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Author: Arturo Bris
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Arturo Bris
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Author: Erik Berglöf
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 228
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Author: Justine Chinoperekweyi, Ph.D.
Publisher: Notion Press
ISBN: 1644291479
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 159
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Book Description
This thesis is the product of my PhD studies at the Department of International Economics and Management at Copenhagen Business School and consists of four essays - one literature review and three empirical studies - on different aspects of the corporate governance of banks. The four essays are self-contained and can be read independently.
Author: Yurtsev Uymaz
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Business
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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This thesis comprises four papers that examine the effect of information advantage ofbank executives and CEOs on bank risk taking and performance and also investigate toreveal which CEO power variables, which denote information advantage to the CEO,influence the likelihood of bank fraud and the likelihood of detecting fraud.Paper 1 provides a theoretical, regulatory, structural, and historical analysis of US banks.The regulatory environment of banks has been changed dramatically as well as thestructure of banks in the last three decades. Banks' financial intermediation role andopaqueness that comes from greater risk-taking make them special in corporategovernance applications. It is known that regulations have the direct effect on bankcorporate governance with the hands of regulators.Paper 2 examines whether information advantage of the CEO can influence bank risk toadd empirical evidence to hypothesised relationship from the perspective of the CEOpower. CEO tenure and CEO network size that denote the sources of informationadvantage are used as the CEO power variables. The effect of CEO power on threemeasures of bank risk is assessed: Z-score, systematic risk, and systemic risk. Resultsfrom fixed effects and generalised method-of-moments (GMM) dynamic panel dataestimations reveal that banks are more likely to take on more risks when CEO's have arelatively long tenure and large network. The results of the robustness tests provide thesame connection between CEO power and bank risk.Paper 3 explores whether institutional investors in publicly listed US banks can influencebank ownership structure and performance through a prior connection to newly appointedsenior executives of the bank by employing a unique dataset. The impact of theconnection on three measures of bank performance is assessed: non-interest income tototal assets ratio, market beta, and Tobin's Q. Institutional investors increase theirshareholding in banks after the appointment of a connected executive. Results ofregressions reveal that the presence of connected executives is positively and significantlyassociated with developments in market beta and non-interest income, and negatively andsignificantly related to developments in Tobin's Q. The results as consistent withinstitutional investors with prior connections to bank executives having a significantinformation advantage relative to other shareholders in the bank on its likely futureperformance.Finally, paper 4 contributes the corporate governance literature that has little to say aboutthe likelihood of banks engaging in financial fraud. The commission of financial fraud bybanks as partly reflecting that bank's culture, which is driven in large part by the bank'ssenior executives, especially the CEO. A unique dataset on financial fraud in publiclylistedUS banks is employed to test for a link between fraud and CEO power that createsinformation advantage. The results from probit and partially-observed bivariate probitestimations suggest that banks are more likely to commit fraud and more likely to bedetected by regulators if they have powerful CEOs measured by length of CEO tenure,Chair/CEO duality, size of CEO's network, and if the CEO is also a part-owner of thebank. Fraud also appears more likely to be committed by large banks with relatively poorbalance sheets, raising the prospect that fraud (and powerful CEOs) can have adversesystemic consequences.
