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Author: Marcelo Rezende
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business information services
Languages : en
Pages : 384
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Author: Marcelo Rezende
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business information services
Languages : en
Pages : 384
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Author: Salvatore Piccolo
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 225
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In my dissertation, I study equilibrium and optimal contracting between parties in relationships with asymmetric information. The welfare and private properties of incomplete contracting are analyzed both in imperfectly and perfectly competitive markets. The first essay analyzes the welfare effects of incomplete contracting in a principal-agent set-up. I study Resale Price Maintenance, a complete contract, and quantity fixing, an incomplete one, in a successive monopolies framework with information asymmetries. Both contracts entail a double marginalization driven by information rents distributed to the retailer. When firms behave non-cooperatively, the principal imposes retail price restrictions, and the impact of complete contracting on consumers' surplus is ambiguous. When, firms maximize ex ante joint profits, policy recommendations are unambiguous: if the preferred contracting mode from an ex ante viewpoint entails retail price restrictions, it also raises consumers' surplus, thereby producing a Pareto improvement relative to incomplete contracts. The second essay examines the welfare effects of contracting incompleteness when agents' preferences and productivity depend on their health status, and occupational choices affect individual health distributions. Efficiency requires agents of the same type to obtain different expected utilities if assigned to different occupations. Workers with riskier jobs get higher (lower) expected utilities if health affects production (consumption) capabilities. Competitive equilibria are first-best if complete contracts are enforceable, but typically not if only incomplete ones are traded. Compensating wage differentials are incompatible with ex-ante efficiency. The third essay provides a rationale for contracting incompleteness in a competing organizations set-up. I show that principals dealing with competing agents may leave contracts silent on some verifiable performance measures when certain aspects of agents' activity are noncontractible. Two effects are at play once one moves from a complete to an incomplete contract. First, reducing the number of screening instruments has a detrimental effect on principals' profits as it makes information revelation more costly. Second, it may create strategic value by forcing competing organizations to behave in a more friendly manner at the competitive stage.
Author: Hsiu-Chuan Yeh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 330
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Author: Christian Decker
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Pinaki Sankar Bose
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Industrial organization (Economic theory)
Languages : en
Pages : 196
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Author: George J. Stigler
Publisher: University of Chicago Press
ISBN: 0226774325
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 336
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Book Description
The Organization of Industry collects essays written over two decades—pieces prepared especially for this volume, previously unpublished material, and reprinted articles drawn from numerous sources, many which include additional commentary by the author. The essays are unified by George J. Stigler's careful analysis and by his clear and witty style. In part one, Stigler examines the nature of competition and monopoly. In part two he discusses the forces that determine the size structure of industry, including barriers to entry, economics of scale, and mergers. Part three contains articles on a wide range of topics, such as profitability, delivered price systems, block booking, the economics of information, and the kinky oligopoly demand curve and rigid price. Part four offers a discussion of antitrust policy and includes Stigler's recommendations for future policy as well as an examination of the effects of past policies. "Stigler's writings might well be subtitled 'The Joys of Doing Economics.' He, more than any other contemporary American economist, dispels the gloom surrounding economic theory. It is impossible to confront the subject treated with such humor and verve and come away still believing that economics is the dismal science."—Shirley B. Johnson, American Scholar
Author: Dennis C. Mueller
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461555590
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 397
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Book Description
Competition, Efficiency and Welfare contains a collection of papers in honor of Manfred Neumann. This collection was prepared as a tribute to a teacher and scholar, whose accomplishments have enriched various fields of economics. The magnitude of his interests is reflected in the breadth of topics covered in this volume: industrial economics, competition policy and related topics. However, if one unifying principle runs through Manfred Neumann's work, it is the belief in the power of competition. Born on May 16, 1933, Manfred Neumann studied economics at the University of Cologne. He graduated in 1960. In 1969 Manfred Neumann was appointed Professor of Economics at Nürnberg University. He was Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences of the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, President of the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics (EARIE) and Chairman of Industrial Organization Study Group of the Verein für Sozialpolitik. Most of his professional career has been spent at Nürnberg, where he has helped to make the Economic Institute one of the leading research centers in Industrial Organization. He has also been involved in various advisory activities. The volume contains 18 essays. The first twelve are grouped into four categories: Innovation and R&D (Part I), Cartels (Part II), Mergers and Merger Policy (Part III), and Methodological Issues in Industrial Organization (Part IV). These papers fall within the bounds of industrial economics, which has been Manfred Neumann's primary research interest throughout his career. Part V includes two papers on theories of international trade, which has been a recurring topic of interest for Manfred Neumann through the years. The last three papers look at broader policy and macroeconomic issues. Contributors to this volume include Karl Aiginger, David B. Audretsch, Paul A. Geroski, Stephen Martin and Dennis Mueller.
