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Author: Baogui Wang
Publisher: National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
ISBN:
Category : Contracts, Agricultural
Languages : en
Pages : 106
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Book Description
Author: Baogui Wang
Publisher: National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada
ISBN:
Category : Contracts, Agricultural
Languages : en
Pages : 106
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Book Description
Author: Tai-Yeong Chung
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 232
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Book Description
Author: Kristina L. Buzard
Publisher:
ISBN: 9781267418838
Category : Commercial policy
Languages : en
Pages : 106
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Book Description
The first chapter of the dissertation addresses general issues in contracting with external enforcement. We study a contracting environment with specific investments in which renegotiation, and therefore hold-up, is possible. We show that taking account of the precise nature of trading and investment technologies is important for accurately determining the trading relationships in which efficient investment and trade will occur and that careful modeling of institutional detail and the information available to private parties and the external enforcement body (e.g. a court) are key. The second chapter presents a model of international trade agreements in which domestic policy-making power is shared between executive and legislative branches of government. Acknowledging the complexity of the legislative process as well as its susceptibility to lobbying reveals a political commitment role for trade agreements in that executives can use them to reduce incentives for lobbying so that the legislatures can better withstand political pressure. This helps explain the result from tests of the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model that there is too much protection relative to contributions given estimates of governments' social-welfare weights : I predict that contribution levels may in fact be low because tariffs have been raised to prevent political pressure and the increased risk of a trade disruption it engenders. The third chapter extends this model to a repeated-game framework, replacing the assumption of external enforcement with self-enforcing promises of future cooperation. Here, the inability of actors to make commitments affects the design of trade agreements in two ways: executives must not only take into account the legislatures' lobbying-driven propensity to revoke delegation and break the agreement, but also be robust to the executives' own incentives to renegotiate out of any punishment scheme. The design of the dispute resolution mechanism that makes the optimal punishment incentive compatible must balance two, often-conflicting, objectives: longer punishment periods help to enforce cooperation by increasing the costs of defecting from the agreement, but because the lobbies prefer the punishment outcome, this also incentivizes lobbying effort and with it the political pressure to break the agreement. Thus the model generates new predictions for the optimal design of mechanisms for resolving the disputes that arise in the course of trade-agreement relationships.
Author: David Campbell
Publisher: Springer
ISBN: 1137269278
Category : Law
Languages : en
Pages : 258
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Book Description
Changing Concepts of Contract is a prestigious collection of essays that re-examines the remarkable contributions of Ian Macneil to the study of contract law and contracting behaviour. Ian Macneil, who taught at Cornell University, the University of Virginia and, latterly, at Northwestern University, was the principal architect of relational contract theory, an approach that sought to direct attention to the context in which contracts are made. In this collection, nine leading UK contract law scholars re-consider Macneil's work and examine his theories in light of new social and technological circumstances. In doing so, they reveal relational contract theory to be a pertinent and insightful framework for the study and practice of the subject, one that presents a powerful challenge to the limits of orthodox contract law scholarship. In tandem with his academic life, Ian Macneil was also the 46th Chief of the Clan Macneil. Included in this volume is a Preface by his son Rory Macneil, the 47th Chief, who reflects on the influences on his father's thinking of those experiences outside academia. The collection also includes a Foreword by Stewart Macaulay, Malcolm Pitman Sharp Hilldale Professor Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and an Introduction by Jay M Feinman, Distinguished Professor of Law at Rutgers School of Law.
Author: Susanne Ohlendorf
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 111
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Book Description
Author: Ilya R. Segal
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 216
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Book Description
Author: Hojin Jung
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Government auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 218
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Book Description
Author: P. S. Atiyah
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 396
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Book Description
Author: Paul D. Finn
Publisher: Lawbook Company
ISBN: 9780455207551
Category : Contracts
Languages : en
Pages : 261
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Book Description
Author: Jean Beuve
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 0
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Book Description
This Ph.D. dissertation seeks to investigate the existing links between cooperative behavior and formal contracts. First, because formal agreements are supposed to facilitate smooth collaboration and avoid costly misunderstandings, we are interested in how formal contracts impact on the ability of parties to cooperate. Following the same intuition, we also analyze cooperation through the lens of renegotiations in order to investigate how contracts adapt themselves through time in a changing environment. Second, we also study the impact of the existence of informal dealings, alternatively considered in previous literature as substitute or complement to formal contracting. More precisely, we aim to investigate how the existence of relational mechanisms may impact on contractual choices. Our goal is thus to improve the understandings of the role played by formal contract and informal cooperation in relationships and to enrich the theory of the determinants of incomplete contract. Our results suggest that the role of formal contract in relationships strongly depends on the context and the identity of parties. Our results also identify the ability of the parties to sustain a relational agreement as a new source of endogenous contractual incompleteness. Finally, we also find that adaptations through contractual renegotiations are not necessarily harmful for the contracting parties. We believe that this Ph.D. dissertation contributes to the literature on the debate of complementarity and/or the substitutability of formal and informal governance and to the literature on the link between relational contract and endogenous contractual completeness. In the end, the overall implication is the necessity for parties to carefully think about the initial contract they draft. Because it has an impact on their ability to cooperate ex post and also because contracts can be over-complete compared to the efficient (i.e. socially optimal) level of completeness.
