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Author: Yanning Zhang
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Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Yanning Zhang
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Languages : en
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Author: Abdullah Abdulrahim A Almeer
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Languages : en
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Author: Mustafa Oguz Afacan
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Languages : en
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This dissertation consists of four essays on matching theory. The first two essays, which are presented in Chapters 2 & 3, investigate two different manipulation channels in school choice problems. The last two essays, which are presented in Chapters 5 & 6, employ the hospital-intern matching market model. While I introduce and investigate a new manipulation tool in Chapter 5, the last essay studies the welfare effects of pre-arrangements.
Author: Ayse Yazici
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Category : Matching theory
Languages : en
Pages : 112
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"In two-sided matching problems, there are two disjoint sets of agents, for instance, firms and workers, hospitals and interns. Each agent has a preference order over agents on the other side. An outcome of the problem is a match. Stability has been considered to be the main property that accounts for the success of many matching processes. It is a robustness property: no coalition has a good reason to disrupt the suggested match. A well-studied question is to what extent it is reasonable for agents to be truthful about their preferences. Agents may have an incentive to misrepresent their preferences. Therefore, procedures that produce stable matches with respect to the announced preferences may not produce stable matches with respect to the true preferences. Then, a natural question to ask is: What are Nash equilibria? A significant portion of this volume is devoted to full-fledged game theoretic analysis in one-to-one, many-to-one and many-to-many matching problems. In the first chapter, we study the problem of allocating indivisible goods to agents when monetary transfers are not allowed. Our main requirement is strategy-proofness. Our second goal is fairness. Fairness is incompatible with efficiency. We consider two instances of this problem: (1) the supply of each object is one; and (2) the supply of each object may be greater than one. For each instance, we identify a fair and strategy-proof rule that Pareto dominates any other rule satisfying the two properties. In the second chapter, we consider many-to-one and many-to-many matching problems where each agent has substitutable and separable preferences. We analyze the stochastic dominance (sd) Nash equilibria of the game induced by any vii probabilistic stable matching rule. In the third chapter, we model decentralized matching as a sequential game in which firms sequentially make job offers to workers. The complex and uncertain aspects of decentralized processes are represented by a randomly selected order according to which firms make offers. We study the sd-Nash and realization independent equilibria of the Decentralized Game we define. In the fourth chapter, we show that the so-called 'rural hospital theorem' generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We also show that this domain of preferences is maximal"--Page vi-vii.
Author: Terence Robert Johnson
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Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Siqi Pan
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Category : Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 112
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This dissertation focuses on the design and implementation of matching markets where transfers are not available, such as college admissions, school choice, and certain labor markets. The results contribute to the literature from both a theoretical and a behavioral perspective, and may have policy implications for the design of some real-life matching markets. Chapter 1, “Exploding Offers and Unraveling in Two-Sided Matching Markets,” studies the unraveling problem prevalent in many two-sided matching markets that occurs when transactions become inefficiently early. In a two-period decentralized model, I examine whether the use of exploding offers can affect agents' early moving incentives. The results show that when the culture of the market allows firms to make exploding offers, unraveling is more likely to occur, leading to a less socially desirable matching outcome. A market with an excess supply of labor is less vulnerable to the presence of exploding offers; yet the conclusion is ambiguous for a market with a greater degree of uncertainty in early stages, which depends on the specific information structure. While a policy banning exploding offers tends to be supported by high quality firms and workers, it can be opposed by those of lower quality. This explains the prevalence of exploding offers in practice. Chapter 2, “Constrained School Choice and Information Acquisition,” investigates a common practice of many school choice programs in the field, where the length of students' submitted preference lists are constrained. In an environment where students have incomplete information about others’ preferences, I theoretically study the effect of such a constraint under both a Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA) and a Boston mechanism (BOS). The result shows that ex-ante stability can only be ensured under an unconstrained DA, but not under a constrained DA, an unconstrained BOS, or a constrained BOS. In a lab experiment, I find that the constraint also affects students’ information acquisition behavior. Specifically, when faced with a constraint, students tend to acquire less wasteful information and distribute more efforts to acquire relevant information under DA; such an effect is not significant under BOS. Overall, the constraint has a negative effect on efficiency and stability under both mechanisms. Chapter 3, “Targeted Advertising on Competing Platforms,” is jointly written with Huanxing Yang. We investigate targeted advertising in two-sided markets. Each of the two competing platforms has single-homing consumers on one side and multi-homing advertising firms on the other. We focus on how asymmetry in platforms’ targeting abilities translates into asymmetric equilibrium outcomes, and how changes in targeting ability affect the price and volume of ads, consumer welfare, and advertising firms' profits. We also compare social incentives and equilibrium incentives in investing in targeting ability. Chapter 4, “The Instability of Matching with Overconfident Agents: Laboratory and Field Investigations,” focuses on centralized college admissions markets where students are evaluated and allocated based on their performance on a standardized exam. A single exam’s measurement error causes the exam-based priorities to deviate from colleges' aptitude-based preferences: a student who underperforms in one exam may lose her placement at a preferred college to someone with a lower aptitude. The previous literature proposes a solution of combining a Boston algorithm with pre-exam preference submission. Under the assumption that students have perfect knowledge of their relative aptitudes before taking the exam, the suggested mechanism intends to trigger a self-sorting process, with students of higher (lower) aptitudes targeting more (less) preferred colleges. However, in a laboratory experiment, I find that such a self-sorting process is skewed by overconfidence, which leads to a welfare loss larger than the purported benefits. Moreover, the mechanism introduces unfairness by rewarding overconfidence and punishing underconfidence, thus serving as a gender penalty for women. I also analyze field data from Chinese high schools; the results suggest similar conclusions as in the lab.
Author: Ashutosh Dinesh Thakur
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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In this dissertation I use tools from market design and matching theory to study institutional design in political economy and development. How are personnel allocated within a public organization? What is the intended distribution of talent across institutions and are organizational procedures successful in attaining their stated goals? Who can exert influence in personnel allocation processes and what is the impact of these organizational choices on outcomes? How does an institution evolve? How should these systems be designed? My research tries to address such institutional questions at the heart of public administration and political economy. Matching theory in political economy is an unexplored space. In political economy, we often think of underlying voting processes determining allocations or outcomes. However, there are also many assignment problems where there is no voting, or where the voting process is embedded within a larger allocation procedure. At the heart of such assignment procedures is a matching mechanism. It takes as input, people's preferences of where they want to be assigned, incorporates priorities and other constraints to be instituted, and returns the set of assignments. I use and develop tools of matching theory in these instances to better understand the assignment problems (empirically and theoretically) and to design better mechanisms (an engineering perspective). I explore two new substantive applications in matching theory: mechanisms allocating elite civil servants to states in India (Chapter 1) and party-specific mechanisms for assigning politicians to committees in the US Senate (Chapter 2). These political economy applications share a unique feature that is new to the theoretical matching literature. Namely, the very people who are allocated by the matching mechanism choose, or agree upon, the choice of the matching mechanism. Chapter 3 studies the matching mechanism as an endogenously chosen institution and introduces the novel concept of majority stability. Collectively, my dissertation highlights two important themes at the intersection of matching theory and political economy: i) correlated preferences as a source of institutional imbalance and ii) the perspective of a matching mechanism being an endogenous institutional choice.
Author: Ngoc Ha Dao
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 109
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Author: Kim-Sau Chung
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 286
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Author: Frédéric Payot
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Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 95
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