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Author: Itay Perah Fainmesser
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 328
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Book Description
This thesis consists of three essays on the theory of networks and its applications to markets. The first essay develops a new model for studying repeated games in buyer-seller networks, and explores the connection between network structure and cooperation. The second essay introduces new techniques to analyze the effect of Word-Of-Mouth (WOM) on cooperation in networked markets. The third essay studies how network structure affects the timing of hiring in networked markets. Consider a large market with asymmetric information, in which sellers choose whether to cooperate or deviate and 'cheat' their buyers, and buyers decide whether to re-purchase from different sellers. In the first chapter I model active trade relationships as links in a buyer-seller network and suggest a framework for studying repeated games in such networks. I derive conditions that determine whether a network is a Steady State Cooperation Network (SSCN)--a network that is consistent with trade and trust between every buyer and seller that are connected. In particular, three network features increase the incentives for cooperation: sparseness, moderate competition, and segregation.
Author: Itay Perah Fainmesser
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 328
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Book Description
This thesis consists of three essays on the theory of networks and its applications to markets. The first essay develops a new model for studying repeated games in buyer-seller networks, and explores the connection between network structure and cooperation. The second essay introduces new techniques to analyze the effect of Word-Of-Mouth (WOM) on cooperation in networked markets. The third essay studies how network structure affects the timing of hiring in networked markets. Consider a large market with asymmetric information, in which sellers choose whether to cooperate or deviate and 'cheat' their buyers, and buyers decide whether to re-purchase from different sellers. In the first chapter I model active trade relationships as links in a buyer-seller network and suggest a framework for studying repeated games in such networks. I derive conditions that determine whether a network is a Steady State Cooperation Network (SSCN)--a network that is consistent with trade and trust between every buyer and seller that are connected. In particular, three network features increase the incentives for cooperation: sparseness, moderate competition, and segregation.
Author: Alexander Teytelboym
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 480
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Book Description
Author: Supriya Sarnikar
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Mircea Ioan Marcu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Recent developments in the economics of networks have shown the potential fallacies of using one-sided logic in two-sided markets. In the third study I develop a two-sided market model to analyze the pricing and quality decisions of a profit maximizing managed care organization (MCO) in the presence of indirect network externalities between doctors and patients. The managed care organization faces trade-offs when choosing the quality of service, insurance premiums, and physician reimbursements. These trade-offs depend on patient health risk and physician cost distributions, the elasticity of supply of physicians with respect to reimbursements, the marginal cost of service quality, and the marginal utility derived by patients from access to a broader network of physicians and the quality of health services. In the case of iso-elastic distributions of patient health risk and physician cost of treatment, an increase in the cost of providing quality decreases the quality provided by the MCO, which leads to fewer policyholders, lower physician reimbursements, and fewer doctors in the preferred network. The insurance premium also decreases. An increase in the health risk of the population results in lower quality, lower reimbursements, and fewer physicians in the MCO's network. The insurance premium also decreases, but the decrease is smaller than the decrease in individuals' utility due to lower quality and fewer physicians, which leads to fewer policyholders.
Author: José Roberto Parra Segura
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Author: David Easley
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 1139490303
Category : Computers
Languages : en
Pages : 745
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Book Description
Are all film stars linked to Kevin Bacon? Why do the stock markets rise and fall sharply on the strength of a vague rumour? How does gossip spread so quickly? Are we all related through six degrees of separation? There is a growing awareness of the complex networks that pervade modern society. We see them in the rapid growth of the internet, the ease of global communication, the swift spread of news and information, and in the way epidemics and financial crises develop with startling speed and intensity. This introductory book on the new science of networks takes an interdisciplinary approach, using economics, sociology, computing, information science and applied mathematics to address fundamental questions about the links that connect us, and the ways that our decisions can have consequences for others.