Author: Milena Petrova
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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In the past couple of decades, digitization has affected the strategy of economic players and the structure of markets across the board by lowering the cost of storing, sharing and analyzing data. This has given rise to a new field of economics, the economics of digitization, which touches upon the fields of industrial organization, market design, information economics, and labor economics. For industrial economists, these new questions and challenges coupled with new types of data, have led to vigorous research on the topics of reputation, search, rankings, matching, and online auctions. Following this line of research, the first two of the chapters in my thesis are on the topics information frictions and reputation systems in online service markets, and the third chapter proposes a novel methodology for modeling transaction prices motivated by competition on online distribution channels.
Author: Samuel Isaac Grondahl
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 200
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This thesis is a collection of three chapters that investigate burgeoning empirical issues in industrial organization. In the first chapter, I study platform fee policy with a specific focus on two-sided online marketplaces. The main contributions of the paper are threefold. First, I study a setting with coordinated price experimentation along the three different fee dimensions that are common to such marketplaces. Second, I describe the empirical impact of incomplete fee salience on equilibrium outcomes. Finally, I quantify the network externalities that must be present in order for observed fees to constitute an equilibrium. In the paper, I begin by developing a tractable model of the platform’s problem that generates testable predictions and yields equilibrium conditions in terms of estimable quantities. Then, using estimates from experimental data obtained from a large online marketplace, I quantify the salience and network effects. To conclude, I consider the counterfactual level and composition of equilibrium platform fees under when these effects are muted or absent. In the second chapter, using data from the same source as in chapter one, I study small sellers competing on the supply side of online marketplaces. As these platforms grow and markets become increasingly disintermediated, an important concern is whether small sellers, who may have limited experience or attention, can individually compete effectively with larger, often professional sellers operating on the same marketplaces. To answer this question, I develop and estimate a structural model that incorporates essential features of the empirical setting, including large and rapidly changing choice sets and buyer heterogeneity. Using the estimated model, I compute optimal pricing policies under various informational and computational restrictions. I find that small sellers adhering to a simple strategy can obtain nearly optimal expected revenue and that this strategy’s information requirements are easily satisfied in the online setting. Additionally, I present suggestive evidence that sellers learn to approximate such a strategy through repeated market interactions. In the third and final chapter, I investigate the industrial impacts of firm control rights, which confer discretion over firm policy and are usually shared between debt and equity holders. Control rights operate along a continuum and are difficult to measure. As a proxy, I consider the discontinuous shift in control from equity holders to creditors due to loan covenant violations, a common form of technical default. This paper contributes to the growing covenants literature in two ways. First, I consider the impact of and response to covenant violations at the industry level, inclusive of firms never in technical default. Second, I empirically document the effects of violations on contemporary product markets. I find that control rights transfers to creditors make firms tough in product markets, consistent with the predictions of a stylized model, and that markups decline at the industry level, though the declines are sharpest for firms directly affected.
Author: Hongkai Zhang (Ph. D.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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This thesis consists of three chapters on information transmission and utilization in marketplaces and their implications on firm competition and quality discovery. The first chapter analyzes the dynamic effect of sponsored search advertising on quality discovery on the Taobao.com retail platform. In a stylized model, a new product's boosted exposure from sponsored search ads could help the platform to infer how well the product converts exposure to sales (the quality measure) and award top organic search ranks accordingly. Hence, sellers with higher private quality signals would bid more aggressively for sponsored ads, which accelerates the platform's discovery of these high-quality products. An empirical analysis echoes the stylized model and reveal a synergy between the platform's PC and mobile interfaces. The second chapter (co-authored with Sara Fisher Ellison and Christopher M Snyder) studies price dynamics for computer components sold on a price-comparison website. We estimate a dynamic model of competition, backing out structural estimates of managerial frictions. The estimated frictions are substantial, concentrated in the act of monitoring market conditions rather than entering a new price. Coupled with supporting reduced-form statistical evidence, our analysis provides a window into the process of managerial price setting and the microfoundation of pricing inertia, issues of growing interest in industrial organization and macroeconomics. The third chapter analyzes the revelation of hard information in a buyer-seller relationship. The seller can choose whether and when to credibly reveal quality information and some buyers, called prosumers, have greater taste for quality than others. This paper first analyzes an alternating bargaining game allowing endogenous delay between communications in the fashion of Admati and Perry(1987), and constructs an equilibrium with delayed revelation of quality. The paper then analyzes an informed principal problem and found that under certain conditions, both seller types choose the same truth-telling mechanism that maximizes the revenue of the seller type with high quality. In both games, a high quality seller hides his quality information before the buyer acts in order to extract surplus from prosumers.