Author: Gerald A. Epstein
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN: 1783472642
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 391
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Book Description
The many forces that led to the economic crisis of 2008 were in fact identified, analyzed and warned against for many years before the crisis by economist Jane D�Arista, among others. Now, writing in the tradition of D�Arista's extensive work, the
Author: Jing Zhang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
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Book Description
"This dissertation consists of two essays that address important questions related to corporate governance and financial reporting in the banking industry. The first essay investigates why and how bank-level shareholder rights affect the quality of loans originated for securitization. Poor loan securitization has been blamed for the financial crisis. But why so many risky loans were originated for securitization remains an unsettled question. In this study, I attempt to address this question from a corporate governance angle. Focusing on a sample of securitization activities that involve less risk transfer, I find that banks with strong shareholder rights originate poor quality loans to securitize and experience large nonperforming and charge-off in securitized loans. This association is more pronounced in banks that have large and non-management shareholders. In addition, the negative impact of shareholder rights on the quality of securitized loans is also found to be more strengthened in banks that have larger information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Lastly, banks with the highest shareholder rights pre-crisis are found to suffer the largest losses in securitized loans during the financial crisis. Overall, the evidence supports the view that stronger shareholder rights that impose intense pressure on managers encourage the origination and securitization of riskier loans. Hence, the failure of securitization is likely due to a failure of banks' internal governance, and there could be a potential negative consequence of having powerful shareholders in banks. These findings should provide insights into the ongoing regulatory reform with regard to rebuilding corporate governance mechanisms for financial institutions.The second essay investigates the characteristics of banks that are likely to misstate their financial statements. There has been an extensive amount of research studying the determinants of financial misreporting in the non-financial industry. However, very little work has been done as to what causes financial institutions to manage their earnings, and how we can best detect accounting misstatements in banks. The objective of this paper is to analyze the characteristics of misstating banks and develop a model to predict misstatements in the banking industry. Using a sample of 247 banks that had accounting restatements, I find that banks with financial misstatements have larger abnormal loan loss provisions, abnormal securitization income, and are more likely to engage in securitization business. I also find that managers are more likely to conduct accounting manipulations when there is underperformance, a demand to raise external financing, or a high leverage ratio. Furthermore, banks involved in more complicated business are found to face a higher likelihood of having misstatements. Together, my evidence suggests that bank managers use the discretions in loan loss provisions and securitization accounting estimates to manage financial numbers, and the key motivating factors for accounting manipulations are deteriorating performance and capital market pressure. Finally, a scaled logistic probability (B-score) is derived from the prediction model, which can be used to help investors, auditors or regulators to identify accounting misstatements in the banking industry." --
Author: C.J.M Kool
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 1461312639
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 252
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Book Description
Essays on Money, Banking and Regulation honors the interests and achievements of the Dutch economist Conrad Oort. The book is divided into four parts. Part 1 - Fiscal and monetary policy - reviews a variety of topics ranging from the measurement of money to the control and management of government expenditures. Part 2 - International institutions and international economic policy - looks at the international dimension of monetary and fiscal policy, with extensive discussion of the International Monetary Fund and the European Monetary Union. Part 3 - The future of international banking and the financial sector in the Netherlands - is an insider's view of the strategic choices facing financial institutions in the near future. Finally, Part 4 - Taxation and reforms in the Dutch tax system - is closest to Oort's research and practice since he has become known as an architect of the 1990 Dutch tax reform; this part is dedicated in particular to the tax reforms suggested by Oort.
Author: Ross Levine
Publisher: World Bank Publications
ISBN:
Category : Banks and banking
Languages : en
Pages : 20
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Book Description
"Levine examines the corporate governance of banks. When banks efficiently mobilize and allocate funds, this lowers the cost of capital to firms, boosts capital formation, and stimulates productivity growth. So, weak governance of banks reverberates throughout the economy with negative ramifications for economic development. After reviewing the major governance concepts for corporations in general, the author discusses two special attributes of banks that make them special in practice: greater opaqueness than other industries and greater government regulation. These attributes weaken many traditional governance mechanisms. Next, he reviews emerging evidence on which government policies enhance the governance of banks and draws tentative policy lessons. In sum, existing work suggests that it is important to strengthen the ability and incentives of private investors to exert governance over banks rather than to rely excessively on government regulators. These conclusions, however, are particularly tentative because more research is needed on how legal, regulatory, and supervisory policies influence the governance of banks. This papera product of the Global Corporate Governance Forum, Corporate Governance Departmentis part of a larger effort in the department to improve the understanding of corporate governance reform in developing countries"-- World Bank web site.
Author: Hwa-Jin Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 20
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Book Description
This Essay discusses and analyzes the role of financial regulation and the state's interference through financial supervision with corporate governance of banks from economic and political perspectives. It suggests that the limits of corporate law and financial regulation cause the state to use financial supervision as the effective tool for such interference. This Essay also argues that the stakeholder model cannot legitimize the state's intrusion into the corporate governance of private banks through such non-legal measures as financial supervision. It looks into the alternative mechanisms in corporate law and financial regulation for the enhancement of corporate governance of banks from a comparative perspective.
Author: Joachim Schwalbach
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 3642594999
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 218
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Book Description
Corporate Governance is a subject of great interest to academics, investors, and politicians throughout the world. Corporate governance is associated with the way firms are managed and controlled. Countries have adopted different governance systems to resolve the corporate governance issues. Anglo-Saxon systems differ from European and Japanese systems, and Eastern Europe and China, for instance, experiment with the way private organizations should be governed. Despite the great interest and intense debate, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of various governance systems is still sparse. This book brings together most current contributions from various perspectives and from an international angle. The book is an essential reading for academics, university students, practitioners, investors, politicians, and legislators.