Author: W. Mark Fruin
Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 0195353625
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 337
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Book Description
Despite the negative press Asian economies have received in connection with the recent financial crisis, their record of spectacular growth over the past few decades remains irrefutable. In an effort to provide a rich, textured analysis of these economies, editor W. Mark Fruin presents a collection of essays that explores the wide range of network organizations that have been established in the Pacific Rim. Conventional studies of economic organization have tended to center on markets and hierarchies, the two forms of organization most common in the West. But today the world moves too quickly and too unpredictably for the idealized organizations of microeconomic theory to keep up. It is no accident that the region that has generated the world's most explosive economic growth is also the region where network organizations--sets of independent actors who cooperate frequently for mutual advantage--are most pervasive. Rapid economic, social, and technical changes favor the formation of network organizations, and vice versa. The contributors to this volume identify and elucidate four basic types of networks: naturally occurring networks, market replacing networks, hierarchy replacing networks, and market enhancing networks. They show how all of these have been shaped by the history, government, legal system, and culture of each country under consideration. These network organizations allow the authors to compare and contrast network forms in China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States according to features such as degrees of formalization, rule definition, and market conformance. The works collected here make an important contribution to a networks-markets- hierarchies framework that recognizes and emphasizes the diversity of organizational forms and behaviors. A unique resource for scholars and professionals in the fields of management and economics, this book enables a complex analysis of one of the world's fastest growing and most theoretically challenging regions.
Author: Andrius Bielskis
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 1317001516
Category : Political Science
Languages : en
Pages : 264
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Book Description
Interest in Aristotelianism and in virtue ethics has been growing for half a century but as yet the strengths of the study of Aristotelian ethics in politics have not been matched in economics. This ground-breaking text fills that gap. Challenging the premises of neoclassical economic theory, the contributors take issue with neoclassicism’s foundational separation of values from facts, with its treatment of preferences as given, and with its consequent refusal to reason about final ends. The contrary presupposition of this collection is that ethical reasoning about human ends is essential for any sustainable economy, and that reasoning about economic goods should therefore be informed by reasoning about what is humanly and commonly good. Contributions critically engage with aspects of corporate capitalism, managerial power and neoliberal economic policy, and reflect on the recent financial crisis from the point of view of Aristotelian virtue ethics. Containing a new chapter by Alasdair MacIntyre, and deploying his arguments and conceptual scheme throughout, the book critically analyses the theoretical presuppositions and institutional reality of modern capitalism.
Author: Seung Yeon Jeong
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Cristian Emerson Melo Sanchez
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Electronic dissertations
Languages : en
Pages : 228
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This thesis belongs to the growing field of economic networks. In particular, we develop three essays in which we study the problem of bargaining, discrete choice representation, and pricing in the context of networked markets. Despite analyzing very different problems, the three essays share the common feature of making use of a network representation to describe the market of interest. In Chapter 1 we present an analysis of bargaining in networked markets. We make two contributions. First, we characterize market equilibria in a bargaining model, and find that players' equilibrium payoffs coincide with their degree of centrality in the network, as measured by Bonacich's centrality measure. This characterization allows us to map, in a simple way, network structures into market equilibrium outcomes, so that payoffs dispersion in networked markets is driven by players' network positions. Second, we show that the market equilibrium for our model converges to the so called eigenvector centrality measure. We show that the economic condition for reaching convergence is that the players' discount factor goes to one. In particular, we show how the discount factor, the matching technology, and the network structure interact in a very particular way in order to see the eigenvector centrality as the limiting case of our market equilibrium. We point out that the eigenvector approach is a way of finding the most central or relevant players in terms of the "global" structure of the network, and to pay less attention to patterns that are more "local". Mathematically, the eigenvector centrality captures the relevance of players in the bargaining process, using the eigenvector associated to the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of a given network. Thus our result may be viewed as an economic justification of the eigenvector approach in the context of bargaining in networked markets. As an application, we analyze the special case of seller-buyer networks, showing how our framework may be useful for analyzing price dispersion as a function of sellers and buyers' network positions. Finally, in Chapter 3 we study the problem of price competition and free entry in networked markets subject to congestion effects. In many environments, such as communication networks in which network flows are allocated, or transportation networks in which traffic is directed through the underlying road architecture, congestion plays an important role. In particular, we consider a network with multiple origins and a common destination node, where each link is owned by a firm that sets prices in order to maximize profits, whereas users want to minimize the total cost they face, which is given by the congestion cost plus the prices set by firms. In this environment, we introduce the notion of Markovian traffic equilibrium to establish the existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy price equilibrium, without assuming that the demand functions are concave nor imposing particular functional forms for the latency functions. We derive explicit conditions to guarantee existence and uniqueness of equilibria. Given this existence and uniqueness result, we apply our framework to study entry decisions and welfare, and establish that in congested markets with free entry, the number of firms exceeds the social optimum.
