ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF U.S. PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY PDF Download
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Author: Rui Ju
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 118
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This dissertation consists of two topics. Chapter 1 examines the relationship between contingent commission use and underwriting performance as well as underwriting risk using data from 2005 to 2016. Top brokers were banned from receiving contingent commissions following the inquiry in 2004 led by Eliot Spitzer, former New York Attorney-General. But the ban raised concerns about whether it created a level playing field across the industry, as smaller brokers continued taking them. In addition, despite the possible conflicts of interest, contingent commissions have also been recognized as a way to better align agent and insurer incentives. Regulators agreed to relax the terms for the leading brokers in 2010, resulting in a less onerous compliance regime for contingent commission use. It is important to study the effectiveness of contingent commission use on improving underwriting performance. This study finds strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that contingent commissions' usage is associated with better underwriting performance as well as lower underwriting risk. This study also finds a curvilinear relationship between underwriting performance and the level of contingent commission use. Chapter 2 investigates the impact of executive overconfidence on capital structure decisions and reinsurance purchases using a sample of 37 publicly-traded property-liability insurance groups for the period 2002 to 2016. This study finds that insurance firms with overconfident executives have significantly higher leverage ratios than those without overconfident executives. This study also finds evidence that insurance firms with overconfident executives cede more reinsurance, and this evidence is stronger for insurers with more limited business capacity than those with ample business capacity. The results of this study also indicate that overconfident executives prefer internal reinsurance to external reinsurance. This research provides evidence that personality traits of executive impact capital structure decisions and reinsurance purchases for insurance firms, which should be of interest to policyholders and regulators.
Author: Rui Ju
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 118
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Book Description
This dissertation consists of two topics. Chapter 1 examines the relationship between contingent commission use and underwriting performance as well as underwriting risk using data from 2005 to 2016. Top brokers were banned from receiving contingent commissions following the inquiry in 2004 led by Eliot Spitzer, former New York Attorney-General. But the ban raised concerns about whether it created a level playing field across the industry, as smaller brokers continued taking them. In addition, despite the possible conflicts of interest, contingent commissions have also been recognized as a way to better align agent and insurer incentives. Regulators agreed to relax the terms for the leading brokers in 2010, resulting in a less onerous compliance regime for contingent commission use. It is important to study the effectiveness of contingent commission use on improving underwriting performance. This study finds strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that contingent commissions' usage is associated with better underwriting performance as well as lower underwriting risk. This study also finds a curvilinear relationship between underwriting performance and the level of contingent commission use. Chapter 2 investigates the impact of executive overconfidence on capital structure decisions and reinsurance purchases using a sample of 37 publicly-traded property-liability insurance groups for the period 2002 to 2016. This study finds that insurance firms with overconfident executives have significantly higher leverage ratios than those without overconfident executives. This study also finds evidence that insurance firms with overconfident executives cede more reinsurance, and this evidence is stronger for insurers with more limited business capacity than those with ample business capacity. The results of this study also indicate that overconfident executives prefer internal reinsurance to external reinsurance. This research provides evidence that personality traits of executive impact capital structure decisions and reinsurance purchases for insurance firms, which should be of interest to policyholders and regulators.
Author: Zhen Liu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 151
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Book Description
The first part of the dissertation investigates cost experience in the US life and health insurance industry over the period 1998-2012. We generally test the difference in expenses among different distribution systems, which mainly consists of independent agency, broker, career agency, exclusive agency, and direct writing. We check to see if cost, revenue and profit efficiency differences are associated with different distribution methods. Cost, revenue, and profit efficiencies are estimated by Data Envelopment Analysis. Unlike the results in the property and liability insurance industry, the cost difference is insignificant among distribution systems. Results on cost efficiency and revenue efficiency support the market imperfection hypothesis, which says that the market imperfections such as entry barriers, price regulation, or search costs cause the coexistence of different distribution systems. The second part of the dissertation examines the relationship between mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and underwriting cycles in the P-L insurance industry. In a soft market, capital is relatively high. This leads to an increase in the number of M&A transactions and the probability that managers conduct non-value-increasing M&As. We test this proposition by analyzing the associations between volumes of M&A deals, and returns associated with M&As and underwriting cycle. The results show that the numbers of M&As are negatively related with the premium rate changes and positively related with changes in the combined ratio. We also find that the cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement date of M&As are smaller for the shareholders of insurer acquirers in a soft market. Even more, we find that the market reaction of M&As is less sensitive to agency problems in a hard market than in a soft market.
