Essays in the Empirical Analysis of Auction Markets PDF Download
Are you looking for read ebook online? Search for your book and save it on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets. Download Essays in the Empirical Analysis of Auction Markets PDF full book. Access full book title Essays in the Empirical Analysis of Auction Markets by Ali Hortaçsu. Download full books in PDF and EPUB format.
Author: Ali Hortaçsu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 390
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Ali Hortaçsu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 390
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Bjarne Brendstrup
Publisher:
ISBN: 9788790117276
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Matthew Loren Gentry
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 123
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Bin Yu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 144
Get Book Here
Book Description
This dissertation addresses the empirical analysis of procurements based on the auction theory, which is known as the structural-form analysis of procurement auctions.
Author: Shumpei Goke
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
In this dissertation, I investigate various aspects of auction design problems. In Chapter 1, I study secret reserve prices in auctions that are partially binding in the sense that the sellers can accept bids below them. Such a reserve price has a bite only when the winning bid exceeds it, in which case the winning bid is accepted without seller's action. This work investigates the motivation for this puzzling practice that many real-world auctions take, such as wholesale used-car auctions. I estimate a structural model of ascending auctions using the auction data in the wholesale used-car market. To microfound seller's decision of the secret reserve price, I posit that the seller has uncertainty as to the value of the item when she sets the reserve price and that this uncertainty is resolved after she observes the auction price. I compare the status quo with two counterfactual auction formats: (i) no reserve prices and the seller gets to accept or reject every winning bid, and (ii) the seller commits to the secret reserve price. I observe very little difference among them in terms of probability of trade, seller's payoff and revenue. I discuss how the current format may be rationalized as reducing transaction costs for asking sellers' confirmation of all winning bids and avoiding sellers' cognitive cost of committing to a reserve price. The work in Chapter 2 is a joint work with Gabriel Y. Weintraub, Ralph A. Mastromonaco, and Samuel S. Seljan. Weintraub and I formulated the research questions and laid out steps for the research project in close collaboration, and I performed all the data analysis with the advice from Weintraub. Mastromonaco and Seljan provided Weintraub and me with the dataset and the necessary domain knowledge. In this work, we study actual bidding behavior when a new auction format gets introduced into the marketplace. More specifically, we investigate this question using a novel dataset on internet display advertising auctions and exploiting a staggered adoption by different publishers (sellers) of first-price auctions (FPAs), instead of the traditional second-price auctions (SPAs). Event study regression estimates indicate that, immediately after the auction format change, the revenue per sold impression (price) jumped considerably for the treated publishers relative to the control publishers, ranging from 35% to 75% of the pre-treatment price level of the treatment group. Further, we observe that in later auction format changes the increase in the price levels under FPAs relative to price levels under SPAs dissipates over time, reminiscent of the celebrated revenue equivalence theorem. We take this as evidence of initially insufficient bid shading after the format change rather than an immediate shift to a new Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Prices then went down as bidders learned to shade their bids. We also show that bidders' sophistication impacted their response to the auction format change. Our work constitutes one of the first field studies on bidders' responses to auction format changes, providing an important complement to theoretical model predictions. As such, it provides valuable information to auction designers when considering the implementation of different formats. In Chapter 3, I study the efficient design of mortgage foreclosure auctions. Lenders with delinquent mortgages recover their lending by foreclosure, which is a legal process to sell the mortgage property via public auction. In the U.S., mortgage lenders are allowed to bid in such foreclosure auctions, and they win in such auctions very frequently. I study the question of why mortgage lenders win in most of those auctions. I develop a theoretical model of ascending auctions with private values. I find that the lender's optimal bidding strategy is the same as the optimal reserve price of an auction seller, if it is below the debt balance. In other words, the lender exercises monopoly power as would an auction seller, up to the remaining debt. This increases the probability that the lender wins the auction, as third-party bidders' optimal strategy is to drop out of the auction when the price reaches their respective valuations of the mortgage property. The monopoly power that the mortgage confers to the lender also implies that the resulting allocation of the mortgage property may be inefficient. To resolve such inefficiency, I derive a mechanism that achieves efficient allocation of the foreclosed property.
Author: Timothy N. Cason
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Auctions
Languages : en
Pages : 54
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Thomas A. Martin (IV.)
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
A recent pursuit of the auction design literature has been the development of an auction mechanism which performs well in a multi-good setting, when the goods are not substitutes. This work began in earnest with the Federal Communications Commission spectrum license auctions in the early nineties and continues to this day. In a setting in which goods are not substitutes, the value of one good depends non-negatively on the quantities of other goods that are won. This type of interdependent value structure has proven difficult to account for in auction design. However, the need for mechanisms that account for such a value structure hinges on the magnitude of the interdependence, whose computation is an empirical exercise. I identify a setting in which to perform this computation. I develop an empirical methodology that allows me to recover bidders' value functions in a multi-good auction setting. This methodology allows me to assess the magnitude of any interdependence in the goods? value structure. Since the auction setting that I analyze is a variation of the standard uniform price auction, which has been adapted for a multi-good setting, I am able to measure the benefit of having a direct revelation mechanism. This counterfactual study is performed by maximizing the value of the auction using the recovered bidder value functions. I find evidence that there is an interdependent value structure in the setting. The counterfactual auction finds that the standard uniform price auction, adapted to a multi-good setting, performs poorly in the presence of such a value structure. The setting for this analysis is an auction for financial transmission rights held in Texas in 2002. The auction involved twenty two firms and collected almost $70 million in revenue. This research is the first to empirically assess efficiency in this type of auction setting.
Author: Marleen Renske Marra
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages :
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: Nicholas James Shunda
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 312
Get Book Here
Book Description
Author: PAULO BRAULIO DE SOUZA COUTINHO
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 148
Get Book Here
Book Description
The primary focus of this dissertation is to study the connections between the auction mechanism used to sell Treasuries securities and the secondary market activity, when auction participants can trade the auctioned securities among themselves. I use a game theoretically framework where participants understand the market rules and behave strategically so as to maximize their returns. The model is capable of explaining puzzling empirical patterns from the U.S. Treasury market and provides policy implications. In the third chapter of the dissertation I use tools developed by the auction theory to analyze corporate organizations capital structure decisions. For a firm's perspective, using debt to finance new investments could be cheaper than using equity. Nevertheless, a higher debt level increases the risks the investment will be liquidated before it yields the promised dividends. The chapter studies firms' optimal decisions when facing the trade-off between debt and equity and its implications on equilibrium prices and interest rates on the financial market.
