesh, we find that matching through social networks rather than formal channels results in mismatches. This chapter demonstrates that while social networks compensate for search frictions in formal labor markets by matching more workers and jobs, their match quality is low. The second chapter evaluates the effects of social security benefits on labor supply. The benefits can reduce labor supply through two channels: current benefits and expectations over future benefits. I develop a framework to jointly estimate both channels and apply it to the South African pension program, which lowered the male eligible age in 2008 to 2010. I find the anticipatory effect of future benefits to be considerable: it accounts for nearly 60 percent of the labor force contraction caused by the lowering of the eligible age. Moreover, the framework identifies binding liquidity constraints faced by nearly-age-eligible people. The third chapter examines spillover effects of the South African Old-Age Pension Program on employment choices of recipients' children. By exploiting quasi-experimental variations in eligibility, the empirical results show that prime-age children leave the labor force if their fathers receive pension benefits. I find suggestive evidence that they leave the labor force to receive education and training. I also find suggestive evidence that the benefits allow prime-age individuals to look for jobs for longer duration. These findings imply that the program does not discourage work but help prime-age individuals move to more productive jobs.
Author: Hans Rosling
Publisher: Flatiron Books
ISBN: 125012381X
Category : Science
Languages : en
Pages : 353
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INSTANT NEW YORK TIMES BESTSELLER “One of the most important books I’ve ever read—an indispensable guide to thinking clearly about the world.” – Bill Gates “Hans Rosling tells the story of ‘the secret silent miracle of human progress’ as only he can. But Factfulness does much more than that. It also explains why progress is so often secret and silent and teaches readers how to see it clearly.” —Melinda Gates "Factfulness by Hans Rosling, an outstanding international public health expert, is a hopeful book about the potential for human progress when we work off facts rather than our inherent biases." - Former U.S. President Barack Obama Factfulness: The stress-reducing habit of only carrying opinions for which you have strong supporting facts. When asked simple questions about global trends—what percentage of the world’s population live in poverty; why the world’s population is increasing; how many girls finish school—we systematically get the answers wrong. So wrong that a chimpanzee choosing answers at random will consistently outguess teachers, journalists, Nobel laureates, and investment bankers. In Factfulness, Professor of International Health and global TED phenomenon Hans Rosling, together with his two long-time collaborators, Anna and Ola, offers a radical new explanation of why this happens. They reveal the ten instincts that distort our perspective—from our tendency to divide the world into two camps (usually some version of us and them) to the way we consume media (where fear rules) to how we perceive progress (believing that most things are getting worse). Our problem is that we don’t know what we don’t know, and even our guesses are informed by unconscious and predictable biases. It turns out that the world, for all its imperfections, is in a much better state than we might think. That doesn’t mean there aren’t real concerns. But when we worry about everything all the time instead of embracing a worldview based on facts, we can lose our ability to focus on the things that threaten us most. Inspiring and revelatory, filled with lively anecdotes and moving stories, Factfulness is an urgent and essential book that will change the way you see the world and empower you to respond to the crises and opportunities of the future. --- “This book is my last battle in my life-long mission to fight devastating ignorance...Previously I armed myself with huge data sets, eye-opening software, an energetic learning style and a Swedish bayonet for sword-swallowing. It wasn’t enough. But I hope this book will be.” Hans Rosling, February 2017.
Author: Isabel Melguizo López
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788449064616
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 402
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Los individuos a menudo exhiben robustos patrones de comportamiento al relacionarse con otros y cuando toman decisiones económicas. Por ejemplo, tienden a interactuar de manera desproporcionada con otros similares a ellos. Además, las dimensiones no-cognitivas de la personalidad, como la confianza o la perseverancia afectan a la dilación de las tareas. Esta tesis incorpora estos patrones de comportamiento en modelos económicos de aprendizaje social y de decisiones sobre el momento en el que desarrollar tareas. En el primer capítulo argumentamos cómo los desacuerdos se pueden perpetuar en la sociedad cuando los individuos forman sus opiniones comunicándose de manera desproporcionada con sus similares. Para ello consideramos un modelo dinámico de formación de opinión en el que los individuos desarrollan sus opiniones mediante la incorporación de las de otros en su red social. Nuestros individuos exhiben homofilia, esto es, la atención que prestan a otros se basa en la posesión de atributos similares. La característica clave de este marco es que la atención co-evoluciona con las opiniones, regida por cuán sobresalientes son los atributos. Esta prominencia viene dada por la diferencia de opiniones entre los grupos que poseen y que carecen de estos atributos. Al asumir que los atributos con mayores diferencias en opiniones merecen más atención, mostramos si hay, inicialmente, un único atributo sobresaliente, éste recibe una atención creciente en el tiempo y la sociedad queda escindida en dos grupos de pensamiento. Esta situación se presenta porque los individuos reorientan sus interacciones con otros similares en el rasgo más saliente de tal manera que las opiniones no se mezclan. En el segundo capítulo complementamos el estudio del primero explorando cómo modificaciones en el comportamiento de los individuos afectan a la formación de opiniones. Incorporamos el caso en el cual las opiniones están sujetas a las perturbaciones y demostramos que el desacuerdo es robusto a la aleatoriedad. También discutimos el caso en que los individuos se influencian entre sí con diferentes intensidades, como McPherson et al. (2001) documenta, los jóvenes exhiben mayor homofilia de género que los mayores. Encontramos que cuando algunos individuos agravan la atención que prestan al rasgo más sobresaliente inicialmente, el desacuerdo persiste a través de él, siendo las diferencias en opiniones más mayores que en el caso simétrico. Finalmente exploramos condiciones generales sobre la evolución de la homofilia para que el desacuerdo persista. En el primer capítulo discutimos un proceso particular en el que la evolución de homofilia promueve el desacuerdo, por el contrario, la homofilia constante en Golub y Jackson (2012) afecta a la velocidad de convergencia al consenso, un resultado que siempre surgía. La conciliación de ambos resultado descansa en afirmar que el desacuerdo persiste siempre que que los individuos intensifiquen sus relaciones con otros similares, suficientemente rápido. Específicamente, hay dos fuerzas en juego: primero, las personas prestan cada vez más atención a los demás sobre la base de un atributo específico. Segundo, siempre prestan atención a todos los demás. El desacuerdo persiste cuando la primera domina. En el último capítulo, discutimos la relevancia de las habilidades no-cognitivas en la decisión de cuándo hacer frente a tareas difíciles, pero valiosas. Para ello consideramos un marco dinámico con un individuo caracterizado por el potencial con el que ejecuta sus habilidades. Mostramos que cuando este individuo presenta bajo potencial, se enfrenta siempre a tareas fáciles de bajo valor mientras que cuando presenta alto potencial, se enfrenta siempre a tareas difíciles. Cuando este potencial es sensible a la consecución de resultados, el individuo puede encontrar óptimo pasar de tareas fáciles a difíciles en algún momento. Intuitivamente, los éxitos en tareas fáciles lo motivan a enfrentarse a tareas difíciles.