Author: Shuang Yang
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 99
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This dissertation consists of two topics. Chapter 1 explores the relationship between U.S. Property-Casualty (P/C) insurers' underwriting risk, investment risk, and leverage risk, using data from 1998 to 2013. I test the trade-off hypothesis using a simultaneous equation model framework with partial adjustment effects. The three equations model intend to examine the interrelations between insurers' leverage and two measures of firm risks: underwriting risk and investment risk. The empirical evidence, various to different sample periods and model specifications, suggests there is no significant relationship existing between insurers' underwriting risk and investment risk. But these two types of risks are both significantly and negatively related to the leverage ratio. The overall results imply that insurers tend to tradeoff leverage risk and underwriting risk/investment risk, but it appears that they have not taken an integrated approach between the total level of underwriting risk and investment risk yet. The second part of this dissertation empirically investigates the impact of credit risk on insurers' reinsurance demand, using data on the U.S. P/C insurance industry from 2000 to 2014. I mainly explore how insurers' credit rating status and downgrade risk affects their reinsurance demand. Using a two-stage least square (2SLS) regression model, I find that low-rated insurers are associated with a higher utilization of reinsurance. In addition, insurers that are downgraded in the previous year tend to have a higher reinsurance demand than the others. Results also show that downgraded group-affiliated insurers tend to significantly increase their internal reinsurance demand from the group-affiliated members while decreasing the purchase of external reinsurance significantly. In general, I find that insurers' reinsurance demand is affected by their credit rating and downgrade risk.
Author: J. David Cummins
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
ISBN: 9400956584
Category : Business & Economics
Languages : en
Pages : 321
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Book Description
The Geneva Association and Risk Economics The Geneva Association The Geneva Association (International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics) commenced its activities in June 1973, on the initiative of twenty-two members in eight European countries. It now has fifty-four members in sixteen countries in Europe and in the United States. The members of the association are insurance companies which provide financial support for its activities. The aims and strategy of the Geneva Association were clearly defined in 1971 by the founding committee. They were set forth in the first report to the Assembly of Members in 1974: "To make an original contribution to the progress of insurance by objective studies on the interdependence between economics and insurance." In pursuit of this objective, the Association strives to place insurance problems in the context of the modern economy and to overcome the antagonism between different groups and institutions by showing that they all have a common interest in tackling the problem of risk in a changing world. In consequence, the studies made by the Association had to move away from the subjects familiar to insurance professionals and explore related fields, dealing with opinions and behavior falling outside the profession's vii FOREWORD viii traditional framework of analysis. It is in this direction that the Association's preoccupations have been directed from the beginning, towards areas in which insurance activities come into contact with those of other economic sectors such as government, banking, manufacturing, and households.
Author: Jiang Cheng
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Insurance
Languages : en
Pages : 336
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Author: Gregory P. Nini
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 183
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Author: Arthur D. Little, Inc
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Insurance
Languages : en
Pages : 50
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Author: Gyu Dong Kim
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 85
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The first part of the dissertation examines the effects of rate regulation, compulsory insurance laws, the wealth of individuals, premiums, and claim costs on insurance affordability and insurance purchase as measured by the ratio of uninsured and underinsured motorist claims frequencies to property damage liability claim frequencies in the US personal auto insurance industry. Because regulations which are intended to let high-risk drivers purchase insurance may discourage low-risk drivers from purchasing insurance, the effect of the regulations should be examined from the perspective of both high-risk and low-risk drivers. Literature using only uninsured motorist claim data finds that the effect of rate regulation, compulsory insurance laws, and residual market is significant on insurance affordability from the perspective of high-risk drivers. However, this study using both uninsured and underinsured motorist claim data demonstrates that the effect is weaker or not significant in increasing insurance purchase in general. The second part of the dissertation tests the sustainability of the Korean reverse mortgage program, reflecting the house price indices in different regions. Literature generally uses aggregate house price indices and consequently underestimates the risks that result from more volatile individual house prices than averaged house prices. This paper predicts house price indices by region and finds that the Korean reverse mortgage program would have losses at 25th percentile or 30th percentile, in contrast to the results of the simulation using the nationwide house price index, which show that the Korean reverse mortgage program is sustainable at 95% confidence level. This paper also concludes that longevity risk is not a big concern in the reverse mortgage program as long as interest rates are low and house prices are high. However, longevity risk inflates the effect of high interest rates and low house prices on the reverse mortgage program.
Author: Yingrui Lu
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category :
Languages : en
Pages : 137
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This dissertation includes two chapters. In Chapter 1, "Information Risk and the Cost of Equity Capital Revisited: Evidence from the U.S. Property-Casualty Insurance Industry", I revisit the relationship between information risk and the cost of equity capital in the U.S. property-casualty (P-C) insurance industry. Eckles, Halek and Zhang (2014) find that information risk has no effect on the cost of equity using a sample of U.S. P-C insurers. Following their approach, we decompose information risk into innate and discretionary components. I find that innate information risk affects the cost of equity capital through two opposing channels. On the one hand, innate information risk directly increases an insurer's cost of equity capital by increasing investors' assessment of the riskiness of the insurer's future cash flows. On the other hand, innate information risk indirectly decreases the insurer's cost of equity capital by changing its production so that the assessed riskiness of the firm's future cash flows are reduced. This (negative) indirect effect depends on factors that influence the insurer's underwriting decisions. My empirical results provide supporting evidence for a significant, positive direct effect of innate information risk, while the magnitude of the (negative) indirect effect increases with the insurer's proportion of long-tail business and decreases with its affiliated reinsurance usage. As to the impact of discretionary information risk, my results are mixed. I also find that, on average, the overall effect of information risk on the cost of equity capital for property-casualty insurers is significant and negative. In Chapter 2, "Coordination of Capital, Earnings, and Taxes in the U.S. Property-Casualty Insurance Industry", I investigate how property-casualty (P-C) insurers manage discretionary tools to achieve regulatory capital, earnings, and tax planning goals. I examine one accrual tool, loss reserve errors, together with two real transaction tools: realized capital gains (losses) from investment sales, and capital contributions. I find that when P-C insurers have lower pre-managed capital levels, managers will report income-increasing loss reserve errors, recognize more realized capital gains and receive more capital contributions. When P-C insurers have lower pre-managed earnings, managers will report income-increasing loss reserve errors. When P-C insurers have higher marginal tax rates, managers will report income-decreasing loss reserve errors and recognize more realized capital losses. Moreover, I analyze the effect of ownership structures on the degree of managerial discretion for various reporting goals. My analysis includes three different types of ownership structures: public, private stock and mutual firms. I find that, through the use of capital contributions, public firms are more aggressive in capital management, while mutual firms are less aggressive in capital management than private stock firms. In terms of using the other two tools, compared to private stock firms, public firms do not manage capital less aggressively; they do not manage earnings more aggressively; they do not manage taxes less aggressively. Compared to private stock firms, mutual firms are less aggressive in capital management; they are more aggressive in earnings management; they are less aggressive in tax management.
Author: Adel M. Rabh
Publisher:
ISBN:
Category : Insurance
Languages : en
Pages : 324
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